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Articles
The New Role of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
in American Death Penalty Law
Bruce S. Ledewitz*
I.

INTRODUCTION**

In Zant v. Stephens,' the United States Supreme Court announced a new role for statutory aggravating circumstances in
death penalty law.2 Prior to Stephens, it had been argued that the
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Yale University; Associate Professor of Law,
Duquesne University School of Law. The author is the director of the Allegheny County
Death Penalty Project.
** Much of the research for this article was conducted as part of an Allegheny County
Death Penalty Project summer investigation into state court interpretations of statutory
aggravating circumstances. I would like to thank the Duquesne University law students who
volunteered their time for this research, particularly Russ Broman. I would also like to
thank my research assistant, Judi Olmstead, for her help in the preparation of this article.
EDITOR'S NoTE: The reader should note that references to state statutes generally, and
statutory aggravating circumstances in particular, are based upon available state law compilations during the summer of 1983. By the time this article is printed, some of that law will
have changed and indeed, has probably changed already. The nature of these
changes-adding statutory aggravating circumstances, altering the definition of murder, or
generally redrafting death penalty provisions-are usually such that conclusions about the
overall shape of American death penalty law are unlikely to be affected. Thus, while the
reader should check specific references carefully, I trust that conclusions, whatever their
merits, will be unaffected by statutory tinkering.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
2. By statutory aggravating circumstances I refer to those circumstances surrounding a
defendant or a crime which a state legislature has indicated by formal enactment should be
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role of statutory aggravating circumstances was to provide the sentencer with factors to consider in arriving at a sentence of life or
death.' The States4 were free to select almost any kind of statutory
considered in deciding between a sentence of life or death. Statutory aggravating circumstances are utilized in different ways in state death penalty systems, see infra Part II, but
they all indicate factors the legislature deems particularly relevant in the determination of
the capital sentencer.
Stephens and Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983), held, inter alia, that one statutory aggravating circumstance must be found before a defendant may be considered for
death. This requirement had been suggested in prior cases. See infra notes 3 and 83 and
accompanying text. What was unclear before Stephens and Barclay was why the states were
required to adopt statutory aggravating circumstances. One possible explanation of this requirement was that in order to limit arbitrary outcomes, statutory aggravating circumstances were to circumscribe the universe of aggravating factors a capital sentencer could
consider. See infra notes 3 and 83-95 and accompanying text. That explanation was laid to
rest in Stephens' and Barclay's approval of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances as a
permissible basis for a death sentence. Justice Stevens suggested a new role for statutory
aggravating circumstances in Stephens: narrowing the pool of defendants eligible for death.
This article evaluates this role and assesses its implications.
3. Prior to Stephens, the controversy about statutory aggravating circumstances focused on whether their role was to provide the exclusive ground for capital sentencing decisions. Specifically, the argument concerned the validity of death penalties imposed based
solely or in part on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Several judicial opinions had
held, or at least suggested, that reliance upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution whether such consideration
was permissible under the relevant state statute or not. See, e.g., Moore v. Balkcom, 709
F.2d 1353, 1364-67 (11th Cir. 1983); Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593, 609 (11th Cir.
1983); State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 188, 654 P.2d 1170, 1182-84 (1982); Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1267 (11th Cir. 1982); Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56, 58-60
(5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2922, judgment reinstated, 686 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (for further
consideration in light of Barclay). State courts had also invalidated reliance by capital
sentencers upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, but generally upon the ground
that the state statute did not permit such reliance. See, e.g., Keller v. State, 380 So. 2d 926
(Ala. 1979); Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979); Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278
(Fla. 1979).
Judicial decisions on this question were not unanimous. Some courts anticipated correctly
the direction the U.S. Supreme Court would take in Stephens and Barclay and approved
reliance upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. See Harris v. Puley, 692 F.2d 1189,
1192 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1425 (1983); People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 402,
447 N.E.2d 218, 242 (1983); cf. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (1983) (jury
permitted to consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances). For further discussion of the
controversy over nonstatutory aggravation, see infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that the rejection of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances is not
related to the issue implicated directly in Stephens-the validity of affirming a sentence of
death when one or more statutory aggravating circumstances found by the sentencer were
applied in error and should not have been found. See Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982)
(question certified to Georgia Supreme Court). A death penalty might be affirmed in such a
case even while rejecting nonstatutory aggravation, either because a death sentence would
have resulted anyway (a harmless error rule) or, a subspecies of harmless error, because all
of the evidence that supported the death penalty would have been considered anyway under
a statutory aggravating circumstance found properly to apply. See generally Ford v. Strick-
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aggravating circumstance, 5 but the sentencer was to be limited to
considering those factors chosen. Stephens, and Barclay v. Florida6 held that, if a state so chooses, capital sentencers will be free
to consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in deciding
upon the proper sentence.7 The new constitutional role for statuland, 696 F.2d 804, 813-15 (11th Cir. 1983) (plurality opinion).
4. This article focuses exclusively upon state death penalty statutes. While there are
other death penalty statutes, see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472-1473 (death penalty for death resulting from aircraft hijacking) and 18 U.S.C. § 351 and § 1111 (death penalty for assassination of certain government officials), homicides have been traditionally, and remain primarily, governed by state law. This is so particularly in death penalty law. The NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. publication, Death Row, U.S.A., August 20, 1983 reports that of 1230 persons imprisoned under a sentence of death, all but 7 were sentenced
pursuant to state statutes.
5. There had not been much suggestion prior to Stephens that state selection of statutory aggravating circumstances might be restricted. In State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 628
P.2d 943, 944 (1981), the Supreme Court of Arizona suggested that Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420 (1980) represented a drastic limit upon which defendants could receive the death
penalty:
We believe Godfrey v. Georgia . . . mandates that the death penalty should be reserved for only the most aggravating of circumstances, circumstances that are so
shocking or repugnant that the murder stands out above the norm of first degree
murders, or the background of the defendant sets him apart from the usual murderer.
129 Ariz. at 63, 628 P.2d at 946. See also State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 198, 639 P.2d 1020 (1982).
This is essentially the view of Godfrey taken by Justice Stevens. See infra notes 142-45 and
accompanying text. But even in Watson, the Arizona Supreme Court did not view Godfrey
as a limit on state selection of statutory aggravating circumstances, but rather as background to its own role in reviewing the imposition of the death penalty in particular cases.
The Georgia Supreme Court, confronted with a proposed application of Godfrey to the aggravating circumstance of murder committed during a burglary, simply refused to consider
the argument seriously. Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982). The requirement that a murder or murderer be uniquely awful seems to have been applied only to
vague aggravating circumstances, such as "heinous atrocious or cruel." See Middleton v.
State, 426 So. 2d 548, 552 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983). At least one court has
refused to apply Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) as another substantive limit on
particular aggravating circumstances. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776 (1983). For discussion of
Enmund, see infra note 19-82 and accompanying text.
Commentators prior to Stephens had discussed the suggestion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) that the death penalty had been (and therefore perhaps should be) reserved
"for a small number of extreme cases." Id. at 182 (plurality opinion) (discussing jury capital
sentencing), and from such an idea it is a short step to the requirement of a hierarchy of
aggravation. See, e.g., Morris, Hans Mattick and the Death Penalty, 10 U. TOL. L. REv.
299, 311 (1979). Nevertheless it is a big step from such general recognition of the extreme
nature of the death penalty to the specific limitations on aggravating circumstance selection
suggested in Stephens.
6. 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
7. Nothing in Stephens or Barclay requires states to permit nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances to be considered by capital sentencers, as Justice Stevens mentioned in Stephens. 103 S. Ct. at 2743 n.17 (recognition that Arkansas and Pennsylvania do not admit
nonstatutory aggravation). The role of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances is now up to
each state.
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tory aggravating circumstances is to narrow the pool of defendants
eligible to be considered for death.
The radical element in the Court's formulation of the role for
statutory aggravating circumstances is that under it, the states are
no longer free to prescribe any statutory aggravating circumstances
they wish. A valid statutory aggravating circumstance must "genuinely narrow" the class of defendants and must "reasonably justify" the selection of some defendants for death rather than others.
The first part of this article argues that the quantitative and
qualitative requirements of Stephens represent a commitment by
the Court to the serious evaluation of state statutory aggravating
circumstances. The second part of the article is an attempt to begin the process of substantive evaluation, in an admittedly superficial way, of current state statutory aggravating circumstances.
What this article is not, is a prediction about what the Court will
do in future cases. The second part of the article suggests that the
requirement of good reasons for death, if taken seriously, would
throw into serious question much existing death penalty law. The
states do not have good reasons for selecting those persons they
have made eligible for death. Nevertheless, no observer of this
Court expects wholesale invalidation of state death penalty statutes. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Court will continue
to permit arbitrariness in the decision for death. Those of us who
see the death penalty as an ugly and irrational process must be
content to continue to show how impossible it is to treat it as
rational.
II.

STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THEORY

A.

Capital Crimes

Coker v. Georgias seems to represent the proposition that only
homicide can justify the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant.9 Justice White's plurality opinion10 held that the death
8. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
9. The issue of attempted murder will be addressed separately. See infra notes 67-73
and accompanying text. The plurality opinion of Justice White did not deal with the issue
of crimes threatening to the public at large, such as treason and airplane hijacking, but the
analysis used suggests that the death penalty would not be available for such crimes. See
infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. But see Recent Decisions, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 253,
267 (death penalty for these crimes is "conceivable" even after Coker). See also Eberhart v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (death penalty for kidnapping with bodily injury reversed).
10. Justice White was joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens. Justices
Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty is prohibited in all cases. 433 U.S.
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penalty for rape of an adult woman is "excessive" because it is
"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."11 Justice

White found disproportion in two sources: the judgment of society
and the judgment of the Justices. The "objective evidence" consisted of the refusal of most state legislatures to prescribe death
for the crime of rape and the refusal of most juries to impose it.'2
Justice White acknowledged that "in the end our own judgment"
must decide the issue of the proportionality of death for rape. 8
at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 600-01 (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, but would not have decided
whether "capital punishment always-regardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of rape." Id. at 601. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
Justice White did not expressly discuss the issue, and Coker has been viewed as leaving
open the issue of the death penalty for the rape of a child. See Recent Decisions, supra note
9, at 267 n.87. Nevertheless, there is sufficiently broad language in Justice White's opinion
to warrant Justice Powell's conclusion that Coker proscribes the death penalty for any rape.
See 433 U.S. at 592.
11. 433 U.S. at 592. Justice White defined a sanction as excessive if it is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime or "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment ...." Id. Although Justice White held the death penalty for rape of
an adult woman to be "grossly disproportionate and excessive," id., it may be presumed that
he is following the definition of excessive that he set forth a few lines before. Justice White
did not address in his opinion whether the death penalty for rape might serve the legitimate
goal of deterrence. See id. at 592-93 n.4.
12. Justice White stated that objective evidence, such as legislative enactments and
jury verdicts were helpful in determining the "country's present judgment" concerning the
death penalty for rape. Id. at 593. But it is not clear whether Justice White was looking for
guidance or justification for his own view that the death penalty is disproportionate for
rape, since he introduced his analysis with the unnerving observation that "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual
Justices .... " Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
In terms of an "objective" analysis, the opinion pointed out that most states never authorized death as a punishment for rape. Aside from Georgia, only Florida, Mississippi and
Tennessee, authorized death for rape as of 1977, and only in the case of rape of a child. Id.
at 595. Furthermore, at least ninety percent of the time, juries did not impose the death
penalty for rape. Id. at 596-97.
Such "objective" evidence of "present judgment" is not particularly persuasive. As Chief
Justice Burger's dissent argued, two other states had tried to impose death for rape, but
these statutes had been invalidated on the ground of mandatoriness. Id. at 615 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)). Moreover, the Georgia legislature obviously is a better reflection of public opinion, at least in Georgia, than is the Supreme Court. There is no reason
to think that death for rape, particularly under the circumstances of Coker, shocked the
public.
13. 433 U.S. at 597. "Decide" no doubt would be too strong a word for Justice White,
who preferred to say that the Justices' "own judgment" would "be brought to bear on the
question" of the constitutionality of the death penalty for rape. This is not the place for an
investigation into the meaning of Justice White's eighth amendment analysis. I do not wish
to be accused of accepting the premise, however, that statistics about statutes and jury verdicts could decide any legal issue in an "objective" way, that is without the use of someone's

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 22:317

The theory of proportion set forth by Justice White is simple:
The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over
for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so
happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We
have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which "is unique in its
severity and irrevocability" is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
such, does not take human life. 4

Chief Justice Burger's dissent objected to the "primitive simplicity" of "life for life." 15 He assumed that the Coker opinion stands
for the proposition that the death penalty can be imposed only for
crimes resulting in the death of the victim. 6 While Justice White
never says this as such, the fact that no one dies in rape is at the
heart of his disproportionality analysis quoted above.
Aggravating circumstances have no role to play in this brightline conclusion. The Georgia statute did not authorize death as a
punishment for rape alone, but only for a rape accompanied by at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Two statutory aggravating circumstances were found in Coker, first, a prior conviction
for a capital felony and second, the commission of the rape while
engaged in another capital felony (in this case armed robbery).
These circumstances did "not change the fact that the instant
1' 7
crime being punished is a rape not involving the taking of life." It
"judgment."
14. Id. at 598 (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 620 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White's theory of proportionality rests
entirely upon some notion of retribution, and, as Chief Justice Burger objects, not a very
sophisticated one at that. Id. This exclusive reliance upon retribution suggests a difference
under the eighth amendment between an "excessive" punishment, which is not justified by
any penal goal, see 433 U.S. at 592, and disproportionate one, which is apparently not justified in terms of retribution. A punishment which would deter future crimes, and hence
would not be excessive, can still be disproportionate. Id. at 592-93 n.4. Justice White subsumes these different ideas under "excessiveness." See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
16. Id. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). An important difference between the starting
points of the plurality and the dissent is Justice White's reliance upon a theory of retribution and Chief Justice Burger's willingness to consider as well the deterrence effect of the
death penalty for a crime such as rape, which causes severe harm to the victim. See supra
note 15.
17. Id. at 599. Justice White gave a specific reason for rejecting the robbery aggravating circumstance. Since the jury had sentenced Coker to life for the robbery, the robbery
thus was not deemed to merit death, and could not function as an aggravating circumstance.
Id. at 599. This conclusion illustrates the Court's confusion about the purpose of aggravating circumstances. What justifies capital punishment for a rape plus robbery as an aggravating circumstance may be, primarily, the rape. A juror who agrees that death is appropriate
in such a case is not committed to punishing robbery with death, even if other aggravating
circumstances, such as a bad record, are present. From the perspective of the juror, it is the
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appears that where there is no homicide, the death penalty may
not be imposed regardless of the aggravating circumstances that
may be present.
While Coker obviously is a significant case concerning the death
penalty for non-homicides, it did not determine whether the death
penalty is available when the murderer intends to kill, but death
does not occur.18 Nor did Coker address the question whether
death is a punishment always available when the victim does die,
including the issues of felony murder and the death penalty for
accomplices. These questions were addressed, however, in Enmund
v. Florida.0
In Enmund, the evidence showed that Sampson Armstrong and
Jeanette Armstrong planned to rob Thomas Kersey.20 Enmund apcrime, that serves as the primary justification on the imposition of death. It is not reasonable to discount robbery as an aggravating circumstance just because it is not a crime for
which jurors would impose the death penalty.
Justice White also discounted the third aggravating circumstance available in a rape case:
a rape that is "particularly vile or involves torture or aggravated battery." Id. at 599 n.16.
Justice White commented that the defendant could be "appropriately punished for this additional conduct." Id. In the context of permitting death only when the crime involves the
taking of life, it seems clear that "appropriately punished" does not refer to the death penalty, but rather to some other kind of punishment. But what punishment? Chief Justice
Burger's dissent objects that someone like Coker, who is a chronic murderer, escapee and
rapist, already imprisoned for the rest of his life, cannot be deterred by anything except,
perhaps, the prospect of a death sentence for future crimes. Id. at 605-06 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, Coker may be so dangerous, that the only way to ensure the end
of his criminal career is to kill him. Id. at 601. If Justice White means that conditions of
imprisonment may be used as a further punishment or that the absolute loss of the prospect
of freedom (a possible commutation, for example) could deter future criminal acts, or that
prisons can increase security measures for life prisoners like Coker to ensure that incapacitation is close to absolute, these arguments not only tend to undermine the death penalty as
a necessary punishment for aggravated rape, but also as a necessary punishment for murder.
There is obvious irony in the concept of a rape that is not "particularly vile." Since rape
generally involves force or the threat of force (notwithstanding invalid consent cases) the
absence of bruises and broken bones has more to do with a victim's decision to submit than
with any compunction of the rapist. Coker, for example, threatened to cut or kill his 16year-old victim with a knife if she did not submit. Id. at 587. She had given birth three
weeks earlier. Id. at 607 n.2. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Coker raped her in the presence of
her husband. Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He then abducted her, threatening to kill
her if he were apprehended. Id. at 609 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). While it is easy to
imagine even worse behavior by Coker, it is hard to see how this, or any, rape is not "particularly vile." Of course, this objection applies, as well to the requirement of aggravating circumstances for murder. See generally infra notes 135-59 and accompanying text.
18. The issue of attempted murder may appear to be precluded by Justice White's
analysis in Coker, but it is raised again in Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). See
infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
19. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
20. Id. at 3370. As will be indicated infra notes 21-22 & 33, the dissent disputed the
majority's description of what the evidence showed. The discussion in this section is pre-
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parently waited in a car while the Armstrongs approached the victim's house.2 1 Sampson Armstrong pointed a gun at the victim and
told Jeanette Armstrong to take Kersey's money. Mrs. Kersey
came out of the house with a gun to help her husband and shot
Jeanette Armstrong. Sampson then shot and killed both of the
Kerseys. 2 Enmund was convicted of the capital crime of murder in
the first degree based upon his aiding and abetting the crime of
robbery during the commission of which an unlawful killing of a
human being occurred.
In an opinion by Justice White,23 the Supreme Court reversed
the imposition of the death penalty, holding that the imposition of
death based upon vicarious liability for felony murder violates the
eighth and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution.24
mised upon the factual analysis of the majority since this basis provided the foundation for
the Court's legal conclusions in the case.
The majority opinion differed from the dissent over whether there had been an implicit
finding in the Florida Supreme Court that Coker planned the robbery. Compare 102 S. Ct.
at 3371 n.2 with id. at 3384-85 n.24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority opinion analyzed the legal issues from the perspective that because the planning of the robbery was not
a necessary element in Enmund's receiving the death penalty, whether in fact there was
planning of the robbery in this case was irrelevant to the issue of the constitutionality of
Enmund's death penalty.
21. There had been a dispute about just where Enmund was during the robbery. The
trial court concluded that Enmund was a triggerman; the Florida Supreme Court rejected
that finding and held that there was a "likely inference" that Enmund waited in the getaway car. 102 S. Ct. at 3371 & n.2. (citing Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370-1372 (Fla.
1982)).
22. 102 S.Ct. at 3370. The record was not clear as to whether Jeanette Armstrong also
shot the victim. Id.
23. Justice White's view of the necessity for consideration of personal culpability in a
homicide to justify imposition of the death penalty has been consistent. In addition to his
opinions in Enmund and Coker, he concurred in the reversal of death penalties in Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978), cases that also raised the
issue of vicarious liability for homicide in a death penalty case.
24. 102 S. Ct. at 3379. The Court stated, "Because the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty in this case in the absence of proof that Enmund killed or attempted to kill, and regardless of whether Enmund intended or contemplated that life
would be taken, we reverse." Id. Justice White described the basis for liability in Enmund
as "vicarious felony murder." Id. at 3377. By "vicarious," Justice White apparently meant
that the culpability of the Armstrongs was "attributed" to Enmund. In contrast to Justice
White's usage, vicarious liability in criminal law is a term reserved usually for the imposition of culpability upon a person who is without fault, such as an employer's criminal liability for the acts of his employee in the context of minor or civil offenses. See PERKINS AND
BovcE, CRIMINAL LAW, 911-14 (1982); LAFAvE AND ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, 22328 (1972). Enmund's culpability was not imposed on one who is without fault, even though
his fault was less than that of other persons involved in the homicide.
There is another sense in which one may question whether Enmund's culpability was "attributed" to him. The act of killing was attributed to Enmund. But just as there was no
necessity of a finding under Florida law that "Enmund had any intention of participating in
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Justice White engaged in an analysis similar to that in Coker,
but with different results. By the majority's count2 5 eighteen states
permitted the death penalty for a mere participant in a robbery
during which a murder occurs, at least if aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances.2 6 Since this number represented half of the jurisdictions authorizing the death penalty, and
more than a third of all the states, the Court's conclusion that the
legislative judgment "weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue," is unpersuasive. Of more aid to
the majority were statistics indicating that in the prior twenty-five
years, no one convicted of felony murder who did not kill, nor attempt to kill, nor intend to kill, had been executed.26 Additionally,
the 796 inmates on death row as of October 1, 1981, included only
three persons in Enmund's category. 9
As in Coker, Justice White indicated that the ultimate judgment
of disproportionality was one for the Justices, not simply one of
objective evidence. For Justice White, Enmund was like any other
robber. He did not deserve death because he did not kill nor did he
intend or anticipate that a killing would occur. Furthermore, capital punishment for Enmund served no valid penal functions.3 0 One
or facilitating a murder," 102 S. Ct. at 3377, there also was no necessity of such a finding for
the death penalty to be imposed on Sampson Armstrong. The felony-murder rule does not
require proof of such intent. Indeed the Florida Supreme Court held that the killings were
not planned but were "spontaneous" Armstrong v. State, 399 So. 2d 953, 963 (Fla. 1981).
See generally Hubbard, Burry and Widener, A "Meaningful"Basis For The Death Penalty:
The Practice, Constitutionaltiyand Justice of CapitalPunishment in South Carolina, 34
S.C.L. Rev. 391, 504 & n.656 (1982) (felony murder rule both supplies malice to the perpetrator and attributes liability for homicide to all participants in the felony). Accordingly,
culpability in the sense of intent to kill, or anticipation of death, was "attributed" similarly
to Armstrong and Enmund. Armstrong's involvement in the homicide obviously was very
different from that of Enmund, but the legal standard for first degree murder for Armstrong
required killing alone, and did not require any intent. For discussion of Armstrong's liability, see infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
25. The dissent characterized the state capital sentencing schemes differently and
found much more legislative support for the death penalty in a case such as Enmund than
did the majority. See 102 S. Ct. at 3388-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 3372-74.
27. Id. at 3374. Justice White admitted that this aspect of the "objective" evidence
was not as compelling as the legislative judgment in Coker, where the record showed that
only four states authorized capital punishment for rape. Id. at 3374 (referring to 433 U.S. at
596). If the point of this objective evidence is to demonstrate a general consensus against a
particular legislature's choice, one would suppose that a substantial legislative "difference of
opinion" would be fatal to the argument.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 3375-76.
29. Id. at 3375. Justice White also referred to international opinion on the death penalty for a non-triggerman in a felony murder case. Id. at 3376 n.22.
30. Id. at 3377-79. In Enmund, Justice White utilized an "excessiveness" analysis in
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who does not anticipate death cannot be deterred by the prospect
of the death penalty if a killing does occur.3 1 From the perspective
of retribution, Enmund's lack of intent to kill and the fact that he
did not kill must mitigate the punishment he deserves.
Based upon Justice White's opinion, it is possible to make some
suggestions as to the kind of culpability for homicide that must be
present before a defendant even may be considered for the death
penalty. The most obvious conclusion is that in the case of the perpetrator of a killing, if there is an intent to kill, the death penalty
may be appropriate. 2 It is not so clear what lesser mental state the
one who kills may possess and still be subject to death. Armstrong
killed under circumstances where an intent to kill readily could
determining whether the death penalty for Enmund served any penal goals. See supra note
15 and accompanying text. The death penalty was excessive in Enmund's case since, according to the excessiveness analysis of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (plurality
opinion), neither retribution nor deterrence are advanced by the penalty. Justice White also
appeared to state that insofar as Enmund is viewed as merely a robber, the death penalty
was invalidated along the disproportionality lines of Coker. Id. at 3377. Disproportion and
excessiveness are related in that retribution is crucial to each. But deterrence by itself is
insufficient to justify a disproportionate penalty.
31. It appears that Justice White assumed, for purposes of analysis, that Enmund did
not know that the Armstrongs would be armed. The majority opinion stated that the Florida Supreme Court rejected the finding that Enmund planned the robbery. 102 S. Ct. at
3371 n.2. Justice O'Connor assumed that Enmund was aware at least that armed robbery
was to be accomplished. Id. at 3384-85 n.23. The deterrence issue is affected by this distinction. Justice White says that deterrence is not served by sentencing to death one who does
not "contemplate that lethal force will be employed by others.
... Id. at 3377. But one
who is aware that his confederate will carry a deadly weapon is in a better position to anticipate that "lethal force will be employed" than one who thinks that only a purse-snatch is
planned. Since Justice White does not refer to these distinctions, it seems that deterrence is
not seriously the issue in Enmund, and that perhaps the case involved disproportionality
alone. Justice O'Connor discussed only blameworthiness in her analysis, which she labeled
one of "proportionality," id. at 3390, and dismissed arguments about penal goals as "legislative judgments." Id. at 3390-92 & n.42. See Hubbard, supra note 24, at 507 n.677.
32. See, e.g., State v. Richmond,
Ariz. , 666 P.2d 57 (1983) (Enmund does not
prohibit the death penalty for one who intends to kill and does kill). This does not mean,
however, that an intent to kill plus killing is always sufficient to justify the death penalty.
The killer who intends to kill is eligible for the death penalty under Enmund (I will refer to
those who may receive the death penalty under Enmund as "Enmund-eligible"). The Supreme Court has required in addition that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
must be found by the sentencer before the death penalty may be imposed. See infra note
166 and accompanying text. See generally notes 3, 85, and 87 and accompanying text. There
are other requirements that must be satisfied before the death penalty may be imposed,
including the opportunity for the defendant to introduce evidence of a wide range of mitigating circumstances. See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Enmund does not
affect these other requirements. The case does suggest, however, that the imposition of the
death penalty upon one who intends to kill and kills, is not per se disproportionate nor
excessive.
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have been found."3 In effect, Armstrong's crime was not felony
murder, 4 but an intentional killing perpetrated during a robbery.
Classic felony murder does not concern intentional killings. Generally, intentional killings qualify as murder without regard to
whether they are perpetrated during a felony.36 The major purpose
of the crime of felony murder is to reach negligent or accidental
killings that would not otherwise qualify as murder.3 " Assuming
33. It is not clear whether Armstrong's conviction rested on premeditated murder or
felony murder, both of which were classified as first degree murder. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
782.04(1)(a) (West 1973). The trial judge found in the sentencing phase that the killings
were premeditated. See Armstrong v. State, 399 So. 2d 953, 961 (Fla. 1981). The Florida
Supreme Court did not contradict this finding but did state that the killings were "spontaneous," id. at 963, which might seem to eliminate the common law element of premeditation. See Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868)(A killing is premeditated "if sufficient
time be afforded to enable the mind fully to frame the design to kill, and to select the
instrument, or to frame the plan to carry this design into execution.
...)
The significance of premeditation, however, as a requirement in addition to intent to kill
in defining first degree murder has been eroded by judicial decisions, including Drum, which
compress the time necessary to find premeditation, once an intent to kill is established. See
generally PERKINS AND BOYCE, supra note 24, at 131-33. In several states, Armstrong could
have been found guilty of first degree murder, because even a sudden decision to kill is
considered to be deliberate and premeditated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa.
224, 239-40 n.5, 352 A.2d 30, 37-38 & n.5. (1976) (premeditation and deliberation are present
whenever there is a conscious purpose to bring about death); see also Baker v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 193, 237 S.E.2d 88 (1977); State v. Bantista, 193 Neb. 576, 227 N.W.2d 835
(1975); but see State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. 260, 261, 620 P.2d 1285, 1286 (1980). Armstrong's
use of a deadly weapon against the victim would support a finding of intent to kill in many
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 441 Pa. 57, 61, 270 A.2d 195, 197
(1970); State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio St. 214, 233, 102 N.E.2d 11, 16 (1951). See generally
LAFAVE AND SCOTT, supra note 24, at 535-38. Intent-to-kill murder is normally included
within a state's highest degree of murder. See id. at 535.
34. The felony-murder rule as it was formulated in England was a doctrine of constructive malice. To make out a case of murder it was necessary only to establish that the
defendant had committed a homicide while engaged in the commission of a felony. No other
evidence had to be introduced to prove the essential element of malice aforethought. This
was the only function which the rule performed; it obviated the necessity of establishing
malice aforethought by other means.
COOK AND MARCUS, CRIMINAL LAW,

36-193 (1982). The literature is rich both in discussion of

felony murder generally, see, e.g., Westenfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice

Liability-Knowledge or Intent, 51 Miss. L.J. 155 (1980);

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL

LAW, 290-303 (1978); Note, Felony-Murder Rule-In Search of a Viable Doctrine,23 CATH.
LAW. 133 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Viable Doctrine); Alderstein, Felony-Murder in the
New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249, 257-67 (1976); Perkins, A Re-Examination of
Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 557-63 (1934); STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND, Vol. III, 56-57, 75-76 (1883); and in particular of capital felony murder.
See, e.g., Koenig, Capital Punishment Crimes of Murder, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 817 (1982);
Dressier, The Jurisprudence of Death By Another: Accessories and Capital Punishment,
51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17 (1979); Note, The Constitutionalityof Imposing the Death Penalty
For Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356 (1978).
35. See supra note 33.
36. See Viable Doctrine, supra note 34, at 135-36 n.4; Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in
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that Armstrong's conduct could justify the imposition of the death
penalty,3 7 it does not follow that felony murder, as such, would justify such a sentence. How would Justice White have analyzed a
case in which the robber, perhaps armed with only a realistic
plastic "gun," confronted the victim, who then died of a heart attack? 8 The opinions in Coker and Enmund do not permit a confident answer to this question. Justice O'Connor's dissent3 ' in Enmund characterized the defense position broadly, stating that
40
"death is an unconstitutional penalty absent an intent to kill."
Justice White countered this characterization by defining the issue
as whether the death penalty is disproportionate for one who "did
not kill, attempt to kill, [nor] intend to kill."' 41 The classic felony
murderer, like Enmund, does not attempt to kill nor intend to kill.
However, it may be said that the perpetrator who frightens his vicFelony Murder, 18 U. PiTr. L. REV. 51, 52 (1956); Crum, Casual Relations and the FelonyMurder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191, 203-09. It is true that the felony-murder rule is said
sometimes also to include the imposition of liability for the homicide upon all participants
in a felony, see Hubbard, supra note 24, but the Florida Supreme Court in Enmund was
probably correct in describing that result as coming not from the felony-murder rule itself,
but rather from the interaction of the felony-murder rule and "the law of principals," 399
So. 2d at 1369 (quoting Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765, 768-69 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 878 (1977)). Another undeniable effect of the felony-murder rule is to make it easier to
convict defendants of murder, because, among other things, intent to kill need not be
shown. While this effect is obvious, I cannot accept it as a purpose of the felony-murder
rule. See People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782-83, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442,
445 (1965).
37. Cf. Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1983) (Enmund does
not bar the death penalty for felony murder conviction in cases in which defendant "personally killed his victim, savagely beating him to death.") This is not to say that because a jury
could have made appropriate findings of culpability, the fact that such findings were irrelevant under state law and therefore were not made, makes no difference. See Smith v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3129 (1983) (denial of cert.) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and infra note 84.
38. Cf. State v. McKeiver, 89 N.J. Super. 52, 213 A.2d 320 (1965) (victim dies of fright
due to holdup in bar).
39. Justice O'Connor's opinion is referred to in the Supreme Court Reporter as a dissent, 102 S. Ct. at 3379. Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which she is joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissents only from Justice White's holding
concerning the availability of the death penalty for Enmund. Justice O'Connor would have
joined in a narrow judgment, a remand, because the trial judge did not consider Enmund's
relatively minor participation in the homicide as a mitigating circumstance. The trial judge
found that Enmund had planned the robbery and had shot the victims himself. 102 S. Ct. at
3393 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court rejected this finding by the trial
judge. Justice O'Connor would have remanded for a new sentencing hearing based upon the
Florida Supreme Court's view of the record and assumed that a new sentencing hearing
would be held under the majority's order as well, albeit under a different legal standard. Id.
at 3392 & n.43.
40. 102 S. Ct. at 3388.
41. Id. at 3376.
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tim to death has killed, unlike Enmund, and thus perhaps could
receive the death penalty.
Nevertheless, there are strong indications in Justice White's
opinion in Enmund that the classic felony murderer could not receive the death penalty. First, Justice White affirms that "[ilt is
fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished
more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' ," In
classic felony murder, the death of the victim is not intentional. In
fact, a serious attempt may be made to avoid the death of the
victim.

43

A second reason that the death penalty could not be imposed on
the classic felony murderer is that the penal goals of general deterrence and retribution are not served by giving such a person the
death penalty. 44 Enmund could not be deterred by the prospect of

the death penalty for the death of the victim because he did not
"contemplate that lethal force [would] be employed."' 45 This is true
as well in felony murder. When death is an accident, no one will
anticipate death as a likelihood. Justice White adds that statistics
show that robbery is not so dangerous that the death penalty is
necessary to deter robbery itself. 46 This observation, however accurate, applies equally to the vicarious felony murderer and to the
felony murder perpetrator. In terms of retribution, culpability
must be tied to intention. Enmund's culpability must be limited to
his intent to rob. But, of course, the felony murder perpetrator also
intends only to rob. If retribution must be tempered for Enmund,
it should be similarly tempered for felony murderers generally.
There is yet another reason to conclude that Enmund spells the
end of felony murder as a crime for which the death penalty may
42. Id. at 3377 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968)).
43. See, e.g., State v. Meadows, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932) (defendant guilty
of murder in death of victim from fire he helped to set, although at the time the arson was
plotted plans were made to remove persons from the building, and although defendant endeavored to help people from the building once the fire was discovered).
44. I should say that they are not served to the same extent that they are not served in
Enmund's case. It is not clear to me that deterrence, for example, if it is ever served, would
not be accomplished by imposing the death penalty upon Enmund. See supra note 32. See
generally infra notes 67, 199-209 and accompanying text.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
46. Id. at 3378 (citing statistics demonstrating the relative infrequency of homicide
resulting from the commission of a "dangerous" felony). Justice White may be suggesting
here that a felony could be committed in a manner so reckless, that the felony could become
sufficiently dangerous to justify the death penalty when death results. See, e.g., State v.
Wallace, 333 A.2d 72 (Me. 1975). This type of restriction of felony murder is one among
many statutory reforms that limit the reach of the felony-murder rule. See Viable Doctrine,
supra note 34, at 135-50.
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be considered. Justice White stated that Enmund may not receive
the death penalty because he did not kill nor attempt to kill nor
intend to kill. But in classic felony murder, it is not clear that any
participant "kills" in the sense Justice White intends. Consider the
perpetrator armed with a plastic gun who enters a bar causing a
patron to die of a heart attack. What does it mean to say that the
perpetrator "killed" the patron? What is meant is that, but for the
robbery, the patron would not have died and that it is appropriate
in this sense to hold the perpetrator liable for the death. 7 Under
this analysis, an accomplice who drove the perpetrator and waited
outside in the car should be equally liable. The driver causes death
to the same extent as the one who enters. Both driver and perpetrator intend to rob, and the presence of both is necessary to a
successful robbery. Both affirm the use of a plastic gun, knowing,
or negligently oblivious to the possibility, that a patron may be
frightened to death. If Enmund establishes that the driver cannot
receive the death penalty, it ought to follow that the perpetrator of
felony murder also may not receive it. Armstrong may receive the
death penalty but not
for felony murder; he may receive it because
48
he intended to kill.

A conclusion that the death penalty may be considered as punishment for the crime of intentional killing, but not for felony murder, does not exhaust the universe of culpable mental states. 49
American jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for a wide variety of culpable mental states accompanying homicide, including
recklessly killing, 50 knowingly killing" and the manifestation of extreme indifference to life.52 This latter standard is the traditional
47. See PERKINS AND BOYCE, supra note 24 and infra note 66.
48. For discussion of the argument that Armstrong's arguable panic during the robbery does not amount to intent to kill, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
49. Perhaps the most basic mental category not present in the distinction between
intentional killing and felony murder is malicious killing. A homicide committed with malice
aforethought is the traditional, common law, definition of murder. See PERKINS AND BOYCE,
supra note 24, at 57. But malice, intent to kill and felony murder are not at all equivalent.
See Hancock, The Perils of Calibratingthe Death Penalty Through Special Definitions of
Murder, 53 TUL. L. REV. 828, 856-58 (1979). Nor is it easy to sort out the application of
Enmund to the various gradations of malicious killings. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2)(6) (1979 & Supp. 1983) ("recklessly" or
"with criminal negligence").
51. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (Supp. 1983) ("intentionally or knowingly");
see also ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 38, 1 9-1(a)(3); I 9-1(b)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (intent to
cause, 'or knowledge of "strong probability of death or great bodily harm").
52. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(1)(a) (1977 & Supp. 1983) ("extreme indifference
to ... life"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1982) ("extreme indifference
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definition of murder: a malicious killing, 53 which would include an
intent to kill, intent to inflict great bodily harm or demonstrating a
"depraved heart." 54
Can the death penalty be considered for malicious killings where
the defendant did not intend to kill, but perhaps intended to do
great harm, or was indifferent as to whether death resulted? Justice White's opinions in Coker and Enmund do not provide adequate conceptual categories to answer this question.5" In terms of
culpability, the malicious killer does not necessarily intend death.
to life" plus "wanton[]" conduct).

53. See PERKINS AND BOYCE, supra note 24, at 57 ("at common law and traditionally in
the United States murder is homicide committed with malice aforethought"). The "aforethought" aspect of this definition, in the sense of a contemplated plan, has long since been
lost as a restriction in the definition of murder. See id., at 58. The remaining element, malice, may be either express, or implied. LaFave and Scott argue that the term "implied malice" covers all categories of murder in which there exists no premeditated intent to kill:
unreasonable heat of passion, felony murder, extreme negligence, and intent to do serious
bodily harm. LAFAVE AND Scorr, supra note 24, at 529. The Michigan Supreme Court has
decided that only three of these four categories contained any evidence of malice, and eliminated felony murder from the category of murder, defined as at common law as a malicious
homicide. See People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). It may be more
simple to just say that malice is not an element of felony murder, but that felony murder is
a crime separate from malicious killing.
54. The idea of "depraved heart" killing as murder, see, e.g., COOK AND MARCUS,
supra note 34, at 6-166-67, is derived from the definition of malice as including "every case
where there is wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty .... " Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16
(1868). Intent to kill and intent to harm clearly satisfy the definition, but so does an action
of extreme negligence, such as throwing a large stone from a tall building. See LAFAVE AND
ScoTT, supra note 24, at 529. See generally, Napier v. State, 357 So. 2d 1001, 1007-08 (Ala.
App. 1977) ("Depraved heart murder" requires a greatly dangerous act and an extreme indifference to the likely consequences).
55. Justice White's concurrence in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 621 (1978) and Bell
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 643 (1978), provides insight into this question that the more authoritative opinions in Coker and Enmund do not. In both Lockett and Bell, the defendant condemned to death had been an accomplice in a killing during the course of a felony: robbery
and kidnapping respectively. In neither case, however, was there any finding that the defendant knew that a killing would take place, and in Lockett, the gun had gone off when the
robbery victim grabbed it. Id. at 590. Justice White argued that both death sentences should
be reversed, because "it violates the eighth amendment to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim." Id.
at 624. Justice White found the penalty of death absent a purpose to kill to be both disproportionate and excessive; i.e., it makes no significant contribution to the goals of punishment. Id. at 626. It may be argued that malicious killings, such as firing a gun at a crowded
school bus, are not unintentional in the sense Justice White may intend, and in the sense of
the almost accidental killing in Lockett. Certainly, it can be said reasonably that malicious
killings of the school bus variety can be deterred. Justice White's failure to recognize any
such distinctions in his Lockett and Bell concurrence, suggests either that he did not consider the issue, or that he determined that a conscious purpose to kill should always be a
prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 22:317

He intends to hurt, or does not care whether he kills or not, as in
the case of shooting a bullet into a room occupied by several people 66 or into a moving car. Such a mental state, though clearly
worse than that of the perpetrator of classic felony murder, need
not be as vicious as that of the intentional killer. For example, the
malicious killer may try to take precautions to avoid death if possible, as in the case of a terrorist, wishing to blow up a corporate
no one
headquarters, who sets the bomb on New Year's day hoping
58
will be present. Such a person is still guilty of murder.
Justice White's comments about deterrence and retribution59
suggest, however, that malice is a sufficient ground for the imposition of the death penalty when death results, at least when the
actor actually is aware of the extreme risk of death. The person
who is aware that death is fairly likely to occur can be deterred, at
least in theory, 60 from taking the risk.61 In terms of retribution,
Enmund did not intend to kill, and perhaps neither does the malicious killer. But Enmund did not intend even to injure; nor was
Enmund necessarily even willing to injure seriously. 62 The malicious killer, at least if he recognizes the risk, is willing to kill. One
56. See Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 649, 40 S.W.2d 261, 262 (1931) and People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
57. See Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 P. 869 (1918).
58. See PERKINS AND BOYCE, supra note 24, at 59-60. It is not clear whether a subjective realization of the risk one is creating is required for a murder conviction, or whether it
is sufficient that a reasonable person would have appreciated the risk. See LAFAvE AND
ScoTT, supra note 24, at 544-45.
59. See 102 S. Ct. at 3377-79 (Enmund's execution would not contribute to penal
goals, because one who has no intention that death will result cannot be deterred by punishment for a death, and because one who intends only to rob has the moral culpability of a
robber, not a murderer). Justice White's discussion in Coker is not as clearly relevant, but
Justice White did emphasize in Coker that the defendant did not take life, 433 U.S. at 598,
while the malicious killer does take life.
60. There are significant criticisms of deterrence that cast doubt on the usefulness of
this theory. See generally infra notes 201-12, and accompanying text. Such considerations
are beyond the scope of this article.
61. The robber is unaware that such severe sanctions may occur because he does not
expect death to result. The aware, malicious killer does know that there is a significant
likelihood of the victim's death, and thus a significant threat of the sanction of death. On
the other hand, there can be situations in which a person creates an obviously dangerous
Ariz. , 665
situation but does not expect death to result. See State v. McDaniel, P.2d 70 (1983) (locking victim in trunk of a car). In such an instance, it may be said that the
perpetrator did not appreciate the risk.
62. This could be the case even if Enmund had known that the Armstrongs would be
armed. While the presence of a gun increases the risk that a shooting will occur, it does not
increase that risk as much if the perpetrator is unwilling to use the gun. Enmund might
have received such assurances directly, or might have assumed that the Armstrongs did not
intend to kill.

1984

Death Penalty

who creates a serious risk and does not care about the consequences,
is sufficiently culpable to compare to one who kills for a
63
reason.

Nevertheless, creation of a risk of death by one who, for
whatever reason, does not appreciate the risk would not seem to
satisfy Justice White's requirements to be considered for the death
penalty. Enmund, who cannot receive the death penalty, created a
risk of death, albeit a small one, by participating in a robbery. A
malicious killing, for example, throwing a heavy stone onto a busy
highway, creates a much greater risk of death than does committing a robbery. However, if one is too stupid or too drunk to understand the risk, the retributive and deterrence issues concerning the
killing are similar to those of a robbery.6 4 It may be significant in
this regard that in Enmund, Justice White omits incapacitation of
dangerous persons as a justification for the death penalty including
only retribution and deterrence. 6 Retribution and deterrence do
not justify liability for murder for one who kills without understanding the risk. 6
63. One state, Nevada, considers killing without motive to be an aggravating circumstance. See infra note 286 and accompanying text. The culpability of the malicious killer
differs from the culpability present in Coker and Enmund both in terms of the harm caused
by the defendant and the subjective intent of the defendants. See Dressler, supra note 34,
at 32-33 (proportionality under the eighth amendment requires consideration of harm
caused and blameworthiness). But see State v. McDaniel, Ariz. __,
665 P.2d 70
(1983) (while creation of an extreme risk of death that leads to death establishes that one
has killed, and thus satisfies Enmund, the absence of an intent to kill undermines the goals
of retribution and deterrence to such an extent that the death penalty is not appropriate).
64. The drunk or stupid person is not "reckless" under the Model Penal Code, which
requires that the person "consciously disregard[ ]" the risk. Such a person may be considered "negligent," because that standard of care refers to the hypothetical "reasonable person." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) and (d) (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955). The point is not
that negligence is an unacceptable ground for the imposition of criminal sanctions, most
people can be more careful, after all, but that the case for the imposition of punishment
upon such persons is not relevantly different from the case for punishing Enmund.
65. See 102 S. Ct. at 3377-79. In limiting consideration of penal goals to deterrence
and retribution, Justice White suggested he was following the plurality opinion in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). It should be noted that Gregg did include "incapacitation of
dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may commit in the
future." Id. at 183 n.28. See generally infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. Incapacitation is not always included as a goal of punishment. See Gerber and McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey of Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 491, 523-25 (1967). Professor Hart condemned the ideal of segregating those dangerous persons whose behavior
threatens society as, potentially, "cruelty" because it disassociated sanction from wrongdoing. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 41 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407-08 & n.19
(1958). Professor Hart argued that one who is genuinely unaware of the risk he threatens is
not appropriately punished unless he has "knowingly [gone] counter to a valid legislative
determination that the risk he is taking is excessive ....
" Id. at 416.
66. This discussion does not, and is not intended to, exhaust the realm of mental
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If a lesser mental state, such as malice, is perhaps sufficient to
justify the death penalty, it may seem anomalous to suggest that
the mental state associated with attempted murder, generally an
intent to kill,6 7 does not justify the death penalty. In terms of either retribution or deterrence, the one who attempts to kill but
fails is a better candidate for the death penalty than is the malicious killer. Justice White might have been suggesting in Enmund
that the attemptor is eligible for death. But it is unlikely that
states and homicides. Justice O'Connor is correct in pointing out the complexity of assessing
culpable mental states from a single legal standard. See 102 S. Ct. at 3391-92. One particularly intriguing issue is the suggestion in Hubbard, supra note 24, that Enmund provides
"some support" for the proposition that the death penalty is disproporti6nate for an armed
robber who decides before the robbery not to shoot the victim, but who panics and shoots
the victim fatally. Id. at 514-17. A variety of considerations are urged for this position, the
most important of which is that such spontaneous shootings probably are undeterrable because they are unplanned and that the moral culpability for such an act does not compare to
that of the calculated, planned killing.
Considerations such as these raise serious issues about which defendants should receive
the death penalty, some of which will be addressed within. See infra notes 229, 247-49 and
accompanying text. In fact, the very nature of such panic shootings, which are eligible for
the death penalty in South Carolina, Hubbard supra note 24, at 512-13, leads the authors to
question the coherencn of a scheme of statutory aggravating circumstances under which a
planned killing does not justify the death penalty, but an unplanned killing during a felony
may justify a sentence of death. Id. at 516.
There is not an obvious answer under Enmund to the problem of the panic-shooter. Evidence of panic or terror may be admissible in a murder case on the general issue of intent to
kill. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 279-81, 336 A.2d 282, 285-87 (1975). On the
other hand, the Florida Supreme Court did not have much difficulty upholding Sampson
Armstrong's death penalty for a "spontaneous" killing, Armstrong v. State, 399 So. 2d 953,
962 (1981) and the Georgia Supreme Court has recently affirmed the death penalty for a
killing which occurred when the defendant was "discovered during the commission of a burglary." Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 878, 295 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1982). Pointing out that the
irrational acts of a disturbed minority cannot be deterred does not weaken the claim of
deterrence. Deterrence theory concentrates not on those who commit crimes, who are almost
by definition undeterrable, but on the larger number who do not engage in criminal behavior. See Wolfgang, The Death Penalty, Social Philosophy and Social Science Research, 14
CRIM. L. BULL. 18, 51 (1978); Goldberg, On Capital Punishment, 85 ETHICS 67, 69 (1974).
Accordingly, there may well be those in society who will hear that a person has been executed for killing during the commission of a felony, who will then either give up armed
robbery or will take extra precautions. This may seem an uncertain basis upon which to
uphold executing someone, but it is true to the theory of deterrence. See also infra note 235.
67. See, e.g., Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395, 398-99 (1935) (attempted murder requires intent to kill even though murder conviction does not require intent to kill). See also State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219, 222-23 (W.Va. 1978). There are
other, generally accepted, elements of attempted murder, such as, for example, a direct ineffectual act done toward the commission of the offense, see, e.g., Thacker v. Commonwealth,
134 Va. 767, 769, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (1922), which fails to accomplish its goal because of
circumstances independent of the defendant. See, e.g., Howard v. Commonwealth, 207 Va.
222, 228-29, 148 S.E.2d 800, 804 (1966).
68. Because he thinks he will kill, the attemptor is subject to deterrence to the same
extent as is the killer who intends to. One who tries to kill and fails, seems just as morally
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Justice White, who held in Coker that rape of an adult does not
justify the death penalty because "life . . . isnot over,''69 would
discount death of the victim as a prerequisite for the death penalty, by a hint, five years later. Justice O'Conner's dissent characterizes Coker as requiring that the appropriateness of the death
penalty be judged from both perspectives of harm to the victim
and blameworthiness.70 The death penalty for attempted murder
would eliminate the tie between the death penalty and any harm
to the victim at all, or even knowledge by a victim that the attempt took place.7 1 In any event, capital punishment for attempt
would probably flounder on the objective analysis utilized in Coker
7 2
and Enmund.

culpable as one who succeeds. The attemptor may not be as dangerous because he is inept,
but Justice White does not count incapacitation as a factor in death penalty analysis. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text. The above analysis assumes that it is possible to
distinguish the culpable defendant whose attempt to murder is thwarted by circumstances
beyond his control, from the innocent defendant who, after considering the crime, decides
not to go forward. Responsibility for the failure of an attempt is not always easy to establish, however. See Note, Why Do Criminal Attempts Fail? A New Defense, 70 YALE L.J. 160
(1960).
69. Justice White stated that Enmund could not be sentenced to death "in the absence of proof that Enmund killed or attempted to kill" or "intended [to kill] or contemplated that life would be taken .... " 102 S.Ct. at 3379. This formulation suggests that if
there is proof that a defendant attempts to kill, the death penalty may not be disporportionate and excessive. Since the "attempt-to-kill" language could have been eliminated from
the Enmund opinion without altering the outcome, its inclusion might represent a hint by
Justice White. It is unclear why Justice White included attempting to kill in his list of
factors justifying the death penalty. It may have been a reference to the peculiar evidentiary
record in the case.
Under Florida law, Enmund's conduct concerning the homicide was irrelevant, beyond
sitting in the car. 102 S. Ct. at 3372. Thus Enmund's actual involvement in the homicide
was never clarified. Justice White's reference to attempting might have represented a suggestion that evidence of Enmund's conduct at the robbery, handling a gun perhaps, certainly firing a gun at the victim, would justify the death penalty without the necessity of findings on the issue of mental state, if the victim in fact dies. Cf. State v. Richmond,
- Ariz.
- 666 P.2d 57, 62-63 (1983) (assisting in acts intended to cause death sufficient to affirm
death penalty). If this analysis is sound, felony murder may serve as a predicate crime for
the death penalty where it is shown that each participant either kills or attempts to kill. If
evidence of conduct at the commission of the felony is lacking for a particular confederate,
evidence of that confederate's mental state must be introduced to show at least an awareness that lethal force would be used.
70. 433 U.S. at 598.
71. 102 S. Ct. at 3390-91. Cf. Dressier, supra note 34.
72. Attempted murder does not require that the victim suffer any particular effect as

long as the attempt was made. See generally HALL,

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

217-21, 585-86 (1960). If the perpetrator's shot misses, it does not matter whether the bullet
struck a nearby tree or instead strikes the victim in a non-vital part of the body. The crime
is attempted murder in either event. Nor, unlike "apprehension of harm" assault, is there
any requirement that the victim be aware of the attempted murder while it is occurring. Cf.
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A final consideration with respect to culpability is the one most
directly implicated by Enmund - liability for the accomplice to a
homicide. In this regard, Justice White's insistence that "punishment must be tailored to . . . personal responsibility and moral
guilt"73 suggests that the death penalty can never be imposed for
accomplice liability as such, but must always be imposed based
upon the individual culpability of each participant.
There are three types of accomplices 74 in nonaccidental killings
perpetrated 'during felonies. 7 5 First, there is the accomplice who affirms an intention to kill either because he is aware that the perpetrator intends to kill the victim, 76 or because he participates actively in the conduct which leads to death.77 Consideration of the
death penalty in the case of such an accomplice does not violate
Enmund because such a person intends to kill, does kill, attempts
to kill, or, at least, contemplates that life will be taken. The second
type of accomplice liability is pure felony-murder liability, in
which the accomplice is culpable only to the extent of the underlyLAFAVE AND SCOTT, supra note 24, at § 82, 611-12.

73. The Court utilized "objective factors" 433 U.S. at 592, in assessing the proportionality of capital punishment for a particular crime. The factors generally referred to are legislative judgments and jury sentencing determinations. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 597 and Enmund v. Florida, 102 S.Ct. at 3385-86.
The death penalty as a sanction for attempted murder has an undeniably long history.
Attempted murder was not abolished as a capital crime in Great Britain until 1861. See
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, Vol. I, 475 (1883). Nevertheless,
statistics compiled by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., indicate that
prior to the revolution in death penalty law begun in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), not one state punished attempted murder with death, although assaults by prisoners
were designated capital offenses. See e.g., ARIM. REV. STAT. § 12-250 (1956); COLO. REv.
STAT., § 40-7-49 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4710.2 (1962), (a wide variety of non-homicides were defined as capital offenses, most notably robbery kidnapping, treason and rape.)
See BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 43-54 (1974).
74. 102 S.Ct. at 3378.
75. The accomplice analysis in the discussion that follows is not relevant if a
subordinate participant in criminal activity does himself pull the trigger. His liability is then
as a killer rather than as an accomplice. See supra notes 32-68 and accompanying text. See
also State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, __
655 P.2d 70, 81-82 (1983); State v. Koon, 298
S.E.2d 769 (1982).

76. If the killing is truly accidental, neither the perpetrator, nor anyone else, is eligible
for the death penalty. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
77. See Smith v. State, 659 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Okla. 1983) (defendant knew that confederate set trunk afire with victim in it). See also Ruffin v. State, 420 So. 2d 591, 594 (Fla.
1982) (defendant knew victim was to be killed and, afterward, continued in criminal partnership with perpetrator). It is not clear whether the legal standard applied in Ruffin is that
the defendant shared the perpetrator's intent, or that by his active participation he ratified
the killing.
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ing felony. 78 Enmund bars the death penalty in such a case, but it
is not clear how much more involved than was Enmund the accomplice may be and still be protected. 9 The third type of accomplice
is one who is present, and is aware of a likelihood that the victim
may be killed, but who does not participate at all in the homicidal
conduct.8 0 Though the eligibility of such a defendant for the death
penalty is unclear under Enmund, the standard in such a case
should be the same indifference to life standard of malice that
could justify the death penalty in the absence of felony murder.
Helping someone rob who may kill during the robbery presents an
issue not much different from the callous creation of any other ex78. See Ex Parte Raines, 429 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Ala. 1982) (accomplice liable for death
penalty if he aids and abets the killing). See also State v. Richmond, 666 P.2d 57, 62-63
(1983). Richmond, like Ruffin, 420 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1982), illustrates how difficult the gradations of accomplice liability can be in the death penalty context. By one version of the facts,
the defendant knocked the victim unconscious and threw rocks at the victim, but was not in
the car when the victim was run over, which was the conduct that caused death. The Supreme Court of Arizona was willing to affirm the death penalty for the defendant on these
facts but it is not clear whether the legal standard being applied was one of malice
("[a]ppellant . . . was willing to leave the wounded and unconscious victim alone in the
desert..."),
Ariz. at __
, 666 P.2d at 63, or that the defendant encouraged the killing
by his failure to protest and thus ratified the killing ("[t]here is no evidence that appellant
protested or showed any emotion when the victim was twice run over.") Id.
79. See People v. Sims, 136 Cal. App. 3d 942, 186 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1983) (unplanned
shooting during a felony does not establish intent to kill by defendant who aided in commission of the felony).
80. See State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1982) (death penalty affirmed where
defendant held gun on one of the victims); Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 812, 295 S.E.2d 63
(1982) (death penalty affirmed where defendant held gun, threatened victim, and stood next
to the one who shot the victim), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1236 (1983). The legal standard
employed in these participation cases seems to be that the defendant participated more
actively in the commission of the felony than did Enmund. This is not a proper legal standard because, under Enmund, participation in the underlying felony itself is irrelevant to
the issue of eligibility for the death penalty. It is clear that Justice White's opinion in Enmund does not turn on the fact that Enmund was not at the murder scene, but was in the
getaway car. The relevant question for Justice White was whether Enmund intended that
"lethal force" be used, 102 S. Ct. at 3376-77, or anticipated that life be taken. Id. at 3379. It
is not clear whether Justice White means in the case of intent, that an accomplice must
share an intent to kill, or whether he is referring to an intent to carry lethal weapons which
could be used. Nor is it clear whether Justice White means that "anticipating that life be
taken" differs from "intending that lethal force be used." See Hubbard, supra note 24, at
507-08 n.677. It seems to me that the proper standard to distinguish mere participation in
the underlying felony from conduct during the felony that implicates a defendant in the
homicide, is a finding of shared intent or ratification by encouragement, passive or active, in
the killing. See Ritter v. State, 375 So. 2d 270, 274 (Ala. 1979) (accomplice is one who encourages or supports killing), vacated, 448 U.S. 903 (1980), on remand, 403 So. 2d 154
(1981). Thus in Johnson, the involvement of the defendant was so great that a finder of fact
could have found either shared intent to kill, or approval of the killing, and thus shared
responsibility. Of course, legally sufficient facts are not helpful if the finder of fact has not
been instructed to apply the proper legal standard. See supra note 38 and infra note 82.
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tremely dangerous situation, and could be analyzed in the same
way. Justice White's opinion in Enmund certainly does not bar
such an outcome."1
It is clear that Coker and Enmund have limited in a dramatic
way the universe of capital crimes. Only expressly malicious killers
may be considered for the death penalty. Not all malicious killers
are eligible for death, however. The Supreme Court requires as
well that a statutory aggravating circumstance be found by the
sentencer before the death penalty may be imposed. 2
B.

Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Prior to Zant v.
Stephens: The Only Reasons for Death

To understand the new role of statutory aggravating circumstances in American death penalty law, the reader must appreciate
first the role of exclusivity for such circumstances that now has
been rejected. 3 Stephens and Barclay held that statutory aggra81. In this type of case, for example, an accomplice might be present and even be
holding a gun when the perpetrator fires his gun, perhaps to aid in the escape. Such facts
would not tend to show shared intent to kill, nor ratification of the killing, though such a
person is guilty of murder nevertheless, because of the felony-murder rule and accomplice
liability for the acts of others in furtherance of the felony. See People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48,
201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332-33, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738-39 (1960) (felony-murder rule not applicable
where killing is not in furtherance of the felony).
82. This standard does not mean that participation in a robbery in which someone will
be armed automatically qualifies a defendant for the death penalty, though Justice White's
opinion is unclear about Enmund's knowledge on this point. See supra note 32. Justice
White does discuss, however, the risk that one creates by participating in a robbery and
suggests that the extent of this risk is a relevant consideration: "[i]t would be very different
if the likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one should
share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony." 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
But participating in a robbery with someone who is known to kill victims, or who says
before the robbery, "I will kill them if they move" or indicates that perhaps he will kill,
creates a much more substantial risk of death than does a simple robbery, or even an armed
robbery. The standard here should be the extent of the risk of death that the defendant
created. See People v. Davis, 447 N.E.2d 353, 378 (1983) (death penalty affirmed because
defendant "must have anticipated the killing of the victim in the instant case.") In such a
case, as in the other accomplice cases, proper instructions to the jury assume great importance. Whatever the facts, a general verdict of guilty of felony murder will not give the
defendant the benefit of the requirements of Enmund. See State v. McDaniel, 665 P.2d 70,
81 (1983) (Arizona first degree felony murder conviction does not adequately ensure that
Enmund-required culpability level was present; death penalty affirmed on facts in record);
Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75, 76-77 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 697 F.2d
699 (5th Cir. 1983) (death penalty reversed because jury instructed that defendant's intent
to kill could be inferred from act of robbery co-conspirator). Cf. Davis, (felony-murder verdict upheld where fact showed Enmund to be inapplicable).
83. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983) and Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418
(1983) have expressly stated the constitutional requirement of the presence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance before a defendant may be sentenced to death or even exposed to
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vating circumstances are not the only reasons for which a sentencer may impose a death penalty. Those cases approved the use
of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing. 4
In the next section I will discuss those holdings. In this section, I
will outline briefly why exclusive reliance upon statutory aggravating circumstances in sentencing had been thought by some to be
the constitutional role of statutory aggravating circumstances mandated by prior cases.8 5
Discussions of death penalty law usually commence with
Furman v. Georgia."6 Suffice it to say here that Furman invalia capital sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, it had been suggested widely in the legal literature prior to Stephens and Barclay that such a finding was required by the eighth amendment. Some commentators found this requirement to be an "unarticulated premise" of the
plurality opinion of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See Note, Resurrection of Capital Punishment - The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 543, 555 (1977); Recent
Decision, Coker v.Georgia: DisproportionatePunishment and the Death Penalty for Rape,
78 COL. L. REV. 1714, 1720 n.34 (1978); Note, The Bitter Fruit of McGautha: Eddings v.
Oklahoma and the Need for Weighing Method ArticulationIn Capital Sentencing, 20 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 63, 72 (1982). Professor Gillers, on the other hand, found this implied holding
in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
23-24 (1980).
The dispute prior to Stephens and Barclay was not so much over whether statutory aggravating circumstances were required, but rather over the question why they were required.
See supra note 3. Clearly, statutory aggravating circumstances served to distinguish those
murder cases which might warrant the death penalty from those that, according to legislative judgment, did not. See Gillers, supra. Cf. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 38, 609 P.2d 468, 505 (1980) (purpose of special circumstances is to "provide a
rational basis for distinguishing between those murderers who deserve to be considered for
the death penalty and those who do not"). But it was never clear that existing statutory
aggravating circumstances identified particularly blameworthy conduct; see Recent Decision: Coker v. Georgia, supra, harmful effects, Dressier, supra note 34, at 42-43, or special
deterrability, Hubbard, supra note 24, at 563. The idea that statutory aggravating circumstances might serve only as a "threshhold" determination casts further doubt on the capital
punishment system's capacity to identify through statutory aggravating circumstances particularly appropriate cases. Id. at 479, 563.
84. For prior cases that discussed the permissibility of considering nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing, see supra note 3.
85. This section does not address the issue of "harmless error" as it relates to the issue
of reliance upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. When a death penalty is affirmed
despite an erroneous finding under state law of a statutory aggravating circumstance, there
has been in effect, reliance upon a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. A harmless error
rule, however, by affirming such a death penalty only upon a finding that a death sentence
would have been returned in any event, obviates the effect of the nonstatutory aggravating
circumstance. See Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983).
Another question not addressed herein is whether, despite the constitutionality after Stephens and Barclay of considering nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, is might still be
arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional for a state which by state law does not permit nonstatutory aggravating circumstances to be considered, to allow such consideration nevertheless, in a particular case. See Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1983).
86. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman is the case generally regarded as the "foundation of
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dated the death penalty as it existed in 1972 on the ground that
capital sentencing was arbitrary, by which was meant that of many
similarly situated defendants, a few would receive the death penalty while most would not. Unlimited sentencer discretion was said
to be at the heart of the problem. 8 7 Consequently, sentencer discre88
tion was to be "directed and limited" to eliminate arbitrariness.
In 1976, the Court upheld the guided discretion statutes of Georgia, Texas and Florida.89 In finding that the Georgia death penalty
scheme alleviated the problem of arbitrariness, the plurality opinion emphasized that, in general, specified aggravating circumstances "provide guidance to the sentencing authority" 90 about
modern death penalty law." Hertz and Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death:
Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Considerationof Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317, 319 (1981). See England, Capital Punishment in the Light of
ConstitutionalEvolution: An Analysis of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 596 (1977).
The Supreme Court has always accorded Furman the most careful formal deference. In
Zant v. Stephens, 102 S. Ct. at 2742-43, for example, Justice Stevens was careful to explain
that aggravating circumstances as a threshhold uphold concerns over arbitrariness voiced in
Furman. See id. at 2742-43 and n.15. One reason for Furman's significance, aside from its
radical shift in death penalty analysis just one year after the apparent approval of the existing death penalty system in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), is that the case
invalidated all death penalty statutes without explaining what the states were to do next.
See Hancock, supra note 50. In addition, Furman's concern with arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty led to increased emphasis upon studying capital punishment
practices. See, e.g., Note, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment: An
Analysis of Post Furman Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida, 1973-1976, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 75 (1980); Bowers and Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 563 (1980). I have suggested previously that
McGautha's approval of discretion and Furman's insistance on rationality in capital sentencing represent "radically different paths." Ledewitz, The Requirement of Death:
Mandatory Language In the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 103,
156-57 (1982). The Supreme Court's approval of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
suggests that Furman is not any longer the model for death penalty analysis. Cf. id. (suggestion that the Georgia Supreme Court's response in Stephens represented a reaffirmation of
McGautha). See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Ledewitz, supra note 86, at 115-18.
88. This is how the Gregg plurality interpreted Furman: "Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 428 U.S. at
189.
89. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens joined in the lead
opinions in all three cases. The same day that these cases were decided, the Court struck
down mandatory death penalty statutes in North Carolina, Woodson, v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), and Louisiana, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), again with Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens joining in the lead opinions.
90. 428 U.S. at 194.
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what "organized society deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision."' The Court determined that in Georgia, because of
statutory aggravating circumstances, sentencer discretion "is con9 2
trolled by clear and objective standards.
This language hinted strongly that only statutory aggravating
circumstances could be considered as reasons for imposing the
death penalty. If a sentencer was free to impose a death penalty
based upon idiosyncratic factors that appealed to one jury, and not
to other juries, nor to the legislature, how could sentencer discretion be said to be controlled? Appellate review of the sentence still
would limit arbitrary results, but such review was never thought to
represent a substitute for limiting sentencer discretion.
It should be noted that there were indications in Gregg and in
Proffitt v. Florida9" that nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
could be utilized in sentencing.9 4 However, this language had been
ignored by opponents of nonstatutory capital sentencing. 5 Consequently, the Supreme Court's subsequent eager embrace of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in Stephens and Barclay,
came as a surprise.
91.

Id. at 192.

92.

Id. at 198.

93.

428 U.S. 242 (1976).

94. Justice Stewart recognized in Gregg that the Georgia sentencing procedure permitted consideration of "any ... aggravating circumstances" but he described the jury's discretion as "channeled" in that one statutory aggravating circumstance had to be found before
the death penalty could be imposed. 428 U.S. at 206. This is precisely the conclusion that
Justice Stevens came to in Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), see infra notes 106-113 and
accompanying text. In Proffitt, the role of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in the
Florida system was not clear, but the plurality opinion suggested a constitutional defect
only if a death penalty were based "entirely" on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.
428 U.S. at 256-57 n.13.
95. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. granted,vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983), in holding that nonstatutory aggravating circumstances could not be relied upon, decided that the Proffitt language
was equivocal, and said nothing about Gregg. 661 F.2d at 58-60 & n.6. The Court rested its
conclusion upon the arbitrariness principle ennunciated in several opinions in Furman. The
Supreme Court of Washington followed Henry in major part in State v. Bartholomew, 98
Wash. 2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982), except for the defendant's prior record, a nonstatutory
aggravating circumstance Justice Pearson found had been approved specifically in Gregg. Id.
at 196, 654 P.2d at 1184. The Bartholomew opinion noted the relevant language in Gregg,
but found that there were indications in Gregg that approval of the Georgia systems did not
necessarily approve all nonstatutory aggravating evidence. For further discussion of the role
of statutory aggravating circumstances prior to Stephens, see supra notes 3 and 83.
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Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Today: Zant v.
Stephens and Barclay v. Florida

In a rather indirect way, both Stephens and Barclay presented
the issue of the role of statutory aggravating circumstances. In
each case, the sentencer relied upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances or invalid statutory aggravating circumstances in determining death to be the appropriate sentence. The Supreme
Court permitted the death sentences to stand in both cases.
In Stephens, the context in which the issue of nonstatutory aggravation arose was the affirmation of a death sentence by the
Georgia Supreme Court when one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury - "a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions"" - was invalidated as too
vague by the Georgia Supreme Court in an unrelated case." Stephens argued that since there was no way to tell how much influence the invalid statutory aggravating circumstances had had on
the jury, his death sentence should have been reversed.9 8 In a per
curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court certified to the
Georgia Supreme Court the question: "What are the premises of
state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in
this case is not impaired by the invalidity of one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances?" 9 9
The Georgia Supreme Court's answer to this question demonstrated the incorrect premise of Stephens' argument about taint
from an invalid circumstance. 100 The Georgia Supreme Court did
not speculate as to the effect of the invalid statutory aggravating
circumstance on the jury's decision. Rather, the Court affirmed
that under the Georgia statute, the finding of a second or third, or
any number other than one, statutory aggravating circumstance
had no effect on the jury's sentencing decision. The finding of one
96. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1978).
97. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-42, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391-92 (1976). Arnold was
decided after Stephens' trial, but before his appeal was decided. 103 S. Ct. at 2738. In Stephens' direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated the finding of this statutory
aggravating circumstance on the strength of Arnold. Because two other statutory aggravating circumstances had been found, however, the court affirmed the death penalty. Stephens
v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976).
98. See Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 648 F.2d 446
(5th Cir. 1981). This is also the reasoning adopted in Justice Marshall's dissent from certification of an explanatory question to the Georgia Supreme Court. See 456 U.S. 410, 422-23
(1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1982).
100. Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 297 S.E.2d 1 (1982).
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statutory aggravating circumstance was necessary for the death
penalty to be imposed, but the death penalty was not imposed because of that finding. Such a finding served only to select the group
of defendants who may be considered for the death penalty. The
death penalty decision itself was based on nonstatutory factors
alone, 10 ' which simply is another way of saying that the jury had
complete discretion.10 2 Stephens' death penalty was not disturbed
because of the presence of two valid statutory aggravating circumstances which placed him into the class of those eligible for death.
At that point, the jury considered all the evidence and decided
upon the appropriate penalty. Mistakenly finding a statutory aggravating circumstance did not affect this process. 0
101. "Once beyond this plane [a finding on one statutory aggravating circumstance),
the case enters the area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the facts and circumstances of the case determine . . . whether or not the case passes. . . into the area in which
the death penalty is imposed." Id. at 100, 297 S.E.2d at 4. The Georgia Supreme Court
described the operation of the Georgia death penalty sentencing system as a "pyramid", id.
at 99, 297 S.E.2d at 3. At the base of the pyramid are all homicide cases. The "first plane of
division" separates murder from homicide. The second plane separates murder with at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance from all other murder. The third plane represents
the sentencer's discretion actually to impose the death penalty in a given case.
102. Justice Stevens did not quibble with Stephens' description of the last sentencing
plane, in which the sentencer is free to consider any aggravating or mitigating factor, as one
of "unbridled discretion". 103 S. Ct. at 2742.
103. 250 Ga. at 100, 297 S.E.2d at 4. The Georgia Supreme Court said that labelling a
piece of evidence, in this case Stephens' prior record, a statutory aggravating circumstance
rather than, as it should have been labelled, just another bit of evidence, had "an inconsequential impact" on the jury's decision. Id. I do not know how the Georgia Supreme Court
knew this, or if the Georgia court was saying instead that the error should have had an
inconsequential effect. I do not know even how the court knew that the jury understood the
Georgia capital sentencing system. After all, before the Georgia Supreme Court answered
the question certified in Stephens, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently did not understand
it. It is likely that the jury thought that the aggravating circumstances which the legislators
went to the trouble of listing in the statute were supposed to count more than other, nonstatutory evidence of aggravation.
Justice Stevens never quite decided whether the erroneous finding that Stephens had "a
substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," id. at 2747, had no effect on
the sentencing outcome. The Georgia Supreme Court said so and he was not willing to say
that finding was in error. 103 S.Ct. at 2749. Besides, if it was an error of state law, and even
if it did have an effect, it was not a constitutional error. Id. at 2749 & n.25. Thus errors in
state law that increase the chance of death will not lead to death sentence reversals unless
the procedure erroneously adopted by the state independently violates the United States
Constitution. Justice Stevens seemed to leave open the possibility that if evidence of aggravation were considered that should not have been admissible under state law, a reversal of a
death penalty would follow. Id. at 2749-50.
It should be noted that consideration of Stephens' record was not an error under state
law. Under Georgia law, evidence of a capital defendant's prior record is always admissible
at a death penalty sentencing hearing. Id. at 2747-48. Thus, the error was not that the jury
considered Stephens' prior record, but that in using that evidence, the jury found a statu-
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With this explanation, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and upheld Stephens' death sentence. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, addressed first the
issue whether the Georgia approach to statutory aggravating circumstances permits the sentencing jury an unconstitutional degree
of sentencing discretion.' 04 Justice Stevens described the Georgia
system as one in which statutory aggravating circumstances narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Such circumstances play no role in guiding actual sentence discretion. Although
he justified Georgia's system essentially on precedential grounds, 10 5
in so doing, Justice Stevens also clarified the constitutional role of
statutory aggravating circumstances.
Georgia's system had already been approved on its face in Gregg
v. Georgia.0 6 In this further interpretation of the Georgia system
Justice Stevens identified two legislative guards against arbitrary
capital sentencing proscribed in Furman v. Georgia.'0 7 First, review by the Georgia Supreme Court of every death penalty case for
arbitrariness or disproportionality and, second, the statutory aggravating circumstances were found to circumscribe the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty. 0 8 According to Justice Stetory aggravating circumstance that by judicial decision was later removed, in effect, from
the death penalty statute. This distinction between admissibility error and labelling error
was missed at first by the Fifth Circuit, which found that Stephens' record should not have
been considered under state law, 631 F.2d at 397 (5th Cir. 1980) and later modified that
conclusion, 648 F.2d at 446 (5th Cir. 1981).
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2741-44. Thus, Zant v. Stephens became transformed by the Georgia
Supreme Court's explanation of the Georgia death penalty sentencing, into a new attack on
the Georgia death penalty statute, as authoritatively construed by the state's highest court.
Ironically, the issue of the validity of a capital sentencer's consideration of nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances did not affect Stephens' own case, since consideration of his prior
record was not a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, but rather was listed specifically in
the Georgia statute as a matter to be considered, even after Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534,
224 S.E.2d 386 (1976) invalidated the particular statutory aggravating circumstance that
concerned a prior record. See supra note 103. If the objection to nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances is that they permit a sentencer to consider factors the legislature has not
singled out as significant to the sentencing decision, that objection does not apply to what
happened to Stephens.
105. 103 S. Ct. at 2743-44. As a general objection to the Georgia sentencing system,
Stephens' attack had to fail under the authority of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
which upheld the Georgia statute against a facial attack, unless the Court's understanding
in Gregg of the statute's actual workings differed from the Georgia Supreme Court's authoritative description of how the sentencing system operates. Justice Stevens concluded that
the Court in Gregg has understood the role of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in
Georgia, and therefore Gregg decided Stephens. See 103 S. Ct. at 2742-44.
106. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See supra note 105.
107. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
108. 103 S. Ct. at 2742-43.

1984

Death Penalty

vens, this narrowing role of statutory aggravating circumstances
was a "constitutionally necessary function," which operated at the
stage of "legislative definition."' 1 0 9 At the sentencing stage, all that
is required is that the process be "individualized," not that aggravation be limited to earlier defined categories.11 0 These three attributes, "categorical narrowing [by statutory aggravating circumstances] at the definition stage," "individualized determination" of
sentence, and appellate review of death sentences actually imposed, are all that the Constitution requires.' Not just any statutory aggravating circumstance will do, however, but only one that
"genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty" and "reasonably justifi[es] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
'12
murder."
Barclay v. Florida"s also elucidated the constitutional role of
statutory aggravating circumstances. In Barclay, the defendant's
death sentence was based in part on a finding of a nonstatutory
aggravating circumstance. Specifically, the trial judge had considered Barclay's criminal record as an aggravating circumstance, although no statutory aggravating circumstance in the Florida statute referred to a defendant's past record." 4 According to the
109. Id. at 2743.
110. Id. at 2744.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2742-43. In addition to rejecting the general attack on the Georgia statute,
Justice Stevens also discussed allegations of error that concerned the specific labelling error
that occurred in Stephens' case. Justice Stevens found that neither of two rules set forth in
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) mandated reversal of Stephens' death penalty.
Id. at 2744-46. First, the death penalty did not violate the rule that if a jury is instructed on
an insufficient legal theory for conviction, a general verdict will be overturned because of
uncertainty over whether the insufficient theory was relied on. In Stephens, the jury did
find expressly at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, which is all the Constitution
requires. Id. at 2744-45. Second, the death penalty in Stephens did not violate the rule that
a general verdict resting upon both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground is invalid. This rule was not implicated in Stephens because the state was not attempting to impose the death penalty on the basis of constitutionally protected conduct. The statutory
aggravating circumstance found invalid in Arnold, "a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" was not invalid because it penalized protected conduct, but only
because the circumstance was vague. Id. at 2745-46. Finally, Justice Stevens found that the
Georgia Supreme Court did not err in finding that the erroneous consideration of the "substantial history" aggravating circumstance had "an inconsequential impact" on the sentence. Id. at 2749.
113. 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
114. Id. at 3422. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion noted that Barclay's criminal
record was considered at several points; first as rebuttal to the application of the mitigating
circumstance that a defendant has "no significant history of prior criminal activity," in the
context of consideration of the inapplicable "under sentence of imprisonment" statutory
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Court, the Florida death penalty statute, as interpreted by the
Florida Supreme Court, did not permit consideration of nonstatuNotwithstanding the trial
tory aggravating circumstances."
judge's state law error, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
death penalty. " 6 In two separate opinions,' 1 7 the United States Supreme Court held that consideration of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances did not violate the United States Constitution, and
that if this consideration was done in violation of state law, there is
no federal error. " 8 As long as the evidence considered aggravating
is not misleading, constitutionally protected, or mitigating, the fact
that it is considered in violation of state law is not a violation of
the eighth amendment." 9
aggravating circumstance and, second, in the context of consideration of the apparently inapplicable statutory aggravating circumstance in which the defendant had been "previously
convicted. . . of a felony involving the case of threat of violence to the person." Id. at 342122. Justice Rehnquist agreed, and the state conceded, that consideration of Barclay's prior
record as an aggravating circumstance constituted error under state law. Both Justice Rehnquist's opinion, and Justice Stevens' concurrence joined by Justice Powell, (which was necessary to support the Court's judgment) suggested that since the evidence of prior record
was properly before the trial judge to rebut a mitigating circumstance, the state error was
perhaps not so great. Id. at 3427 and 3434 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, both concluded ultimately that since consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances does
not violate the United States Constitution, such consideration in violation of state law does
not violate the United States Constitution unless possibly state law, particularly the state's
harmless error rule, is being applied in a grossly inconsistent fashion. Id. at 3427-28 and
3434-36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 3426 and 3432 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. See Barclay v. State, 343 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892
(1978). The Florida court later vacated its judgment in light of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977) and remanded to the trial judge to give Barclay an opportunity to rebut information in the presentence report. The trial judge reimposed the death penalty and the Florida
Supreme Court again affirmed. Barclay v. State, 411 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1981).
117. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices
White and O'Connor. 103 S. Ct. at 3420. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Powell, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 3428.
118. See supra note 114.
119. Id. at 3427-28 and 3432-33 (Stevens, J., concurring). On the issue of the constitutionality of the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, Barclay does not
extend the decision in Zant v. Stephens. A state may authorize consideration of any evidence that relates to the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime,
including a general authorization to the sentencer to consider all such evidence. Of course, it
obviously could have been thought significant that Barclay was entitled under state law not
to have such nonstatutory aggravation considered. In addition, under Florida law, the sufficiency of statutory aggravating circumstances must be weighed so that consideration of nonstatutory aggravation could easily lead to an inappropriate sentence under state law. See
103 S. Ct. at 3431 & n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The references by the Justices in Barclay and in Stephens to the fact that evidence of
aggravation was otherwise before the sentencer represents residual concern with such state
law error rather than any resistance to consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circum-
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In addition to supporting Stephens' approval of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances as a basis for a death sentence, the Barclay opinions restate the constitutionally required role of statutory
aggravating circumstances. Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that
the Proffitt v. Florida plurality decision, 2 0 which approved the
Florida death penalty statute in 1976, "may properly be read to
stances. See Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3424-25, "In this case the state courts have considered an
aggravating factor that is not a proper aggravating circumstance under state law." Id. (footnote omitted); and Stephens, id. at 2749, "The effect the erroneous instruction may have
had on the jury.
...
Under state law, Barclay's prior record should not have been considered an aggravating circumstance and Stephens should not have been found to have had a
substantial history of criminal convictions. In both cases the Court was careful to point out
that the sentencers were entitled to have before them at the sentencing hearing the evidence
upon which the erroneous findings were based. See Barclay, id. at 3427 and 3434 (Stevens,
J., concurring) and Stephens, id. at 2747-48. Thus the Court never confronted the issue
whether consideration of evidence that should not have been admissible under state law
would represent intolerable arbitrariness in capital sentencing. A state which, like Georgia,
really does permit full consideration of any nonstatutory aggravating circumstance relevant
to the defendant or the case would not raise any such admissibility issue.
Barclay was the subject of some very unusual state law rulings. Justice Marshall objected
in dissent that the trial judge had sentenced three of four other defendants to death over
the recommendation of advisory juries, in each case with similar findings and even the same
commentary. 103 S. Ct. at 3440 & n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This record bespeaks an
easygoing readiness to overrule advisory juries when, under Florida law, a jury recommendation of life is to be followed unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. at 3427 (citing Tedder
v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)). Furthermore the findings of statutory aggravating
circumstances, though affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, were apparently difficult for
the Justices to accept. Justice Stevens, for example, agreed with the finding of two of the
factors, that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel" and that the murder
took place "in the commission of a kidnapping," but could not find evidence to sustain that
the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons" and did not discuss the trial judge's finding that the defendant endeavored to disrupt governmental functions and law enforcement. 103 S. Ct. at 3433-34. Since the evidence upon which the latter
two findings were based was already before the trial judge, Justice Stevens found no federal
error in such, possible, state law errors. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court had devoted little attention to Barclay's claims about trial
error. Its first opinion of affirmance, 343 So.2d 1266 (1977), (described by Justice Stevens as
"cursory," 103 S.Ct. at 3437, and by Justice Marshall's "perfunctory" id. at 3441), was so
brief that Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion was reduced to citing a footnote from the
Florida opinion, that concerned not Barclay, but Dougan, a co-defendant, because the Florida Supreme Court did not actually discuss Barclay's case at all, but indicated that the two
cases were virtually the same. Id. at 3421 (citing 343 So.2d at 1270 & n.2). Perhaps most
remarkable, the Florida Supreme Court found no error at all, not even in the consideration
of Barclay's prior record as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, a plain error under
state law. In the second opinion, following resentencing under Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977), the Florida Supreme Court declined to reconsider alleged non-Gardner errors,
411 So.2d 1310, 1311 (1982). Thus at no time was it necessary for the state supreme court to
consider whether any errors were in fact harmless. [The record as a whole instills no confidence in capital sentencing.]
120. 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.)
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question the propriety of a sentence based entirely on nonstatutory
aggravating factors .... I*M Although Justice Rehnquist perhaps
is not convinced that the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance should be a necessary aspect of a valid death penalty system, he was willing in Barclay to defer to Proffitt and Stephens
concerning this requirement. Justice Stevens, however, stated expressly that "a death sentence may not rest solely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor. 1' 22 Thus, the constitutional role of statutory aggravating circumstances may be stated as follows: a state
death penalty statute must contain statutory aggravating circumstances that limit the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty; once such a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, however, the sentencer may be allowed to decide upon the appropriate
12 3
penalty based upon all the relevant evidence.
D.

The Reach of Zant v. Stephens

The function of statutory aggravating circumstances in Zant v.
Stephens is both new and radical. It is new because, despite Justice Stevens' protestations, it does not limit arbitrariness, the major concern of past decisions. In fact, now that nonstatutory aggravation is permitted along with essentially unlimited mitigation,
capital sentencing, as a constitutional matter, is wholly within the
judgment of the sentencer. Zant v. Stephens is radical because the
states are required to select only the most appropriate offenders
for consideration for death, and the Court has committed itself to
go beyond minimum rationality review in evaluating the states'
choices. These claims are considered in turn.
1. Limiting Arbitrariness
A death penalty system that limits a sentencer's consideration of
121. 103 U.S. at 3428.
122. Id. at 3433.
123. In California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3466 (1983), a case challenging an instruction
concerning possible commutation of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court turned the instruction into consideration of future dangerousness, id. at 3454, a consideration that had not been thought prior to Ramos to be an
aggravating circumstance in California. Viewed, then, as another nonstatutory aggravating
circumstance case, it stands with Stephens and Barclay. See 103 S. Ct. at 3456-57. Justice
O'Connor emphasized, however, that juries must be free to determine whether "death is the
appropriate punishment." Id. at 3456. Certain death penalty statutes, including Pennsylvania's statute, mandate a death sentence if one statutory aggravating circumstance is found
and no mitigating evidence is found, thus precluding consideration of whether the death
penalty is appropriate. See generally Ledewitz, supra note 86.
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the death penalty to statutory aggravating circumstances is attempting to limit the reasons for death. In defining statutory aggravating circumstances, the legislature decides what kinds of facts
and circumstances justify the death penalty. The jury then focuses
on these factors alone in deciding whether death is appropriate.
Such a system attempts to keep the reasons for death consistent
in all cases. No evidence that does not relate to a statutory aggravating circumstance may be considered by the sentencer. Idiosyncratic opinions by jury members, such as, for example, that a prior
episode of child molestation or prospects for adjustment to prison,
or the possibility of executive commutation, warrant the death
penalty, will no longer be factors in some cases and not in others.
The system is designed so that all juries will consider the same
types of evidence in the same way. In this sense, such a system
attempts to be non-arbitrary.
In contrast, a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance system admits that no one knows why sentencers give the death penalty. A
jury simply may find the evidence to be repugnant, or may be
moved by the grief of the victim's family, or may be outraged by
the loss of a particularly valuable or innocent member of society. It
may even be that a jury finds a defendant to be hostile or mean
looking. A nonstatutory system does not attempt to influence the
1
jury's decision as to what factors are significant or irrelevant. 2
Whatever one thinks of the idea that jurors actually would, or
even could, limit their judgment to statutorily identified aggravating circumstances, 12 5 it is clear how such a system seeks to satisfy
124. Of course, even a state system that permits consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances impliedly rejects reliance for aggravation upon discriminatory factors,
such as the defendant's race, class, sex or income, or constitutionally protected conduct, or
evidence of mitigation or inaccurate information. See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 274748. See also Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. at 3427 (plurality opinion).
125. The Supreme Court seems to be convinced that consideration of the fullest possible range of mitigation, and now aggravation, is the best possible course for a state to follow
in capital sentencing, though in the case of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, such a
course is not required. This approval of nonstatutory aggravation and mitigation explains
Justice Stevens' applause in Stephens for the "wide scope of evidence" that may be considered under the Georgia system, id. at 2748, Justice Rehnquist's refusal in Barclay to require
in capital sentencing a "rigid and mechanical parsing of statutory aggravating factors," id.
at 3424, and Justice O'Connor's observation in Ramos that once a statutory aggravating
circumstance is found, a sentencer "is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine
whether or not death is the appropriate punishment." Id. at 3456.
Barclay illustrates that at the level of judgment by the sentencer, limiting consideration
to statutory aggravating circumstances was always a false and misleading protection for capital defendants. Barclay complained that the trial judge "discussed the racial motive for the
murder and compared it with his own experience in the army when he saw Nazi concentra-
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Furman's requirement of non-arbitrary capital sentencing. It is
equally clear that a system that uses statutory aggravating circum,stances merely to define the class of those who may be sentenced
to death, fully at the discretion of a jury, does not aim at the same
kind of non-arbitrary sentencing.12 A nonstatutory aggravation
state may create a class truly deserving of the death penalty, but
127
the class itself still suffers a purely arbitrary sentencing process.
2. Selecting the Most Appropriate Defendants
The opinion in Zant v. Stephens permits consideration of nontion camps and their victims." Id. at 3423. This, Barclay argued, represented consideration
of the nonstatutory aggravating circumstance of "racial hatred." Id. at 3424. Barclay's argument appears entirely correct. The racist motive perhaps appeared to this judge as a good
reason, in part, to give the death penalty. But the legislature had never identified racist
motives as more deserving of death than other motives. Furthermore, another trial judge,
with different experiences, might have followed the jury's recommendation and allowed Barclay to live. This illustrates the likelihood of arbitrary results when nonstatutory aggravating circumstances are considered. Justice Rehnquist seems to feel that such consideration is
inevitable as "[a]ny sentencing decision calls for the exercise of judgment." Id. at-3424. But
the observation that any sentencer will be influenced by factors unique to that person points
out the inevitability of arbitrary judgments in capital sentencing. Such an observation need
not lead to approval of unbridled discretion. Furman promised rational, objective, predictable results. The recognition that rational results in capital sentencing are impossible to
attain, should lead to the abolition of capital punishment rather than to celebration of the
dark mysteries of the human mind.
126. In this article, I am seeking to evaluate the role of statutory aggravating circumstances under Stephens and Barclay. I do not intend to present a full critique of the Court's
decision to allow nonstatutory aggravating circumstances to serve as the basis of death penalty decisions. Nevertheless, it would seem clear that to allow unbridled discretion in imposing the death penalty returns the court to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Under McGautha, only a certain group of defendants was eligible to be considered for
death, and sentencers had full discretion to pick from that group the ones who would receive death. Further, it trivializes Furman v. Georgia and the ten year struggle to interpret
it to say that the only vice identified in Furman was that the capital pool was too large, and
that there had to be a separate sentencing hearing. The Court has never verified that the
capital pool under broad statutory aggravating circumstances is actually much smaller than
in the pre-Furman period, and there is reason to doubt that it is. See Ledewitz, supra note
86, at 125. It is tragically ironic that, when in Gregg and Lockett the Court approved unlimited discretion in the decision not to impose the death penalty, many criticized the Court
for reversing Furman's requirement of objective factors and guided discretion. See
Ledewitz, supra note 86, at 127-28 & n.123. The Court approved unlimited discretion in
order to ensure that one sentenced to die in fact deserved to die. Indeed, such a significant
concern justifies Lockett's retreat from objectivity and the loss of the assurance of nonarbitrary results. But nonstatutory aggravation, that is, unlimited sentencing discretion in
deciding what reasons justify death, is not just weakening Furman, it is eliminating
Furman's significance. No longer is non-arbitrariness, as the Furman opinions understood
the concept, a relevant consideration. See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
127. Cf. Gillers, supra note 83, at 26-31 (commenting on the effect of nonstatutory
mitigation in capital sentencing).
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statutory aggravating circumstance as a basis for the decision to
impose the death penalty, but only when one statutory aggravating

circumstance is found to be present. The finding of one statutory
aggravating circumstance is said to adequately channel jury sentencing discretion, because the statutory circumstance differentiates in "an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way"
a capital case from the many cases "in which the death penalty
may not be imposed. ' 128 In order to perform this constitutionally
required differentiating function, a statutory aggravating circumstance "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and, must reasonably justify the imposition of a

more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found
guilty of murder.' 29 Thus, there are two requirements for a valid
statutory aggravating circumstance: first, it must limit the class of
murderers numerically and, second, it must represent a "good reason" for choosing this defendant to be eligible for death, rather
than other defendants who are not eligible for death.
The numerical limiting goal is unclear. Presumably, the starting

point for the pool to be narrowed is that class of convicted killers,
who, under Coker and Enmund, could be considered for the death
penalty. How much this class must be reduced is not specified. If
fifty persons are convicted of Enmund-eligible murder, is a statutory aggravating circumstance valid, or is a system valid as a
whole, that limits consideration of the death penalty to forty-five,
or twenty-five or ten of these defendants?13 0
128. 103 S. Ct. at 2744.
129. Id. at 2743.
130. Justice Stevens' numerical limitation on individual statutory aggravating circumstances, that such a circumstance "genuinely narrow" the class, is not likely to present any
serious compliance issues for statutory aggravating circumstances currently in use in the
states. The statutory aggravating circumstance applicable potentially to the largest number
of defendants is that the killing took place during the commission of some type of other
crime, usually a dangerous felony. Clearly the use of this factor does not, and could not,
expand on the mental state requirements of Enmund. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Rather, such a circumstance is applied only if the defendant is eligible under
Enmund to be considered for the death penalty.
Even such "felony-murder" circumstances, however, narrow the Enmund-eligible class
substantially. Statistics show that only about 23% of all homicides in the United States
arise out of other felonies. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNrrED STATES 12 (1981)
(17% of homicides result from felonious activity; 6% from suspected felonious activity).
This figure is misleading, of course, since under Enmund, an undetermined number of felony murder confederates, and perhaps even some perpetrators, are not eligible for the death
penalty, and certainly more cases in the general category of homicide are not eligible for the
death penalty, either because of Enmund's limits, or because of state substantive criminal
law limitations such as defining a class of manslaughter cases as ineligible for the death
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The reason that no answer is possible to the question, "how
much must the class be narrowed?" is that numerical limits withpenalty. Nevertheless, it seems a fair assumption that a felony-murder statutory aggravating
circumstance does not include most Enmund-eligible murder, and thus narrows that class.
Most categories of statutory aggravating circumstances satisfy the numerical limiting requirement even more obviously. For example, murder by use of an explosive device, a statutory aggravating circumstance in several states, accounted for only sixteen murders in the
United States in 1981.
But many state death penalty systems are vulnerable to the criticism that while individual statutory aggravating circumstances may narrow the class of murder for which the death
penalty is authorized, the operation of the state system as a whole, that is, all the statutory
aggravating circumstances together, tends to ensure that almost every murder is covered by
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.
Some states have so narrowed statutory aggravating circumstances that few murders are
included. In New Hampshire, for example, only killing a law enforcement officer, killing
during kidnapping, soliciting another to kill and being solicited for pecuniary gain are included within the definition of capital murder, conviction of which renders one eligible for a
death penalty sentencing hearing. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1 & 630:5 (1974). Vermont
restricts consideration of the death penalty to an unrelated second offense of murder or
murder of law enforcement or correctional officials. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(b) & (c)
(1981).
But most state systems include most Enmund-eligible murderers under one or more statutory aggravating circumstances. The Georgia system contains ten relevant statutory aggravating circumstances for murder: a prior capital offense during the commission of aggravated battery, burglary or arson, risking death to more than one through a dangerous device,
receiving money, victim a judicial officer, defendant a principal or agent, vile, horrible and
inhuman offense, victim a peace officer or fireman, act of escapee, and preventing arrest. GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982). Although this list is not as broad as some it does not
include murder during a robbery as a formal category for example - it nevertheless covers a
great number of cases potentially. Prevention of arrest is a circumstance capable of including any act of concealment. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. 1982); but
see Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978) and State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d 569 (N.C.
1970). Vile, horrible and inhuman is also capable of expansion of course. Cf. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 109 n.4 (1982). Pennsylvania is another state with a broad pattern
of statutory aggravating circumstances, under which almost every intentional killing is included. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d) (1982).
There is reason to think that Justice Stevens assumed that every death penalty system
must exclude most, or at least many, murderers from consideration for the death penalty.
Justice Stevens approved of the way that statutory aggravating circumstances differentiate
the death penalty sentence "from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed." 103 S. Ct. at 2744 (emphasis added). The reason the death penalty may not be imposed in these "many" cases is, presumably, because Justice Stevens
expects that not even one statutory aggravating circumstance will cover "many" cases.
Whether this empirical observation was correct or not, the form of the statement suggests
that it must be true that as a whole, most or many eligible murderers under Enmund may
not be rendered death eligible.
Even without regard to Justice Stevens' specific words, the numerical limit must be supposed to apply to statutory aggravating circumstances combined because, if it does not, the
requirement is trivial. Imagine a statute with seven statutory aggravating circumstances,
that the crime occurred on a Monday, a Tuesday, and so forth. Every circumstance individually narrows the class, but the total effect is that everyone becomes eligible for the death
penalty. This does not seem to be what Justice Stevens had in mind.
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out reference to substantive limits are meaningless. For example, a
state could "genuinely narrow" the pool of Enmund-eligible murderers by recognizing as its only aggravating circumstance the fortuity that the defendant's name begins with an "A." Such a statutory aggravating circumstance would narrow the class, but to no
coherent purpose. One can judge whether a statutory aggravating
circumstance narrows "enough" only by understanding what substantive limits there are, if any, on which members of the Enmund-eligible pool may be considered for the death penalty.
Justice Stevens' formulation does contain a substantive aspect.
To be valid, a statutory aggravating circumstance must "reasonably justify" the consideration of a particular defendant for the
death penalty. This requirement might mean that the state must
merely show that this defendant deserves to die either on deterrent
or retributive principles,' despite the mitigating evidence the defendant produces to convince a sentencer to spare his life.13 2 Such
a formulation would amount to minimum rationality review, or no
33
review at all, of state statutory aggravating circumstances.1
131. I do not mean to narrow at the outset the universe of possible justifications for
the death penalty. I intend to discuss other perspectives in addition to deterrence and retribution. See infra notes 188-216 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has accepted only deterrence and retribution as justifications for capital punishment, see
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1979) (plurality opinion), and therefore these two
claims represent a useful starting point.
132. Statutory aggravating circumstances do not establish that death is the appropriate penalty for a defendant. The sentencer must consider mitigating evidence of the defendant's character, and record, and the circumstances of the murder. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
133. Minimum rationality review, or the "rational basis test," refers to the standard of
review used by the Supreme Court in reviewing legislation in the area of economics or social
welfare. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONsTrrurriONAL LAW 448-50 (1983). Such legisla-

tion will be upheld if it "rationally relates[s] to any legitimate end of government." Id. at
448. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Environmental Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978)
(statutory limit on liability for nuclear accidents "bears a rational relationship" to goal of
encouraging private investment in energy production); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (statute providing that retailers may not rent space to anyone to
perform eye examinations upheld as having a "rational relation" to objective of discouraging
commercialism). The now-classic formulation of such minimal review is Justice Stone's
statement in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), that such
legislation must rest upon a "rational basis."
The minimum rationality test is an exceedingly easy one for legislation to satisfy. See
generally, LOCKHART, KAMIsAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449 (1980) ("Not since 1937
has the Court struck down an economic regulation as violative of substantive due process
. . ."). In fact the judiciary has been described as having "abdicated the field." McClosky,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP.
CT. REv. 34, 38.

Consequently, such review would always result, once Enmund is satisfied, in the upholding of the legislative determination that a particular statutory aggravating circumstance rep-
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It is unlikely that Justice Stevens intended a statutory aggravating circumstance simply to show that a defendant deserves to die.
Every Enmund-eligible defendant may be said, plausibly, to deserve to die since every such defendant committed an intentional
or at least highly culpable killing.8 4 It may be that an intentional
killer with a violent record is, in some sense, even more deserving
of death than one with no record, but the Court has never said
that culpable killing does not, by itself, justify the death penalty."3 5
Certainly, Justice Stevens does not provide an argument why culpable killing by itself should not be sufficient to justify the death
penalty.'3 6 After Coker and Enmund, statutory aggravating circumstances are not needed to select persons deserving to die.
The starting point for Justice Stevens is not the justification of
death for the particular capital defendant. Rather, the point is to
justify the selection of this defendant "compared to others found
guilty of murder.' 7 Justice Stevens assumes, and thus requires,
that most Enmund-eligible defendants not fit into any statutory
aggravating circumstance. " 8 For the minority who do fit at least
resents a "rational" determination that the defendant deserves to die.
134. Indeed, it is the entire point of Coker and Enmund that the death penalty is
excessive and/or disproportionate in cases in which defendants do not take life. See supra
notes 11-17 and 25-32 and accompanying text. Capital punishment for the killer who intends to take life, or at least understands that he is risking the taking of life, is not disproportionate because life has been taken and is not excessive because the death penalty in
such a case serves deterrent purposes and, arguably, retributive ones as well.
135. It is true that since Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court consistently has required the presence of statutory aggravating circumstances before the death penalty may be
imposed. See supra note 85. But the reason for this requirement has not been articulated.
One plausible reason, suggested infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text, is that the state
must select not just those defendants who deserve to die, but those who most deserve to die.
See also supra note 5.
136. Justice Stevens, using a quote from the Gregg plurality opinion, suggested that
the purpose of statutory aggravating circumstances that narrow the class of murderers and
justify the selection of a particular defendant for death is to avoid "standards so vague that
they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision" thus leading to arbitrary and
capricious sentencing condemned in Furman. 103 S. Ct. at 2742-43 (quoting from 428 U.S.
at 198). But a state could provide that anyone who has maliciously killed may receive the
death penalty if, in the judgment of the jury, such is the appropriate penalty after consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence, or even all relevant evidence, mitigating or aggravating. A state statute that adds the killing of a policeman, or the killing during a robbery,
or with a gun, as statutory aggravating circumstances is not more or less vague than the
former statute. Malicious killing and intentional killing are not vague concepts, and may
serve "objectively" to define the pool of those eligible for the death penalty. Once that pool
is created, Justice Stevens does not require an objective process, but is content to allow a
death penalty based wholly upon nonstatutory aggravation and mitigation.
137. 103 S.Ct. at 2743.
138. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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one circumstance, and therefore may be considered for the death
penalty, the purpose of the statutory aggravating circumstance is
to justify selecting these defendants rather than all the others.
What "reasonably justif[ies]" selection of a particular subgroup of
defendants is that these defendants, or their crimes, are the
"worst" murderers or murders, meaning the most deserving of retribution, or the most deterrable. Footnote fifteen in Zant v. Stephens,"9 which follows immediately the substantive requirement
of justification of statutory aggravating circumstances, contains
several references to the idea that the death penalty must be reserved for the worst cases, even among murder.140 The fullest such
expression is Justice White's concurrence in Gregg, which is cited
for the suggestion that the death penalty should be, and ultimately
will be, limited to those cases for which it is "particularly appropriate. 1 41 Further confirmation of Justice Stevens' view that statutory aggravating circumstances must select from the Enmund-eligibility pool of defendants, a few of the worst cases, is his citation
of Godfrey v. Georgia142 as a case that contained an overbroad ag-

gravating circumstance. 148 The death penalty could not be sustained in Godfrey because "the facts of the case . . . did not distinguish the murder from any other murder.' 44 Godfrey's killing

was not the worst, and therefore he could not receive the death
139. 103 S. Ct. at 2743.
140. Justice Stevens cited opinions from Furman by Justices Douglas, 402 U.S. at 248,
Brennan, id. at 261 n.11, Stewart, id. at 294, and White, id. at 309-10, 313, all to the effect
that defendants selected for death were not the worst offenders, and there really was no way
to say why some received the death penalty while most did not. Justice Stevens also cited
the plurality in Gregg for the proposition that the death penalty must be limited to certain
crimes: those "extreme cases ... so grevious an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death," and those for which the death penalty is an effective
deterrent. 103 S. Ct. at 2743. These observations parallel closely Justice White's comments.
See infra note 144.
141. 103 S. Ct. at 2743 n.15 (quoting 428 U.S. at 222).
142. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
143. In Godfrey, the evidence showed that following an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation, the defendant went to his mother-in-law's trailer where his wife was living. Godfrey several times before had attempted to convince his wife to return home. She had refused, and he believed that his mother-in-law was helping to convince his wife to remain
separated. Upon arriving at the trailer, Godfrey saw his wife, mother-in-law and elevenyear-old daughter playing cards. He fired a shotgun into the home, killing his wife instantly.
He then entered the trailer, struck his daughter with the gun, and fired at his mother-inlaw, killing her instantly as well. Godfrey received the death penalty based on the statutory
aggravating circumstance that the murder "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman." 446 U.S. at 426.
144. 103 S. Ct. at 2743.
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penalty. 14 5
Although the standard of judicial review of statutory aggravating
circumstances is not specified, it is clear that the standard is not
minimum rationality. This is so in part because the context is
death itself, thus requiring stringent review, 4 and because there
would be no point to the constitutional requirement of justification
if any factor, or combination of factors, were justified as a matter
of course. Prior to Stephens, Enmund had already established that
if a particular execution does not serve a serious penal goal, such
as retribution or deterrence, the death penalty is unconstitutional
in that case.1" 7 Thus to be Enmund-eligible means that retribution
or deterrence principles, or perhaps both, support the death penalty in a defendant's case. Accordingly, the justification for a statutory aggravating circumstance cannot be that it identifies cases
that are deterrable or in which execution would serve retribution.
Rather, the role of such circumstances is to go beyond minimally
serving these goals, to the most extreme cases in terms of retribution and deterrence.
This is a breathtaking series of assertions, all the more impressive because they are so poorly grounded in anything the Court
had done before. First of all, the Court had never said that it
would judge the validity of statutory aggravating circumstances. In
fact, shortly after Justice Stevens announced the requirement of
justification for statutory aggravating circumstances, Justice
O'Connor, speaking for the Court in California v. Ramos,14 8 reaf145. I am not endorsing this interpretation of Godfrey, but this seems to be Justice
Stevens' view. It seems to me that Godfrey was not premised on the idea that states must
choose the "worst" murderers, nor even that Godfrey was not one of the worst murderers.
Godfrey seems premised on a vagueness rationale, that having chosen a standard for statutory aggravating circumstances, the state must apply that standard in a meaningful way.
See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. Godfrey has been interpreted, however, in
accordance with Justice Stevens' views. See supra note 5.
146. See Hancock, supra note 49, at 872; see generally Radin, The Jurisprudenceof
Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L.
RFv. 989 (1978). I use the term "stringent review" rather than the technical phrases that
would suggest a specific standard, such as "strict scrutiny" and the compelling state interest
test. See Perry Education Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators Assoc., 103 S. Ct. 948, 954-55,
959-60 (1983), because increasingly the Court does not apply any one test or even two tests
to review government actions alleged to infringe important individual rights, but rather engages in a continuim of balancing tests with more or less deference to asserted government
interests. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982). For my purposes, it is
sufficient to assert that the tradition of complete deference to government interests that is
practiced in the field of economic regulation is not appropriate in the death penalty context.
147. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
148. 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
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firmed that the Court had never "undertake[n] to dictate to the
[states] the particular substantive factors that should be deemed
relevant to the capital sentencing decision."' 149 As long as the legislature, "representing organized society" decides that some factor is
relevant, the Supreme Court will not disturb particular statutory
aggravating circumstances.150
Furthermore, the Court had never said before that the states
could not select the entire pool of Enmund-eligible defendants for
consideration for death, 1' and many states have included almost
every kind of culpable murder under at least one statutory aggravating circumstance."12 Godfrey 15 has been said to represent the
judgment that only the worst murderers may be considered for
death, but the plurality 54 in Godfrey was careful to reserve the
question whether Godfrey himself could have received the death
penalty under some type of aggravating circumstance."'5 The prob149. Id. at 3452 (emphasis in original).
150. Id. at 3452-53. According to Justice O'Connor, the limitations on state choice that
the Court had imposed concerned vagueness, consideration of individual factors, broad mitigation, and an opportunity to be heard after meaningful notice. Id.
151. In fact, in Gregg v. Georgia, the plurality held that the death penalty was not
disproportionate for a deliberate killing, which it called the "most extreme of crimes." 428
U.S. at 187. Although the murder in Gregg did involve robbery in addition to murder, that
additional factor is not referred to in the plurality's deocription. Cf. Horton v. State, 249 Ga.
871, 879, 295 S.E.2d 281, 288 (1982) (death penalty not excessive per se for murder during
commission of burglary). Certainly one might have supposed therefore, that a state could
authorize the death penalty at least for any deliberate killing, and then let the defendant
come forward with mitigation. Nevertheless, even prior to Stephens, one can find occasional
state decisions suggesting that without something else in aggravation, the death penalty is
not an appropriate penalty for a killing during the course of a felony. See, e.g., Menendez v.
State, 419 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1982); Roney v. State, 632 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex.Crim. App.
1982).
152. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
153. 446 U.S 420 (1979).
154. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the
judgment.
155. 446 U.S. at 432-33 n.15:
[W]e intimate no view as to whether or not the petitioner might constitutionally have
received the same sentences on some other basis. Georgia does not, as do some States,
make multiple murders an aggravating circumstance, as such.
The irony of viewing Godfrey as a requirement that the death penalty be reserved for the
"worst" cases, even within the category of murder, is that Godfrey's double killing renders
him in some sense a fitting recipient of such a description, though his death sentence was
reversed.
The requirement of depravity in Godfrey ("The petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have
reflected a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder," id. at 433), stems not from a general eighth amendment standard that only the most
depraved may receive the death penalty, but from the fact that the statutory aggravating
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lem in Godfrey was not overbreadth but vagueness of the statutory
aggravating circumstances at issue.15
Justice Stevens does not justify the substantive requirement he
imposes. The question is, why are the states limited to the selection of those defendants "particularly appropriate" for the death
penalty? Why may they not select every defendant for consideration of the death penalty who is eligible under Enmund? Justice
Stevens' substantive requirement can be justified upon the assumption that most juries would not sentence a "merely" culpable
circumstance at issue itself required depravity. Id. at 432. See Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871,
879, 295 S.E.2d 281, 288 (1982) ("Nothing in Godfrey... requires that a death penalty be
set aside in every case unless the defendant can be characterized as 'depraved' "); but see
State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1980) (Godfrey reserves the death penalty
for crimes and defendants set apart from the usual murder or murderer).
156. It is easy to confuse overbreadth and vagueness in Godfrey. For example, the
Fifth Circuit recently referred to Justice Marshall's suggestion in Godfrey that jury instructions be mandated to narrow construction of "potentially overbroad aggravating circumstances." Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273, 1285 n.14 (5th Cir. 1983). But Justice Marshall
actually said that such instructions are necessary to narrow "otherwise ambiguous statutory
language." 446 U.S. at 436-37.
In the first amendment context, there is a close connection between overbreadth and
vagueness analyses. Overbreadth concerns the inclusion within a statutory prohibition of
conduct protected by the constitution. Vagueness, on the other hand, concerns the clarity of
a statute. The concepts are closely related because although it is possible for an overbroad
law to be unambiguous, since it does reach protected conduct, it cannot mean what it says,
and hence is vague. See LOCKHART, supra note 133, at 730-33.
In the death penalty context, an overbroad statutory aggravating circumstance would be
one that imposes the death penalty upon someone for a reason that does not justify the
death penalty. The plurality in Godfrey gave an apparent example of such a circumstance
by describing concern for the "gruesome spectacle" of the scene in Godfrey as an "irrational" basis for the death penalty. 446 U.S. at 433 n.16. But Godfrey's conduct is not immune from the death penalty, though this issue was not decided. If a clear definition of vile,
horrible and inhuman had been given by the Georgia Supreme Court, and had included
multiple murder, and if the sentencer had understood this, there is no reason to think that
the death penalty would have been reversed.
The plurality's concern in Godfrey was with " 'standardless [sentencing] discretion.'" 446
U.S. at 428 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 196 n.47). If statutory aggravating circumstances are required, as the plurality assumed they were, there must be some way to tell
whether they are present or not. The problem is not that the circumstance at issue did
apply to every murder, but that it might apply or it might not, because there was no way to
tell what the aggravating circumstance meant.
The only support for the idea that Godfrey limits the breadth of statutory aggravating
circumstances, either substantively or numerically, is a reference to Justice White's requirement in Furman of a "meaningful basis" for distinguishing the "few" death penalty cases,
from the "many" cases in which a life sentence is imposed. 446 U.S. at 427-28. See infra
note 165. Justice Stevens expands such language to eighth amendment standards requiring
numerical narrowing and serious substantive justification. But the Godfrey plurality did not
face such issues. Godfrey requires a "meaningful basis" for death, but such a meaningful
basis is supplied, as far as one can tell from the plurality opinion, by any statutory aggravating circumstance, no matter how broad, as long as it is not "irrational" nor vague.
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killer to death whether there is mitigating evidence or not.1 5 Thus,
presenting merely culpable killers to capital sentencers runs the
risk that some members of this group will be singled out arbitrarily.'" To counter this possibility, a statutory aggravating circumstance must select a subset of defendants who the legislature feels
would run a substantial risk of the death penalty from any sentencer, and who the legislature agrees should be considered for
death. A particular statutory aggravating circumstance represents
the method by which the state separates this most deserving subset of defendants from other Enmund-eligible cases. Part of this
legislative judgment is purely discretionary. A state legislature is
free to ignore factors, such as future dangerousness, that might be
considered relevant by a sentencer, by omitting those factors from
the list of statutory aggravating circumstances. Culpable killers
who are likely to be dangerous would then not be eligible for
death. But the state is not free to select factors that, by some general consensus, do not present an extraordinarily compelling
5
ground for death.'"
The requirement of substantive justification is not a minimum
rationality charade. Justice Stevens is committed to the evaluation
of statutory aggravating circumstances in terms of the selection of
the most appropriate murders and murderers. The implications of
this commitment for state death penalty systems are serious.
157. I do not mean that this necessarily is the basis for Justice Stevens' requirement
that the states select particularly reprehensible murderers for the death penalty, rather than
others not as especially reprehensible. In Stephens, Justice Stevens did not discuss his requirement of the worst cases any more than prior cases had justified the requirement of
statutory aggravating circumstances itself. See supra notes 3 and 83 and accompanying text.
I am setting forth a plausible explanation.
158. A death penalty generally applicable to all Enmund-eligible killers would risk not
disproportion or excessiveness, but rather simple arbitrariness.
159. An alternative theory of the requirement of an additional factor beyond malicious
killing to justify the death penalty is suggested in Jones and Potter, Deterrence, Retribution, Denunciation and the Death Penalty, 49 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 158 (1981). The authors
argue that almost no murderers are fully responsible for their murder, but that generally
other persons, or conditions society permits to exist, will bear some part of the defendant's
blame. Accordingly, merely killing does not justify the death penalty because some amount
of mitigation exists to reduce the "pure" retribution of a life for a life. See id. at 165-67.
This theory is appealing, and does answer why it is necessary to have statutory aggravating
circumstances to eliminate from consideration many persons who seem to deserve the death
penalty. The theory does not square with Enmund, exactly, but it would be available as a
justification if the Court finds a need in the future for explanation.
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AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

A. The State Systems
A discussion of the definitions and interpretations of statutory
aggravating circumstances will not be enlightening unless the
reader first understands the different forms in which statutory aggravating circumstances appear in state statutes. At the risk of
considerable oversimplification, I present here three models of
state death penalty statutes that encompass most state systems.
The point in this section is not to familiarize the reader with differences in the format of statutory circumstances, but rather to
show that despite different procedures, the states use statutory aggravating circumstances in similar ways.
1. Capital Homicide
At the outset I acknowledge that I am ignoring differences in the
ways states define capital murder, specifically the culpable mental
state required for consideration for the death penalty. I do this
because I assume that Enmund has nationalized the required
mental states for capital murder at a level commensurate with extreme indifference to life, although most state statutes do not yet
reflect the change, 160 and because however states define capital
160. For example, Florida retains capital murder as felony murder, and retains felony
murder as a statutory aggravating circumstance. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04(1)(a),
775.082(1), 921.141(5)(d) (West Supp. 1983). Accordingly, someone who has committed a
crime such as the one committed by Enmund, and with similar circumstances, could still
receive a sentence of death. The other states listed by Justice White as permitting the death
penalty for vicarious felony murder without regard to who kills, 102 S. Ct. at 3372-73 & n.5,
also have not altered their death penalty schemes to comport-with Enmund. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 189, 190.2(b)(17) (West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(1),
921.141(5)(d) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (Michie 1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1702, 39-2-202, 39-2-203 (1982); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(iv) (Supp. 1983). But see Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 99-17-20, 99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1983); and NEV. REV. STAT. §§
200.030(1)(b), 200.030(4), 200.033(4) (1981) (amended 1983 NEV. STAT. ch. 110). The other
states that Justice White said would permit the death penalty for vicarious felony murder if
other sufficient aggravating circumstances were present, 102 S. Ct. at 3374 & nn. 12-13, also
have not altered their schemes. See Am. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703, 13-1105 (Supp. 1983);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54b, 53a-46a (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4003, 19-2515 (1979);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 455-101, 46-18-305 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-303, 29-2522 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1417, 15A-2000 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22-16-4, 23A-27A-4 (1979 & Supp.
1983). Although these nine states either recognize non-triggerman status as a mitigating
circumstance, or do not recognize felony murder as an aggravating circumstance, they still
permit, theoretically, the death penalty for a defendant who does not, himself, kill mali-
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murder, statutory aggravating circumstances are required to narrow the Enmund-eligible pool even more.1 6' 1
These are significant assumptions. If no mental state requirement is imposed, that is, if unintentional killing may result in a
death penalty, as in classic felony murder, then all would agree
that statutory aggravating circumstances occupy a crucial role because many unintentional killers do not merit the death penalty.
Statutory aggravating circumstances might ensure that such killers
could not receive the death penalty unless there were something
62
extraordinary about their crime or their character and history.'
Alternatively, if, as in Pennsylvania, a state defines capital murder
as intentional killing,6 3 it could be argued that statutory aggravating circumstances are not necessary because the class of Enmundeligible murderers has already been narrowed, quantitatively, to a
ciously. Accordingly, these nine states also could violate Enmund.
Of course, the failure of states to accommodate Enmund by amendment is not dispositive
in a particular case in which Enmund's requirements have been violated. See, e.g., Hatch v.
State, 662 P.2d 1377, 1382-83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (death penalty vacated in death penalty case on authority of Enmund; case remanded for fuller sentence consideration of defendant's individual participation and intent).
161. That is, if states require less of a mental state than does Enmund, Enmund nevertheless will control, and beyond Enmund, a statutory aggravating circumstance will be
required. On the other hand, if the states require more of a culpable mental state than
Enmund, intent to kill for example, a statutory aggravating circumstance will still be required. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. In terms of understanding the role of
statutory aggravating circumstances, there is, therefore, no reason to study differences in the
way capital murder is defined.
162. Of course, if, as in Florida and other states, felony murder may serve as both the
capital crime and an aggravating circumstance, then statutory aggravating circumstances
would not necessarily occupy such a crucial role. See 102 S. Ct. at 3372 n.5. See also
Tokmen v. State, 435 So. 2d 664, 668-69 (Miss. 1983). Other states do not permit the felony
in a felony murder conviction to serve automatically as a statutory aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E. 2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
941 (1980).
I assume that no aggravating circumstance unrelated to a culpable mental state would
justify the death penalty for someone like Enmund. That is, Enmund could not have received the death penalty despite for example, a long record, or if the victim had been a
policeman, or any other such aggravating circumstance. None of the considerations present
in Justice White's analysis in Enmund would be altered by such circumstances. See supra
notes 35-48 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 17 and accompanying text. (The presence of aggravating circumstances does not alter the conclusion in Coker that rape of an
adult does not justify the death penalty.) Nevertheless, aside from these constitutional limits, statutory aggravating circumstances can serve a significant role in tending to lower the
number of felony-murderers who are eligible for the death penalty.
163. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a) (Purdon 1982) provides for a death penalty
sentencing hearing after a conviction of murder of the first degree. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2502(a) (Purdon 1982) defines murder of the first degree as a criminal homicide committed as an intentional killing.
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relatively small number, and qualitatively, to those who deserve to
die.164 Nevertheless, even an intentional murder state must have
65
statutory aggravating circumstances.1
2. The Timing of the Application of Statutory Aggravating
Circumstances
Statutory aggravating circumstances come into play at various
points in defining who is eligible for the death penalty. Most states
that have the death penalty as an available option define a degree
of murder in common law terms and bring statutory aggravating
circumstances into play only at that point. 66 I will call this use of
164. Pennsylvania might eliminate all statutory aggravating circumstances, and provide for a mitigation-only death penalty hearing, as does the state of Washington. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (Supp. 1983). Or, Pennsylvania might provide that an
intentional killing is a statutory aggravating circumstance. By either method, all defendants
convicted of intentional killing would be eligible for the death penalty. Such an outcome
does not violate Enmund. The issue is, does such an outcome violate Stephens?
165. This assumption is neither supported nor undermined by Stephens. Intentional
killing is a category of murder "worse" than killing with malice without intending to kill.
Accordingly, it could be argued that limiting the death penalty to intentional killing, "genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" and "reasonably justif[ies] the imposition [of the death penalty]." 103 S. Ct. at 2742-43. (I presume that by
referring to narrowing, Justice Stevens was referring to the Enmund-eligible class of murderers. If Justice Stevens meant narrowing the class of persons eligible under state law for
the death penalty, separate statutory aggravating circumstances plainly would be required.)
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1979) provides support for a general requirement of
statutory aggravating circumstances. In Godfrey, the reversal of one statutory aggravating
circumstance led to a reversal of the death penalty because it was the only circumstance
found, and the presence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance was necessary for
consideration of the death penalty under state law. See id. at 429. But the plurality assumed
that the presence of a statutory aggravating circumstance was mandated by the eighth
amendment in addition to being a state law requirement. "A capital sentencing scheme
must, in short, provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'" Id. at 427 (quoting Justice
White's Furman concurrence, 428 U.S. 313) [bracketed material added]. See supra note 83.
Since Godfrey's act was clearly a deliberate killing, see 446 U.S. at 422 n.1, it follows that
deliberate killings require a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty
may be imposed.
166. Twenty-five states utilize the sentencing approach. See AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-703 B (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1978 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (1979 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
17-10-30 (Michie 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905 (West
Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 68 (West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
ANN. §

565.006-.014 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1983);

§ 29-2520

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 46-18-301 (1983);

NEB. REV.

(1979); NEy. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-14, 31-20A-1 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp.
1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.1, 2929.03 (Page 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
701.10 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law Co-op.
STAT.
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aggravating circumstances the "sentencing approach," because the
aggravating circumstances are not relevant until after guilt or innocence is established.
Illinois"'7 and Pennsylvania"' are representative of the sentencing approach. Both states define capital murder, that is, a degree
of murder that permits the state to seek the death penalty, in
traditional, common law terms. 1 9e After a conviction for murder, or
murder in the first degree, both states define a series of statutory
aggravating circumstances, (in Illinois seven, in Pennsylvania ten)
that are submitted to the sentencer and that define which murderers may be sentenced to death. 170 Of course, even if statutory agSupp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A (1979 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-2-203 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(c) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-10-202
(1977).
There are problems with the categories of death penalty statutes I am proposing. For
example, insofar as a state defines murder as including felony murder and then applies statutory aggravating circumstances, I define it as a sentencing state. But if a state then utilizes
felony-murder as a statutory aggravating circumstance, see supra note 160, it is difficult to
say whether the felony murder represents the crime defined traditionally, or an aspect of
aggravation brought into play at the stage of legislative definition. I have chosen to ignore
such ambiguities, and, for purposes of illustration, have been content to consider sentencing
systems from the perspective of whether statutory aggravating circumstances alter traditional definitions of murder. Cf. Hancock, supra note 49.
167. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
168. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon 1982).
169. In Pennsylvania, first degree murder is capital murder, which is defined as intent
to kill. See supra note 163. In Illinois, capital murder is defined more broadly, including a
killing that results when the actor knows there is a strong probability of serious harm. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(2)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1983). Illinois, though it defines felony
murder as a capital offense, excludes classic felony murder from consideration as a statutory
aggravating circumstance. See id. at § 9-1(b)(6).
170. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1983) provides as follows:
A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of
18 or more and who has been found guilty of murder may be sentenced to death if:
1. the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the
murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman; or
2. the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the course
of performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate at such
institution or facility and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
3. the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which
is substantially similar to Subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the
deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so
long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or
of separate premeditated acts; or
4. the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train,
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ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
5. the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement of understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of
value; or
6. the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if:
(a) the murdered individual was actually killed by the defendant and not by
another party to the crime or simply as a consequence of the crime; and
(b) the defendant killed the murdered individual intentionally or with the
knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was one of the following: armed robbery, rape, deviate sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, forcible detention, arson, burglary, or the
taking of indecent liberties with a child; or
7. the murdered individual was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave
material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant,
or was an eye witness or possessed other material evidence against the defendant.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) provides as follows:
Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(1) The victim was a fireman, peace officer or public servant concerned in official
detention as defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5121 (relating to escape), who was killed
in the performance of his duties.
(2) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be
paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the
killing of the victim.
(3) The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or as a shield
or hostage.
(4) The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the hijacking of
an aircraft.
(5) The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by
the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the
defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.
(6) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.
(7) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.
(8) The offense was committed by means of torture.
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(10) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life
imprisonment or death was impossible or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of
life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.
171. Pennsylvania does not permit nonstatutory aggravating circumstances to be considered. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (Purdon 1982). Thus the statutory aggravating
circumstances in Pennsylvania are not only a prerequisite for death, they also define the
range of aggravation that the sentencer is supposed to consider. The Pennsylvania statute is
mandatory in the sense that if statutory aggravating circumstances are found and no mitigating circumstances are found, death is mandated. See generally Ledewitz, supra note 88.
The Illinois statute appears to mandate death upon a showing that insufficient mitigation
exists. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(g) (Smith-Hurd 1983): "If the jury determines unan-
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Sentencing systems like those in Pennsylvania and Illinois identify murderers in traditional terms and only at that point select
from this pool those who are particularly appropriate for the death
penalty." 2 It is this type of system in which the Zant v. Stephens
approach to statutory aggravating circumstances works most easily. The pool of murderers, all of whom are eligible for the death
penalty under Enmund, is narrowed at a second, sentencing stage,
in terms of factors selected by the state legislatures.
The second type of state death penalty system, in the context of
the use of statutory aggravating circumstances, is that which includes statutory aggravating circumstances within the definition of
capital murder. 7 8 Under such a definitional use of statutory aggravating circumstances, a state could dispense with further consideration of statutory aggravating circumstances. Perhaps the best example of this approach is the state of Washington. Washington
charges a capital defendant with aggravated first degree murder,
which consists of the traditional categories of murder plus a finding by the finder of fact of at least one of ten statutory aggravating
circumstances. 17 4 After a conviction of aggravated first degree murimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death." Id.
172. A few states define murder in basically traditional terms, but add other considerations that in most states are matters of aggravation. For example, in Oklahoma, murder in
the first degree is defined in terms of intent to kill and felony murder, which are traditional
categories; but included as murder in the first degree is to cause the death of a child through
torture. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(c) (West 1983). This latter aspect of the definition of murder isolates factors, the age of the victim and the treatment of the victim, that in
a pure sentencing system would be considered statutory aggravating circumstances. Since
the major part of the definition of murder in the first degree in Oklahoma is the traditional
common-law approach, I include it as a sentencing state. Nebraska is another state that has
a specialized category of murder in the first degree-death caused by perjury. See NEB. REv.
STAT. § 28.303 (1979). But this crime is so specialized, that the system seems easily characterized as one in which murder is defined in traditional terms.
Another state that does not quite fit is New Jersey. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3C (West
1983). In New Jersey, murder is defined in traditional terms, but before a sentencing hearing is convened for the purpose of applying statutory aggravating circumstances, a further
finding that the defendant was either perpetrator or procurer of the homicide is required.
Since, at least in the felony murder context, this requirement shadows, although it does not
quite restate Enmund, it does not seem to represent a significant narrowing of the Enmundeligible class of murder and murderers, and thus does not function as a statutory aggravating circumstance.
173. See generally Hancock, supra note 49; Cf. Autry v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394, 1406
n.5 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Texas law in effect provides for a determination to be made during the
guilt phase that other states reserve for the sentencing phase.")
174. WASH. REv. COnE ANN. § 10.95.020 (Supp. 1983-1984) provides:
A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits first degree murder and one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist:
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der, a sentencing hearing is held in which the defendant may pre175
sent evidence in mitigation.
The definitional approach is rare.1 7 6 Nevertheless, depending
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or fire fighter
who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the act resulting in
death and the victim was known or reasonably should have been known by the
person to be such at the time of the killing;
(2) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the person was serving a term
of imprisonment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized leave in
or from a state facility or program for the incarceration or treatment of persons adjudicated guilty of crimes;
(3) At the time of the act resulting in death, the person was in custody in a
county or county-city jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty
of a felony;
(4) The person committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that he or she
would receive money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid or
had agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing the
murder;
(6) The victim was:
(a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former witness in an
adjudicative proceeding; prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting attorney;
defense attorney; member of the board of prison terms and paroles; or a probation or parole officer; and
(b) The murder was related to the exercise of official duties performed or to be
performed by the victim;
(7) The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or
to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime;
(8) There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common
scheme or plan or the result of a single act of the person;
(9) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from one of the following crimes:
(a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree;
(c) Burglary in the first or second degree;
(d) Kidnapping in the first degree; or
(e) Arson in the first degree;
(10) The victim was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter
and the murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting activities of the victim.
175. Limited nonstatutory aggravating circumstances may also be considered at the
capital sentencing hearing in Washington. See State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 19397, 654 P.2d 1170, 1184-85 (1982).
176. Without real confidence, I identify four states in addition to Washington as coming close to a definitional system: California, Texas, Utah and Virginia. California defines a
capital crime as traditional homicide plus several "special circumstances." See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2 (West 1983). Texas defines capital murder as murder plus one of five statutory
aggravating circumstances. Before the death penalty is imposed, however, the jury must
consider three statutory questions, which could be considered further aggravating circumstances. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974). See also California v. Ramos,
103 S. Ct. at 3453-54, where the Court considered the statutory question concerning future
dangerousness in this fashion. Utah defines murder in the first degree as intentional murder
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upon the satisfaction of the numerical narrowing and substantively
justifying aspects of Stephens, there is nothing in the timing of the
consideration of statutory aggravating circumstances that violates
Justice Stevens' requirements.'"
The third class of death penalty system is that which defines a
special class of murder, based in part on statutory aggravating circumstances, and then holds a sentencing hearing in which a finding
of at least one new statutory aggravating circumstance is required
before the death penalty may be considered. A good example of
this mixed system is Connecticut. Under the Connecticut statute 8
a capital felony is defined as murder that includes one or more of
six statutory aggravating circumstances, such as the killing of a
member of a police department, or a prior capital conviction. 7 9 Afplus one of eight statutory aggravating circumstances. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202
(1978). At the sentencing hearing, aggravating circumstances are considered again, but they
include the same statutory aggravating circumstances. See id. at § 76-3-207 (1978). Virginia
defines capital murder as a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing" when one of seven
statutory aggravating circumstances is present. See VA. CODE § 182-31 (Supp. 1983). Although in some of these states, statutory aggravating circumstances also apply after a finding of guilt, I distinguish these states from those in the "mixed" category because these
sentencing hearings are either highly specialized or are related to prior findings.
177. The Court has not considered the procedural issue of having the sentencer consider aggravation before factual guilt is established. Ultimately this will be argued by someone on the same grounds that Gregg required a separate sentencing hearing in the first
place. See 428 U.S. at 190-91. Nevertheless, the issue, though serious, is beyond the scope of
this article.
178. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54b and 53a-46a (Supp. 1983).
179. Connecticut defines capital felony as follows:
A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1)
Murder of a member of the division of state police within the department of public
safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the division
of criminal justice, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a constable who performs criminal law
enforcement duties, a special policeman, appointed under section 29-18, an official of
the department of correction authorized by the commissioner of correction to make
arrests in a correctional institution or facility, or of any fireman, as defined in subsection (10) of section 53a-3, while such victim was acting within the scope of his duties;
(2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary
gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same
for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted
of intentional murder or murder committed in the course of commission of a felony;
(4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder,
under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be
returned to safety; (6) the illegal sale, for gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a
person who dies as a direct result of the use by him of such cocaine, heroin or methadone, provided such seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person;
(7) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first
degree; (8) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a
single transaction.
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ter conviction of a "capital felony," a sentencing hearing is held in
which the sentencer must find at least one of five different statutory aggravating circumstances before the death penalty may be
imposed.' 80 Certainly, "mixed" states 8 ' go beyond the requirements of Stephens, assuming that the statutory aggravating circumstances at the definition stage are sufficient to reduce the pool
of Enmund eligibles. New Hampshire, for example, defines capital
murder very narrowly. 82 It is clear that New Hampshire could dispense with further statutory circusmtances altogether and could
hold a sentencing hearing for consideration of mitigation and, if it
so elected, nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.8 8 New HampCONN. GEN. STAT.

180.

§§ 53a-54b (Supp. 1983).

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§

53a-46a(g) (Supp. 1983) provides:

If no mitigating factor is present, the court shall impose the sentence of death on
the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds...
(1) the defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted
commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and he had previously been convicted of the
same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses for each of
which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which
offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the
defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation
of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
Connecticut also has a provision, not present in most states, that the death penalty shall
not be imposed if one of five statutory mitigating circumstances is present. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-46a(f) (Supp. 1983).
181. There are seven such mixed states. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40, 13A-5-49 (Supp.
1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1303, 41-1501 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a46a, 53a-54b (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4003, 19-2515 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 407-10, 413 (1983 & Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 99-19-101 (Supp. 1982);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§

630:1, 630:5 (1974 & Supp. 1981). My total list of states with death

penalties comes to thirty-seven, because I do not include New York, which has a very limited statute, though one person has been sentenced to death. See Death Row, USA, supra
note 4 at 13.
182. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (1974 & Supp. 1981) provides:
1. A person is guilty of capital murder if he knowingly causes the death of:
(a) A law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty;
(b) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit kidnapping

. .

.;

(c) Another by criminally soliciting a person to cause said death or after having
been criminally solicited by another for his personal pecuniary gain.
183. This approach is utilized in Washington, a definitional state. See supra notes
174-75 and accompanying text.
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shire, instead, sets forth a series of seven additional statutory aggravating circumstances at a sentencing hearing,184 one of which
must be found before the death penalty may be imposed. 18 5
The foregoing description of death penalty systems indicates
that the states have different approaches for applying statutory aggravating circumstances to those who have committed capital
crimes as defined by Enmund. But these differences are not significant. The issue is not at what point such statutory aggravating circumstances are considered, but rather, what kinds of factors do the
states consider aggravating, and whether they individually, and as
a whole, select validly those who may be considered for death.
B.

Substantive Limits on Statutory Aggravating Circumstances

While Justice Stevens suggested in Zant v. Stephens that it is a
constitutional requirement that there be found in every death penalty case a statutory aggravating circumstance that "reasonably
justif[ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder," it is difficult to
believe that the Court will accept the implication of his position.
Justice Stevens' formulation means that the Court has an idea
when it is more appropriate that one defendant receive the death
penalty than another defendant. The Court is promising that
someone will decide when a state's judgment on these matters is
184. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(a) (1974 & Supp. 1981) prescribes aggravating circumstances as follows:
(1) The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(3) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(4) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The murder was exceptionally heinous, atrocious or cruel.
185. Id. § 630:5 IV (Supp. 1981). One criticism to which mixed systems are subject is
that they are redundant. Generally, anyone who is included in the first set is also included
somewhere in the second set, because of the great, though not complete, overlap between
them. In Alabama, for example, the statute provides expressly that some factors may apply
to both stages. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-50 (Supp. 1982). Such a format suggests that only the
first stage is anticipated as a limiting step. The second sentencing stage could be viewed
either as providing actual grounds for imposing the death penalty in a system limited to
statutory aggravating circumstances or, in a system that permits reliance on nonstatutory
aggravation, as providing the sentencer with a list of aggravating circumstances deemed particularly relevant by the legislature.
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"reasonable". I doubt the Court has any such idea and I am confident that the Court will not undertake such judgments. I intend
here to examine the statutory aggravating circumstances that the
states have chosen from the perspective of substantive evaluation.
My attempt will be brief, but I think it raises serious issues concerning the justification of the death penalty that the Supreme
Court would be hard pressed to address.
1. The Theoretical Framework for Justificationof Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
What would reasonably justify the selection of some kinds of
murder and murderers for death penalty eligibility rather than
others? Penal theory generally holds that four goals justify criminal sanctions: rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution."' In a secular state, rehabilitation obviously is not served
by execution,"s' but the three other goals remain potential justifi186. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 35-62 (1968).
Briefly put, and as outlined by Packer, rehabilitation aims at changing the personality of the
offender so that, without regard to threat of future punishment, he will choose in the future
not to break the law. Incapacitation is physical restraint of the offender so that he loses the
capacity, or loses much of the capacity, to commit crimes during the period of restraint.
Deterrence is the inhibiting effect that punishment of one offender is thought to have on
potential offenders by reminding all such persons of the consequences of committing a
crime; when this inhibiting effect is focused on the offender himself, the fear of future punishment is referred to as special deterrence. Finally, retribution advances the view that punishment for evil actions is good because the defender deserves to be punished. There are
said to be two versions of retribution, revenge theory and expiration, but actually there are
more than two. It should be noted that the idea expressed by Justice Stewart in Gregg that
capital punishment is needed to prevent vigilante justice and lynching, 428 U.S. at 183, is
not a retributive justification of punishment, but a utilitarian position related to deterrence-deterrence of other crimes rather than those of which the offender was guilty. Of
course, as a utilitarian position, the argument is ludicrous.
This short description of penal goals obviously does not do justice to the rich legal literature on this topic, or even to the categories of justification of punishment that have been
proposed. Two such goals are denunciation and symbolic value, see Jones and Potter, supra
note 159, at 158; Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other Than Deterrence,
14 CRIM. L. BULL. 19 (1978); Packer, supra at 41-45; see also Tyler & Weber, Support For
the Death Penalty:Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude, 17 LAw & SocIETry REv. 21 (1982). The wide range of value reinforcement accomplished by criminal law is
important, but is not critical to the crude arguments about justification I will advance here.
I will limit my discussion, as did the Supreme Court plurality in Gregg to incapacitation,
deterrence and retribution and hope not to do too much damage to the rich texture of the
subject. Other valid claims can be discussed within this basic framework.
187. By curious reasoning, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state constitution
provision requiring the Indiana criminal law to be founded on reformation rather than vindictive justice does not outlaw capital punishment. Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 766
(1982) (Art. I § 18 of Indiana Constitution does not prohibit the death penalty.). Of course
putting someone on death row may reform him, but since he is to be executed in any event,
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cations for particular statutory aggravating circumstances. Even
before considering the relationship of aggravating circumstances to
these goals, however, there are some serious problems with the task
itself.
In the death penalty context, incapacitation is the most suspect
of the three penal goals. The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia that
found the death penalty to be constitutional per se, acknowledged
that to be constitutional the death penalty must satisfy penal goals
not attainable through mere life imprisonment. 188 The two goals
discussed were retribution and deterrence. 189 Incapacitation was
dismissed in a peculiar footnote that neither accepted such a justification nor denounced it.'9 0 Not until Barefoot v. Estelle'9' did a
majority of the Court uphold the need to incapacitate dangerous
92
people as a justification for the death penalty.
Incapacitation does not justify killing someone whom the state
already controls. If a convicted murderer adjudged to be particularly dangerous is able to hurt someone in prison, let alone kill
someone, " the state that has him in custody is guilty of serious
neglect. Prisoners sentenced to death are now kept under conditions of extreme security on death row, often for many years. Obviously, we could keep murderers who are particularly dangerous
that is apparently not the purpose of putting him there.
188. 428 U.S. at 182-87 (eighth amendment proscribes penal sanctions "so totally
without penological justification (that it] results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.").
189. Id. at 183-87.
190. Id. at 183 n.28. "Another purpose that has been discussed is the incapacitation of
dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future." Id. (citations omitted).
191. 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983). Barefoot was decided the same day as Barclay v. Florida
and California v. Ramos.
192. In Barefoot, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, set forth guidelines concerning procedures to be followed in federal courts for stays of execution pending
consideration of a capital defendant's federal habeus corpus petition, id. at 3391-95, and
held, inter alia, that the admission of psychiatric testimony on the issue of a defendant's
future dangerousness is not unconstitutional. Id. at 3396-99. In the course of this discussion,
Justice White approved consideration of "the likelihood of a defendant committing further
crimes" as a "constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty ....
Id.
at 3396. The plurality in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), had so suggested previously,
id. at 274-76, and in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472-73 (1981), a majority of the Court
seemed to have assumed that such a circumstance was per se valid. The same day that
Barefoot was decided, Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court in California v. Ramos, also
approved future dangerousness as an aggravating circumstance. See 103 S. Ct. at 3453-54.
193. The idea that one could be executed in order to prevent conduct less harmful
than murder is a peculiar one in light of Coker. If one cannot be sentenced to die because of
a past harm less than killing, how can someone be executed justifiably for future threatened
conduct less than murder? The question for incapacitation should be, will the defendant kill
again?
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under those secure conditions without ever executing them.1 94 The
negligence of the state is all the more obvious if the problem of
incapacitating fully is that the state itself may one day release a
dangerous killer through pardon or parole. 195 Incapacitation justifies life imprisonment, but not the death penalty. 196
General deterrence 197 was approved by the Gregg plurality as a
justification for the death penalty in a less than ringing endorsement.19 8 But the general efficacy of deterrence is not the issue in
terms of justifying statutory aggravating circumstances. If the
death penalty worked as a deterrent to murder generally, then the
death penalty presumably would be available in every murder, or
at least in every Enmund-eligible murder, and no statutory aggravating circumstance would be necessary. 9 9 But the plurality in
194. It is possible that eighth amendment issues would be raised by such perpetual
isolation. See Note, Coker v. Georgia, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 253, 266 & n.83 (constitutional issue
raised by segregation of violent offenders over extended period of time). But if the alternative is death, such objections have a hollow ring. See infra note 205.
195. Most states, apparently as a matter of state law, do not permit references by
prosecutors to the possibility of pardon or parole. See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at
3459-60 & n.30, and 3465-66 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. Justice O'Connor missed this distinction in footnote 18 in Ramos, id. at 3454.
Justice O'Connor referred to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18-2.5(c)(i) (2d ed. 1980)
as support for her argument that capital punishment might be justified by the goal of incapacitation. But the ABA standard suggests that future dangerousness is a "legitimate reason" for total confinement. It is just the point, however, that total confinement is the fullest
extent that a sanction is justified by such danger. Total confinement eliminates future risk,
or at least in an ideal world, ought to eliminate it. It would be unfair in the extreme, if
future dangerousness were justified as a ground for someone's execution, because otherwise,
the state would be forced to spend the money necessary for secure confinement.
I should add that this discussion assumes that society can identify well those persons who
would kill again if given the opportunity. I know of no evidence that social science has
attained any such reliable capacity. See Ledewitz, Foreseeingis Believing: Community Imposition of Liability For The Acts of "Dangerous" Former Mental Patients, 45 LAW AND
CONT. PROB. no. 3, 67, 69 (1982). Nor is there reason to believe that incapacitation of murderers as a group will lead to much reduction in murder. See Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1177, 1189-90 (1981).
197. Specific deterrence, the decision of a person to avoid future crime because of past
criminal sanctions, is not relevant in the death penalty context. See supra note 186.
198. 428 U.S. at 185. ("Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty
may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view.") (Footnote omitted).
The death penalty was also justified on the ground that it would deter private acts of violence against offenders. See id. at 183.
199. The plurality in Gregg was concerned about the constitutionality of the death
penalty as a general proposition, that is, its per se validity. The challenge posed by Justice
Stevens' requirement in Stephens, that a particular statutory aggravating circumstance reasonably justify the death penalty for a particular case, or a particular class of cases, raises
the issue of the special deterribility of a particular kind of murder, or the particular appro-
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Gregg did not accept deterrence theory as a general proposition.
What Justice Stewart was suggesting in Gregg is that the death
penalty works as a deterrent better than life imprisonment in two
cases: "cold calculus murder" such as the killing of a witness, and
those-with-nothing-more-to-lose murder, such as murder by a life
prisoner. 00
The problem with the assumption that the death penalty deters
particularly calculated killings, which the Gregg plurality said was
"undoubtedly" the case, is that there is no evidence to support the
assumption. 0 Nor is the matter one of common sense. The death
penalty is not usually going to be imposed in any kind of murder.
priateness of retribution for a particular kind of murder. If there were no special qualities of
a murder to be identified by statutory aggravating circumstances, which there well may not
be, there would be no need for statutory aggravating circumstances.
The general debate over deterrence and the death penalty continues, of course. Justice
Stewart in Gregg identified some of the important literature as of 1976. 428 U.S. at 184-85 &
n.31. A more recent survey is contained in Lempert, supra note 196.
The empirical research seems to me to demonstrate clearly that the death penalty does
not deter, nor does it reduce murder through any preventive mechanism other than deterrence. It is odd to see, however, that proponents and opponents view the empirical research
so differently. Compare, e.g., Bedau, The Death Penalty: Social Policy and Social Justice,
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 767, 793 ("As for general deterrence, although some recent research purports to demonstrate that the death penalty has a deterrent effect, and that is superior in
this regard to imprisonment, (sic) the latter inference has been severely challenged and at
present cannot be said to have been vindicated."), with van den Haag, A Response to
Bedau, 1977 AIz. ST. L.J. 797, 798-99 ("There is little doubt that the evidence for the
added deterrent effect of the death penalty is strong now, certainly stronger than the contrary evidence, though it is not conclusive."). In part this dispute over the empirical research stems form disagreement over which side has the burden of proof. See Jones & Potter, supra note 159 at 158-59. Another related reason for dispute is that proponents of the
death penalty regard the general deterrent effect of the death penalty as intuitively obvious.
See van den Haag, supra; Goldberg, supra note 66; Brudner, Retributionismand the Death
Penalty, 30 UNIv. OF TOR. L.J. 337, 338-39 (1980), whereas opponents of the death penalty
consider the suggestion of added deterrent value to be implausible. See Jones & Potter,
supra note 159, at 160-61; Morris, supra note 5, at 306-07.
200. Id. at 185-86. According to Justice Stewart:
We may... assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act on passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many
others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully
contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death
may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. And there are
some categories of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner, where other sanctions
may not be adequate.
Id. (citations omitted).
201. See Jones & Potter, supra note 159, at 161 n.7. It is not that one cannot argue
that certain kinds of murder are not more deterrable than are other kinds, see Lempert,
supra note 195, at 1194-96, but that the empirical research has not been conducted with this
end in mind. In fact most of existing research does not permit distinction between premeditated murder and non, or less, premeditated murder. Id. at 1193-94.
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The "colder" the calculus, the more likely the potential killer is to
see this.20 2 Besides, the calculating killer also has more to gain, and
so may be less open to such speculative deterrence. 0 3
Deterring murder by one who stands to lose little, such as a life
prisoner, does sound plausible, but it is vulnerable to the observation that some people who are in prison for life would prefer to be
executed. 0 4 Nor is it clear that life prisoners stand to lose little if
convicted of another murder. 0 5
In Harry Roberts v. Louisiana20 6 the Court approved the killing
of a policeman as a statutory aggravating circumstance on the basis that some groups in society are more at risk to murder than are
other groups.10 7 This analysis assumes that the death penalty is an
effective deterrent. But such an observation proves too much, thus
undermining the requirement of a narrowing statutory aggravating
circumstance. If deterrence works generally, then it would be reasonable for the state to make all murder subject to the death penalty and eliminate statutory aggravating circumstances altogether.
202. See Jones & Potter, supra note 159, at 160-61.
203. The basis for this questionable economic view of violent human behavior,
whether planned or not, is beyond the scope of this article.
204. I do not mean by this that some people kill in order to be executed, a matter
which remains open to dispute. See van den Haag, supra note 198, at 802. Rather, I am
questioning the deterrent effect of the death penalty for one who faces a prospect of permanent, or at least extremely lengthy, imprisonment. The tendency of those who are not facing
death imminently to prefer it to life imprisonment was recently attributed to J.D. Autry,
whose last minute stay on October 5, 1983 aroused great public interest. Autry v. Estelle,
103 S. Ct. 180 (1983). An article about Autry in Newsweek, stated that prior to the scheduled execution, Autry preferred death to a commutation to life imprisonment. Death in
Texas, NEwswE.K, Oct. 17, 1983, at 46, 49. After lying on a gurney for over an hour, waiting
for poison to be added to a saline solution, Autry's preference for death reportedly changed.
Id. at 73.
205. Cf. Note, supra note 194, at 266 n.83 (even prisoners with life sentences may be
deterred without the death penalty). If parole is a possibility, the loss of that possibility is
likely. Even if one's sentence is life imprisonment without parole, there is the hope of commutation or a legal change. Besides, the hope of leaving prison, conditions of confinement
clearly justified by security needs for one so violent-and thus not subject to invalidation
under the eighth amendment-would make a prisoner's future very bleak. The loss of exercise time, access to a library and contact with other prisoners may not seem important to a
non-prisoner, but they are drastic consequences to someone for whom a prison cell represents the entire universe. At the very least, in the absence of proof, there is no a priori
reason to believe that such a deterrent is ineffective. This, of course, is another example of
burden shifting. See supra note 199.
206. 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (as distinguished from Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976)).
207. See 431 U.S. at 636-37 & n.3. The validity of such a statutory aggravating circumstance, and this rationale, were not before the Court in this case, which concerned a
mandatory death penalty for such a killing. Nevertheless, the rationale seemed to be accepted without dissent.

1984

Death Penalty

The state's interest in preventing any murder is overwhelming.
Furthermore, if all murder could be deterred it would not be reasonable to limit the protection to some groups, such as the police,
as opposed to the rest of society. Thus, a "favored-group" statutory aggravating circumstance must assume that deterrence theory
is particularly effective in regard to some groups, either because in
Justice Stewart's formulation, murder of these persons is apt to be
calculated, or because murderers in such cases are apt to have little
to lose. Either way, favored group status then depends on Justice
Stewart's analysis of deterrence and is subject to the defects discussed above.
The last category of justification for the death penalty is retribution. 08 Retribution lies at the heart of Justice Stewart's defense of
the death penalty. 0 9 While retribution may be the most persuasive
justification for the death penalty,"' it is a complex basis from
208. Retribution represents a "determination of the degree of punishment and suffering that is appropriate for or proportionate to the moral culpability of the offender and his
offense." Hertz and Weisburg, supra note 86, at 369. See also supra note 186 and infra
notes 210-214.
209. Thus, deterrence is a "complex factual issue" better left to state legislators to
decide. 428 U.S. at 186. On the other hand, in terms of retribution, "capital punishment is
an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function...
is essential ....
" Id. at 183.
210. Part of the general debate about the justification for the death penalty, is a subdebate about the persuasiveness of retribution, and deterrence, as justifications for the
death penalty. Critics of retribution as a justification for the death penalty have a litany of
objections. For example, they would argue that the concept of "deserving" the death penalty
is vague, that retribution does not aid in deciding the sentence for a particular murder, and
that its reliance upon community judgment represents justice through public opinion polls.
See, e.g., Gibbs, The Death Penalty, Retribution and Penal Policy, 69 J. CRIM. L. 291, 29498 (1978); cf. Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White Collar Criminals, 73
J. CRiM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 723 (1982). Professor Lempert argues that retributive principles are essentially irrelevant to a defense of the death penalty. Since it is known that innocent persons will suffer death if the death penalty is used, and that guilty, but nevertheless
non-deserving persons will also suffer death, proponents of the death penalty must be committed to some type of utilitarian calculus under which such occasional injustices are outweighed by the overall justice of a system of capital punishment. See Lempert, supra note
195, at 1181-85.
As to deterrence, it is generally acknowledged that deterrence theory by itself cannot be
decisive on the issue of the proper level of severity of a punishment or its distribution or
else "we might execute parking violators because it would deter others," see van den Haag,
supra note 199 at 800, or punish the children of the guilty. The major criticism of deterrence as a justification for the death penalty is, aside from objections that the death penalty
does not actually deter, see McGabey, Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet: Economic Theory,
Econometrics and the Death Penalty, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 485 (1980), that as a species of
utilitarianism deterrence theory uses the offender unjustly as a sacrifice to the common
good. See Jones & Potter, supra note 159 at 164; see also Pugsley, A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1501, 1509 (1981).
0
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which to evaluate statutory aggravating circumstances.2 11 I have
argued elsewhere that the Court has never developed an understanding of what retribution is, beyond defining it as whatever people regard as reprehensible.1 2 Only once, in regard to the blood at
the scene of a murder, have some of the Justices, including Justice
Stevens, appeared to be willing to evaluate community outrage
over a particular circumstance, and invalidate its object.2 13 There
is no reason to think that the Court will embark upon a soulsearching analysis of who really deserves to die, and why.21 4
211. While retribution is regarded generally as providing support for the death penalty, see, e.g., Tyler & Weber, supra note 186; see also Berns, Defending the Death Penalty,
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 503 (1980); W. BEARNS, FOR CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT (1979); van den Haag,
In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Legal-Political-MoralAnalysis, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 51
(1978), recently, several attempts have been made to formulate a retributive position against
capital punishment. See Pugsley, supra note 210; Jones & Potter, supra note 159; and
Brudner, supra note 198.
212. See Ledewitz, supra note 86 at 148-50. That is, although the Court accepts the
idea of limiting the severity of punishment to the extent of personal culpability, indeed the
Court applied its own version of the ex talionis in Coker v. Georgia, supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text, there has been no attempt in assessing homicide to discuss the idea of
who deserves to die and who does not. Enmund, indeed Gregg itself, 428 U.S. at 187, may
turn out to stand for the proposition that retribution supports the execution of any malicious killer, or at least every deliberate killer. If so, the Court will have expressed its judgment about retribution. On the other hand, the Court will have also eliminated the need for
statutory aggravating circumstances.
213. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 n.16 (1980) (including murder leading to a
gruesome scene without regard to the suffering of the victims would be a "totally irrational"
way to interpret a statutory aggravating circumstance that applies to offenses that are outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhumane.)
214. Retribution does not seem well suited for the task of fine-tuning punishment for
homicides through evaluation of statutory aggravating circumstances. See Gibbs, supra note
210, at 298. Nevertheless, recent writing about retribution reveals that it is a penal theory
capable of sophisticated and compassionate application. See Pugsley, supra note 210 and
Brudner, supra note 199. Nor is it clear that there cannot be reasoning about retributive
claims. Walter Berns has said that the public's moral outrage provides the basis for retributive claims justifying the death penalty. See Berns, supra note 211, at 507-09. The Gregg
plurality also justified capital punishment under retribution as "an expression of society's
moral outrage." 428 U.S. at 183. Such claims render retribution inherently ad hoc, a function of how people vote, rather than an expression of any enduring reality. But Alan
Brudner argues that the principal end of punishment is "to annul wrong and thereby vindicate right." Crime is an assertion of unrestrained freedom; punishment reaffirms natural
law, and thus the criminal's own "real rights." Punishment must signify the "recoiling of the
criminal's own and against itself" rather than a new act of violence. Denunciation of wrongdoing is sought either for the social benefits of such denunciation (Justice Stewart's position
in Gregg, see supra note 198), in which case it is utilitarianism rather than retribution, or
because moral indignation is thought to justify violence. But anger is not generally an acceptable basis for homicide. Its self righteousness does not lend it moral weight. Retributive
punishment rests on the "objective nemesis of crime, not the revulsion of men." See
Brudner supra note 199, at 345-49. Brudner asserts that "people confident that human personalty cannot be destroyed, would have no need for the death penalty," since the greatest
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2. Justification of Particular Statutory Aggravating
Circumstances
Whatever the general underpinnings of statutory aggravating
circumstances, the Zant v. Stephens formulation promises to review particular statutory aggravating circumstances. This task is
formidable because it requires an understanding of what goals particular statutory aggravating circumstances are designed to serve,
or perhaps simply do serve. Not much work has yet been done in
this area.2 1
State statutory aggravating circumstances can be grouped into
five categories that will help illustrate the goals they may serve.
Statutory circumstances generally involve the identity of the victim, planned killings, public danger created by the crime, future
violence from the defendant, and treatment of the victim.
a.

The Identity of the Victim

The difficulty of addressing issues of retribution is evident in assessing aggravating circumstances in this group. Despite the deterrence rationale of Harry Roberts,2 1 6 many such statutory aggravating circumstances identify certain groups not for reasons of
deterrence, but because it is most reprehensible to kill them. Thus,
for example, California lists racial killings; 217 Delaware protects
pregnant women, the disabled and persons over sixty-two; 2 8 Tennessee includes young people under twelve;21 9 Washington identievil to which the death penalty corresponds as punishment cannot occur. Id. at 350.
215. There have been a few attempts to evaluate particular statutory aggravating circumstances by reference to penal goals. Charles Black's evaluation of S. 1382, a proposed
federal bill to impose the death penalty, and its aggravating circumstances, remains the
most incisive:
[W]hat is so special about money? Is a man who kills his wife for her insurance worse
than a man who kills his wife so as to be free himself to remarry? [D]oes anyone
really think it is worse to kill a Justice of the Supreme Court, or an FBI agent, than
to kill a j' dge on a court of appeals? [These provisions] rest on no conceivably defensible moral judgments.
Black, Objections to S. 1382, a Bill to Establish Rational Criteria for the Imposition of
Capital Punishment, 26 CRIME AND DELINQ. 441, 450 (1980). An ambitious effort to evaluate
the system for the imposition of death in South Carolina also evaluated particular statutory
aggravating circumstances. See Hubbard, supra note 25.
216. See supra note 206.
217. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16) (West 1983). "The victim was intentionally
killed because of his race, color, religion, nationality or country of origin."
218. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209(e)(1)(p)(q) and (r) (1979 & Supp. 1983).

219. See

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-2-203(i)(1) (1982).
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fies newsreporters for protection.22 Insofar as these state judgments rest on the sympathy in which particular groups of people
are held, the judgments are not rational, and cannot be reviewed
by the courts. Thus, states may list blind people, housewives, football players, or any other characteristics that might move state
legislators.2 21
Other group identifications do not appear to identify certain
groups because of sympathy or attractiveness, but rather, because
these groups are important to society, or unusually at risk from
murder. These goals bespeak deterrence rather than retribution.
Aggravating circumstances of this type proscribe the killing of wit222
224
nesses, 2
police,
firefighters,"'
criminal justice personnel,22 4
225
elected officials
and so forth. Insofar as importance is concerned,
again there is no standard by which to judge legislative enactments
of this kind. Government officials may be of such importance, but
220. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(10) (Supp. 1983).
221. Judges and juries also have certain sympathies. See Smith v. State, 103 S. Ct.
182, reh'g denied, id. at 481 (1983). ("This was a cold-blooded killing of an elderly man
"); cf.
....Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482 (Okla. Crim. 1983) (death penalty is disproportionate when defendant kills a "close family member" and raises a reasonable doubt about his
sanity); Bolender v. State, 103 S. Ct. 2111, reh'g denied, id. at 3131 (1983) (jury recommendation of life when four drug dealers are victims).
222. The states differ over what kind of witnesses are protected. In Pennsylvania, for
example, only "prosecution" witnesses are protected. See 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
9711(d)(5) (Purdon 1982). On the other hand, in Missouri the killing of a witness in any case
is a statutory aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012(2)(12) (Vernon
Supp. 1983).
223. Many states protect police officers, firefighters and correctional officers. See, e.g.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012(2)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1)
(Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-27A-1(7) (Supp. 1983).
See also Evans v. Commonwealth, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982) (juries generally will impose death
penalty where inmate with violent records kills a prison guard). Other states protect one or
more of these categories. These statutory aggravating circumstances are limited both in that
the victims may have to have been on duty, see, e.g., Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 185, 295 S.E.2d
518 (1982) and Magwood v. State, 426 So. 2d 918 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982); cf. Renton v. State,
274 Ark. 87, 622 S.W.2d 171, 174 (1981) (police are on duty, "in a sense," 24 hours a day), or
it may be required that the victim knew, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (Vernon
1974), or should have known, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(9) (1982), that the victim
was a member of the relevant group. See infra note 247.
224. This statutory aggravating circumstance usually includes judges and prosecutors.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209(e)(1)(d) (1979 & Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(11) and (12) (West Supp. 1983); and GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(5) (Michie 1982);
but is sometimes broader, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(1)(b) (1977 & Supp. 1983)
(court official) and IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(f)(9) (1979) (court officials).
225. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(11) (Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-319(2)(f) (Supp. 1983) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3C.(4)(h) (West 1982). Ohio names the
Office of President specifically. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(1) (Page 1982).
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of course so are farmers, teachers, factory workers and everyone
else. The idea that some groups are important enough to attempt
to dissuade potential killers, but that others are not, is a peculiar
one.
Some groups are more at risk than are others to murder. Police,
firefighters, correctional officers, judges, prosecutors, even prisoners 226 all occupy positions that put them into situations in which
dangerous persons, whether criminals or terrorists, have reason to
kill them. Some groups, prisoners, correctional officers and witnesses, for example, are at additional risk because persons with
reason to kill them may already be facing severe sanctions. This
risk rationale represents a deterrence approach.2 2
One problem in all these group identification circumstances is
that they depend upon calculation for their deterrent effect when
calculation may be absent. For example, while some people plan to
kill policemen, others do so in the heat of a chase from the scene of
a crime. Whatever one assumes about Justice Stewart's "cold
calculus" murders and their deterrability, shooting a police officer
from the back of a car during a chase is not of that type. If an
aggravating circumstance must select those most appropriate for
the death penalty, the absence of particular deterrability is
228
crucial.
226. Several statutory aggravating circumstances involving killing while in prison, prescribe that the victim must be a correctional official. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.025(2)(a)5 (Baldwin Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905(4)(i) (West Supp.
1983). Other such factors, such as murder by a life prisoner, see, e.g., IDAHO, CODE § 184003(c) (1979) (murder committed by a person under a sentence for murder.. .), and IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(9) (Burns Supp. 1983), serve to protect anyone at the prison. The
dispute over whether imprisonment includes killings while on probation, parole, or under a
suspended sentence can be viewed as clarifying whether the purpose of imprisonment statutory aggravating circumstances is to protect certain types of persons or, instead, to identify
dangerous repeat offenders. Compare Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1982) (being on
probation is not equivalent to being under a sentence of imprisonment) with Evans v. State,
422 So. 2d 737 (Miss. 1982) (a person convicted and placed on probation is under a sentence
of imprisonment; the evil addressed by the provision is recidivism).
227. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text. While some of these statutory
aggravating circumstances do also represent retributive judgments, it should not be assumed
that society deems it "worse" to kill judges than ministers for example; rather, no doubt,
judges are in greater danger.
228. See supra note 199. A "chase" shooting would qualify as intentional murder in
many states, see supra note 33, and such a killing probably is Enmund-eligible because
arguably deterrence would be served to some extent, since those planning to kill police will.
find out that such a killing usually leads to a death penalty. Cf. supra note 66. Nevertheless,
if the test for a statutory aggravating circumstance goes beyond plausible explanations and
possible effects, spontaneous killings do not select out defendants particularly deserving of
death unless the state is permitted simply to give special protection to any group it wishes.
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Another problem is that some of the murderers in these group
cases are perhaps undeterrable. The terrorist bent on assassinating
a national figure may be willing to die, if not in fact drawn by the
idea. The professional hitman might only raise his price, thus contributing to his prosperity and reducing the murder rate only insofar as he is priced beyond the reach of many people.2 9
Many otherwise inexplicable statutory aggravating circumstances seem to represent poorly phrased attempts to reach certain
groups. Felony murder is probably an attempt to protect police,
witnesses and innocent bystanders. 230 Avoiding arrest and effecting
In addition to the possible absence of calculation, Professor Lempert suggests that police
killings are perhaps undeterrable because the incentive to avoid arrest, and thus punishment is so strong that all other incentives are ineffective. See Lempert, supra note 196, at
1195.
229. I made this observation before discovering that Professor Lempert had come to
the same conclusion. See Lempert, supra note 196, at 1195. The major reason for contract
killers' resistance to deterrence is probably that as skilled professionals, they are rarely
caught. Id. The important factors in any theory of deterrence are speed and certainty of
punishment, as well as severity. See Glaser, Capital Punishment-Deterrentor Stimulus to
Murder? Our Unexamined Deaths and Penalties, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 317, 323-24 (1979).
I do not mean by pointing out such problems, see supra note 228, that such statutory
aggravating circumstances necessarily are invalid under Stephens. But if the Court is serious about evaluating statutory aggravating circumstances and the goals they accomplish,
these issues should be addressed.
230. The most popular state single statutory aggravating circumstance is a killing during the perpetration of certain other crimes. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(4)
(amended 1983 NEv. STAT. ch. 110) (statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder
was committed "while the person was enraged, alone or with others, in the commission of or
an attempt to commit a flight after committing. . . any robbery, sexual assault, arson in the
first degree, burglary or kidnapping in the first degree ....
") (The statutory aggravating
circumstance then goes on to require involvement in the murder supposed to be sufficient
under Enmund.) The predicate crimes can be broader than in Nevada, see 42 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(6) (Purdon 1982) (felony) or narrower, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18303(7) (1983) (aggravated kidnapping resulting in death of victim).
Despite its popularity, this statutory aggravating circumstance is also the least defensible.
Simply put, the killer who enters a store and kills an employee is eligible for the death
penalty if he intended to rob, but not if he did not intend to rob. Even if it be assumed that
such killings under Enmund must be in some sense intentional, see supra notes 35-48 and
accompanying text, the robbery distinction lacks moral significance and relevance to deterrence theory. Compounding the incoherence, the Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted
the Georgia felony-murder statutory aggravating circumstance to apply whether the intent
to commit the felony, in this case theft, arose before or after the killing. Romine v. State,
251 Ga. 208, 305 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1983). I leave it to the reader to imagine what behavior such
an interpretation is intended to deter and/or punish.
The courts seem to have conflicting theories as to what is the purpose of felony-murder
statutory aggravating circumstances. The Georgia Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that murder during a burglary is not any more depraved than any other type of murder. See
Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982). Accordingly, the rationale of felonymurder aggravation could be that killing during a felony simply is more reprehensible than
other types of killing. But see Menendez v. State, 419 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1982) (absent other
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escape circumstances operate similarly."' Hindering operation of
the government 2 2 is not as obvious but probably represents protection of elected officials.2 33 Of course insofar as these statutory
aggravating circumstances express no clear policy, they are hard to
consider reasonable justifications for the selection of particular defendants to be eligible for death.
b.

Planned Killings

This classification comes close to Justice Stewart's description of
"cold calculus" killings that might be deterrable 3 4 Many such killaggravating circumstances, and in the presence of mitigation, killing during a robbery does
not justify the death penalty); see also State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981).
Insofar as the underlying felony is rape or kidnapping, it might be supposed that vicious
treatment of the victim is the rationale. If so, the felony murder statutory aggravating circumstances reach too many cases without such treatment and merely duplicate more refined
circumstances that describe such conduct. See infra notes 273-85 and accompanying text.
Some state courts find that murder during a robbery qualifies under a killing-pecuniary-gain
statutory aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784
(1982); see also Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976) (murder during a robbery
qualifies as one for pecuniary gain, but may not be counted as felony murder as well). The
Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this theory and decided instead that a murder perpetrated on the witness of a robbery represents a killing to conceal, a different statutory aggravating circumstance. See State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 537-38, 250 N.W.2d 867, 873-74
(1977). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals followed Rust and found that a planned
killing of a store clerk during a robbery was not a killing "for remuneration," but found that
the killing was "heinous, atrocious or cruel." Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322, 328-29 (Okia.
Crim. App. 1983). The above cases display a certain elasticity about the concept of felony
murder as an aggravating circumstance. Perhaps it simply partakes of whatever justification
is behind several other kinds of statutory aggravating circumstances.
231. Some state courts interpret avoiding-arrest circumstances so as primarily to protect law enforcement personnel. See Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978) (if victim is
not a police officer, evidence of intent to avoid arrest must be "very strong"); accord, State
v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). In Johnson v. State, 399 So. 2d 873 (Ala.
1979), an avoiding-arrest circumstance was interpreted to apply only to an actual arrest,
thus clearly serving as some additional protection to police while on duty. Some states interpret these factors to encompass the killing of a witness to avoid detection. See, e.g., Parks v.
State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
232. Only a few states have such a statutory aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., Mims.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(g) (Supp. 1982) and NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(h) (1979).
233. Florida interprets disruption of government or law enforcement to include elimination of a witness to a robbery. See Jones v. State, 411 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 189 (1983). The same factor was applied against Barclay in Barclay v. State, 343
So. 2d 1266, 1271 n.5 (Fla. 1977), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) because an attempt to promote a race war threatens "the foundation of American society." Several states protect
elected officials directly by providing that killing an elected official is a statutory aggravating
circumstance. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 39-2-203(i)(11) (1982).
234. The assumptions behind such a theory of deterrence are complex. Proponents of
deterrence theory in the death penalty area often point out that in assessing the effectiveness of deterrence, one should examine not those who murder, but those who refrain from
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ings are motivated by the quest for some type of gain.2 5 Some of
the obvious examples of this type of aggravating circumstance are
killing a witness,2 86 killing for pecuniary gain 37 and hiring or ormurder. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 211, Goldberg, supra note 66. Thus, if only
irrational people commit brutal and terrible crimes, we should not abolish the death penalty, but retain it because is has proved effective in deterring all those sufficiently rational to
be deterred by threat of sanction. From this perspective, Justice Stewart's idea of cases of
special deterrability is inaccurate, or at least should not be used to limit the reach of the
death penalty. Instead, the death penalty regularly should be given in many different kinds
of cases, in order to convince the potential killer that he will receive it. This perspective,
however, undermines the idea of statutory aggravating circumstances identifying the most
appropriate cases for death. The justification for limiting the death penalty to cases of special deterrability is that those considering the death penalty will recognize that they are
much more like those who plan to kill and thus are themselves subject to the death penalty,
than they are like those who kill instantaneously.
235. Distinguishing between killing for gain, and killing out of some other motive is a
basic part of many state systems of statutory aggravating circumstances. The problem with
identifying the motive for the killing as a statutory aggravating circumstance, as opposed,
for example, to how the murder was carried out, or the treatment of the victim, is that no
motive for intentional killing that gets as far as a death penalty sentencing hearing is likely
to be admirable, and killing for no reason at all is just as bad if not worse. It is not clear,
therefore, that motive makes a difference to retributive or deterrence goals, though a particular motive might render one less dangerous in the future.
236. See supra note 222.
237. Most death penalty states have such statutory aggravating circumstances, which
may, as in Arizona and Florida, proscribe a pecuniary gain, which could include a killing to
facilitate a robbery, as well as the killing of an insured by the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703F.4 (Supp. 1983) and FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(5)(f) (West Supp. 1982). See also supra note 230. See State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528,
537-38, 250 N.W.2d 867, 873-74 (1977) (illustrating the reach of murder "for pecuniary
gain"); see also O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980) (killing for remuneration includes poisoning son for life insurance proceeds). There is no doubt that these monetary motivation statutory aggravating
circumstances also reach the contract killer. The provision at issue in Rust, supra, made this
clear by proscribing in three separate phrases "murder committed for hire . . . for pecuniary gain, or the defendant hired another. . .. " See State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 516, 250
N.W.2d 849, 861 (1977) (citing Section 29-2523 R.R.S. 1943 (1)(c)). But an aggravating circumstance that reached killings for pecuniary gain would itself seem sufficient to reach such
a case. (Other statutory provisions typically reach the procurer; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.020(5) (Supp. 1983), and IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(5) (Burns Supp. 1983).
Other states, like Pennsylvania, limit their monetary motivation statutory aggravating circumstances to contract killings alone. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(2) (Purdon
1982) which states: "The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to
pay or be paid by another person or has conspired to pay or be paid by another person for
the killing of the victim." Some states provide, in addition to such monetary motivation
statutory aggravating circumstances, that directing another to commit murder, or committing murder as an agent, are also statutory aggravating circumstances; see Castell v. State,
250 Ga. 776, 793-94, 301 S.E.2d 234, 249-50 (1983), thus reaching an ongoing criminal enterprise in which a particular murder may not be performed for specific remuneration. Cf.
McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804, 807-08 (Fla. 1982) ("cold calculated and premeditated").
Although the states are careful to reach contract killing and organized crime in their death
penalty statutes, there is no evidence that they are successful in prosecuting such offenders
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dering another to kill.
Other types of statutory aggravating circumstances also seem to
be based upon the concept of planning. Ohio, for example, lists
"prior calculation and design" as a requirement of one type of capital murder.238 There are also methods of killing that require a certain amount of forethought. Bombing,28s poisoning,240 killing by lying in wait,241 and executing a hostage, 42 require some degree of
planning. 248 Judicial interpretations of these factors weaken this
justification since the courts do not always require prior planning,2 44 but such an interpretation now presumably risks invalida-

tion under Stephens. 45
The existence of a category of planned killings illustrates the
weakness of statutory aggravating circumstances such as the killing
of police and killing during the perpetration of a felony. Some of
the police circusmtances do not require a showing that the defendant knew the victim was a police officer. 2 Nor do the felony
and obtaining death penalties.
238. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Page 1982). Ohio also provides that pur-

poseful killing while in, or immediately after, the commission of certain felonies is a capital
offense. See id. at § 2903.01(b). Both types of aggravated murder require an additional statutory aggravating circumstance. See id. at § 2929.04. Florida provides, as a statutory aggravating circumstance, that the killing was committed "in a cold, calculated and premeditated
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(5)(i) (West Supp. 1983); Cannady v. State, 427 So. 2d 723, 731 (Fla. 1983). See also
Middleton v. State, 426 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1982).
239. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(f) (1978 & Supp. 1982).
240. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(1) (1979 & Supp. 1982).
241. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(4) (1983), and CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(15) (West Supp. 1983).
242. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(3) (Purdon 1982).
243. In Richards v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1983), the California Court of
Appeals ascribed, in addition to the planning element and hence perhaps deterrence, a
clearly retributive theory to the lying-in-wait circumstance, describing it as a "particularly
cowardly form of murder."
244. When killing for pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances are applied to killings
perpetrated during a robbery, planning invariably is not required. In Armstrong v. State,
399 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1981), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty for Enmund's co-defendant, see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text, for killings the Court
itself said were "spontaneous". Id. at 963. See also Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576 (Miss.
1983) (pecuniary gain circumstance applied to robbery; no evidence of planning).
245. While Enmund requires only malice or an intent to kill, see supra notes 34-75
and accompanying text, which are present or at least inferrable in these convenience store
killings, Stephens requires that the murders selected for death be justifiably chosen. These
robbery-killings are not so justified on retributive, deterrence or incapacitative grounds.
246. Some killing-a-police-officer circumstances require that the killer knew or should
have known that the victim was a member of a protected group. See supra note 223. Other
states provide merely that the murder shall have been committed against a police officer (or
other protected group member), usually while on duty, but without specifying that the de-
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murder circumstances require prior planning to kill the victim or
witness, or even clear evidence for any motive of why the killing
was committed., 7 Under Enmund, deterrence of felonies is not a
permissible goal of the death penalty.24 8 Without such justification,
spur of the moment killings during felonies, or killings during high
speed chases, are not reasonably justified by their special deterrability since the killings themselves are unplanned.
c.

Public Danger from the Act

Many statutory aggravating circumstances concern a particular
threat to the public at large from the act of murder. Most states
with death penalties identify a risk of death to at least one other
person as a statutory aggravating circumstance. 249 The risk of
fendant knew or should have known this. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(7)
(1979 & Supp. 1983). Cf. State v. Barker, 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983) (because evidence would sustain finding that defendant knew victim
was a police officer, court does not decide whether such knowledge is required under the
statutory aggravating circumstance); U.S. v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (crime of assaulting
a federal officer requires proof only of intent to assault, not knowledge that victim is federal
officer).

247. Felony-murder statutory aggravating circumstances typically provide that the
killing take place while the defendant was in the commission of, or flight after, certain dangerous felonies, or attempt to commit certain dangerous felonies. See, e.g. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982). In a typical felony-murder case, there is a robbery and a murder, but it is sometimes difficult or impossible
to say exactly why the killing took place, or even, in relation to the predicate crime, when
the murder took place. See, e.g., Bullock v. State, 391 So. 2d 601 (Miss. 1980); Wheat v.
State, 420 So. 2d 229 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1507 (1983). Of course, often it
may be supposed from the facts, or there may be even direct evidence, that the victim was
killed either to accomplish the crime more easily or to prevent subsequent identification.

See Edwards v. State, 413 So. 2d 1007, 1013 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 239 (1983)
(killing to prevent identification). In any event it is safe to say that planning to kill the
victim is never required to satisfy a felony-murder statutory aggravating circumstance, and
only rarely is present. Cf. supra note 243. Nor is there generally a requirement that the
killing be intended to further the accomplishment of the felony, as long as it is committed
while the felony is in progress, or immediately thereafter. (Under Enmund, however, the
killing, unlike classic felony-murder, cannot be accidental, whether the statutory aggravating circumstance so provides or not. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.) Georgia
law goes so far as to permit the finding of a felony-murder statutory aggravating circumstance even if the intent to commit the underlying felony is formed after the killing is committed. See Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 305 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1983); But see Cruz v.State,
629 S.W.2d 852, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (capital murder under robbery felony murder
provision requires that the victim be killed "with the intent to obtain or maintain control"
over victim's property).

248.

102 S.Ct. at 3378 (death penalty is not a justifiable deterrent to the underlying

felonies in felony murder cases).

249. About half the death penalty states provide as a statutory aggravating circumstance that the defendant caused a risk of death to some number of other persons. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46(g)(3) (Supp. 1983) ("knowingly created a grave risk of death to
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harm to others may be part of the rationale behind statutory aggravating circumstances concerning bombings,"' escape, avoiding
arrest, 51 mass murder,2 52 murder during a hijacking,25 3 and felony
murder. 2 " The states may wish particularly to shield innocent bystanders from the side effects of homicides and other criminal
2 55
activity.
A variety of justifications may be suggested as the basis for danger-to-the-public aggravating circumstances. A deterrence rationale
another person in addition to the victim of the offense") and IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(f)(3)
(1979) ("the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.")
Several states, either instead of, or in conjunction with this type of aggravating circumstance provide as a statutory aggravating circumstance that the defendant endangered some
number of other persons by use in a "public place" of a weapon or device "normally . . .
hazardous" to many persons. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)3 (Baldwin Supp.
1982) ("The offender. . . knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
in a public place by means of a destructive device. . . normally. . . hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.")
250. California, for example, has two such statutory aggravating circumstances that
define capital murder: murder committed by a hidden explosive and murder committed by a
mail bomb. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2(a)(4), (a)(6) (West Supp. 1983). Delaware, as do
other states, proscribes, more simply, causing death by the "detonation of any bomb and use
of an explosive device." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(5), 4209(e)(1)(1) (1979 & Supp.
1983).
251. Most death penalty states have some type of statutory aggravating circumstance
relating to escape or arrest. Some state statutory aggravating circumstances apply to killings
committed either to avoid arrest or effect escape. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, §
413(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1983). Other related aggravating circumstances proscribe killing
during an escape; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5C (1981); (killing after having escaped; and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(2) (1977); and killing to avoid arrest. See also supra
note 231.
252. About half the death penalty states have some kind of statutory aggravating circumstance that applies to killing more than one person during a single criminal episode.
See, e.g., CONN. GN. STAT. § 53a-54b(8) (Supp. 1983). Tennessee requires three or more
victims within 48 hours. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(12) (1982).
253. Only a few states proscribe killing during the hijacking of an aircraft, which is a
kind of specialized felony-murder. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(12) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)4 (Smith-Hurd 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 54(a)(6) (West
Supp. 1983); and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(4) (Purdon 1982).
254. See generally supra note 229.
255. I presume that the core application of statutory aggravating circumstances proscribing risk of death to others is a risk of death to persons other than the victims of the
homicidal conduct. That is, these circumstances concern victims caught in the cross-fire. An
example of such an interpretation is State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 664 P.2d 637 (1983)
in which the Arizona circumstance was applied to a shooting in a crowded bar. On the other
hand, in Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251 (Okla Crim. App. 1982) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 799
(1983), the court sustained application of the Oklahoma circumstance because the defendant shot and wounded two persons in addition to the victim of the homicide. In effect this
interpretation turns the circumstance into an "attempted murder" statutory aggravating
circumstance that compliments mass murder. See also Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d
1227, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 1982) (death sentence reversed: application of circumstance to an
attack on a second victim).
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would suggest that murderers be encouraged to isolate their victims so as to protect the rest of the public. On the other hand,
because many people were such a defendant's potential victims, society may be seeking retribution.2 5 6 Finally, the apparent willingness of the defendant to kill others with whom he has no relationship, may mark the defendant as a particularly dangerous person,
whom society must eliminate or isolate.
These justifications are not at all persuasive. From the perspective of deterrence, it is implausible that murderers who are not deterred from killing, can be caused to kill in a particular way. In
terms of incapacitation, such a defendant has not been shown to be
unusually dangerous, among murderers, because although many
were perhaps endangered by the act, with the exception of mass
killings,2 5 7 no one other than the victim was killed. Retribution

does not seem relevant because the moral wrong of endangering
others is trivial compared to the wrong of the killing of the victim
itself. Endangering without harmful consequence does not identify
a murderer as significantly worse than are other murderers. 58
256. The classic such case is O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
(en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980), a case in which the defendant apparently was
willing to poison other children with Halloween candy in order to cover his plot to poison
his own children in order to collect insurance proceeds.
257. "Mass killing" here means usually killing more than one person. See supra note
252. See also State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 29-32, 292 S.E.2d 203, 225-26 (1982) ("course of
conduct" circumstances proscribing "other crimes of violence" against other persons). It is
questionable whether someone who kills two persons differs very much from a person who
kills one. The requirement of statutory aggravating circumstances appears to mean that intentionally killing one person never, by itself, justifies the death penalty, whereas killing two
persons always can justify the death penalty. This is peculiar deterrence, retribution or incapacitation. For example, in State v. Sonnier, 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981), the defendant and
his brother abducted a young couple, drove them to a deserted area, forced the woman to
have sex and utlimately executed them to eliminate witnesses. Insofar as a risk of harm to
more than one person is concerned, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(d) (West Supp.
1983), it is difficult to see how any important aspect of the justification for the death penalty would have been altered if only the woman had been abducted and killed. Clearly this
is even more true when it is not murder of others that is deemed to justify the death penalty, but shooting and wounding them. See supra note 255.
258. Endangering with harmful consequences, a shooting for example that wounds
others, provides a better case for the death penalty than the mere endangering itself that is
proscribed by these statutory aggravating circumstances. See supra notes 249-55 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even with such additional harm, assault does not provide a
defensible ground for the imposition of the death penalty. Assuming that a single intent-tokill murder does not justify the death penalty without a statutory aggravating circumstance,
it is not clear why an assault in addition should justify the death penalty, since the assault
itself can be punished, as could aggravated rape in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 599 n.16.
Even more obviously than in the case of killing two persons during the same episode, see
supra 257, the case for the death penalty does not change when an assault occurs in addition to an intentional killing.
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d. Future Violence by the Defendant
A number of statutory aggravating circumstances represent, in
essence, predictions of future behavior.2 5 Almost every death penalty state utilizes aspects of a defendant's prior record as a statutory aggravating circumstance. Many states define murder by a
prior capitally convicted person as such a circumstance. 8 0 Some
states, either in addition to, or instead of, a record of capital convictions count prior felony convictions as a statutory aggravating
circumstance.2 61 Idaho lists specifically a propensity to commit
murder as an aggravating circumstance, 62 while a few states provide that a continuing threat to society is a statutory aggravating
circumstance. 6
Whatever the underlying merits of executing a defendant to prevent future harm,26 ' these circumstances are wildly overbroad and
259. The relationship between the facts on the record, and the prediction of behavior,
is illustrated clearly by the Virginia statute, VA. CODE § 19.2-264.2(1) (1983), which provides
in part that a death penalty may not be imposed unless the sentencer finds "after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions. . . that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence .... "
There is doubt whether all of the prior record cases concern empirical prediction of future
behavior. Two disputes that have emerged in considering prior records, first, the amount of
detail of prior crimes that is admissible, (see Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo. 1983))
and second, whether the sentencer will be informed of criminal conduct, for which the defendant has been convicted, but which occurred after the murder at issue, (compare Jones v.
State, 381 So. 2d 983 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980) with State v. Goodman, 298
N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979) and State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 912 (1977)), suggest that there may be a retributive rationale to these
circumstances.
260. See, e.g., 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(10) (Purdon 1982) (defendant has
been convicted of another offense "committed before or at the time of the offense at issue"
for which a life sentence was imposable).
261. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(i) (1979 & Supp. 1982) (defendant
"previously convicted of .
a felony involving the use of, or threat of, force or violence
upon another person").
262. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(f)(8) (1979) ("The defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society"). The wording of this
aggravating circumstance is odd. Apart from "prior conduct" how could the murderers "exhibit a propensity"? On the other hand, how could prior conduct establish such a propensity
without regard to the evidence of the most recent murder?
263. See TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1982) (statutory
question put to jury whether "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"). Apart from
Texas, I know of only two states, Oklahoma and Virginia, that have similar statutory aggravating circumstances. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.12(7) (West 1983) and VA. CODE §
19.2-264.2(1) (1983).
264. Professor Dressler argues that utilitarian concerns, such as future harm, and
vague terms concerning the "viciousness" of the offender, are not related to the concept of
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empirically inaccurate. They are overbroad in the sense of the nature of the future harm. Just as one cannot be executed because
one committed a terrible crime such as rape, 6 5 one should not be
executed because one threatens to commit rape in the future. Yet
only Idaho identifies future murder as the tendency to violence
that must be found.2 6
27
Such circumstances are inaccurate in their predictive capacity.
Fourteen states are content to identify only a single prior felony
conviction, 2 " which may have involved no actual violence at all, 6 9
proportionality, which is grounded in retribution. See Dressier, supra note 34, at 43-44. The
maximum punishment should be set by reference to harm mitigated, by the absence of
blameworthiness in a particular case. Id. at 35-37. The Supreme Court has accepted deterring murder as a justification for the death penalty, see supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text, but at least such deterrence, which represents a compelling justification if true,
cannot be obtained without execution. The prevention of future harm on the part of a few,
or even a few hundred inmates is so easily accomplished by life imprisonment rather than
execution that such latter method of prevention seems a poor excuse for the death penalty.
See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 262. Since many states in effect make incapacitation an issue by
considering a violent record without limiting sentencer consideration to future homicide,
these states aim, apparently, to inflict the death penalty to prevent future violence other
than homicide alone. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. Even states that consider a prior capital offense as the statutory aggravating circumstance, may not limit consideration to prior homicides, but any crime for which a life sentence could be imposed. See
supra note 260. In any event, whatever the prior crime considered, the sentencer is generally
not asked to predict the likelihood of future homicide and so may well consider a threat of
future violence sufficient. States that do ask the sentencer expressly to consider "future
danger," also, except for Idaho, do not limit consideration to the threat of future homicide.
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
Although it would not justify the statutory indifference to the nature of the threatened
future harm, it should be noted that when considering future danger, sentencers themselves
might only impose the death penalty if convinced that future killing is threatened by the
defendant, rather than some other type of crime. See Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885
(Fla. 1979) (comments of trial judge); cf. Goode v. Wainwright, 410 So. 2d 506, 508 (Fla.
1982) (comments of trial judge).
267. There is serious question about the ability of a sentencer, or anyone else, to accurately predict future violence when given all relevant data. See supra note 196. Justice
White in Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983), brushed aside a request that psychiatric
predictions of future danger be excluded as unreliable, a view advanced also in Barefoot by
the American Psychiatric Association, by saying that "[w]e are not persuaded that such
testimony is almost entirely unreliable ...." Id. at 3397. This extreme language was justified in part on the ground that total exclusion requires complete unreliability.
Nevertheless, aside from the theoretically weak case for reliance upon prediction, the reliability of basing such predictions upon statutory aggravating circumstances such as a prior
capital conviction or prior violent felony convictions is clearly much more in doubt. Accordingly, even if the Texas model of asking the sentencer to predict based on all the evidence,
see supra note 262, is not too inaccurate, statutory aggravating circumstances involving
merely prior records are no doubt too inaccurate to be relied upon.
268. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.033(2) (1981) (amended 1983 NEV. STAT. ch. 110)
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as sufficient to establish the propensity to future violence. Obviously, such a determination is unfounded. 70 Even a history of serious felony convictions demonstrates only that one is a career criminal, not that one will commit murder in the future. A prior capital
conviction might be thought of as establishing a tendency to kill,
but a prior murder conviction is not necessarily a reliable prediction of future behavior, certainly not a likely future murder.17 1 In
any event, all of the future danger circumstances ignore the protection afforded society by the defendant's imprisonment and thus
they do not justify the death penalty.27 2 The question the sen("previously convicted . . . of a felony. .
269. Even the states that require more than one felony conviction do not specify that
violence actually had to have been used by a defendant, but only that the defendant has to
have been convicted of crimes involving the use or threat of violence. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(9) (Purdon 1982) ("significant history of felony convictions involving
the use or threat of violence to the person"). The courts interpreting these circumstances
appear to use formal definition of the prior crime as a necessary, but not sufficient condition
for its admission as a statutory aggravating circumstance. Thus, burglary does not qualify,
see Mann v. State, 420 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. 1980) (citing cases) and neither does theft, see
State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983). Certain crimes sometimes involve
violence, but do not do so necessarily: for example, rape may involve force or merely invalid
consent. See Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54, 62 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 794 (1983). In such a case, the defendant may have the opportunity to show that the
statutory aggravating circumstance does not apply. See id. Finally there are crimes, such as
robbery, in which, by definition, the threat of violence is always present, whether the particular incident was violent or not. See State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 448, 586 P.2d 1253, 1260
(1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). A problem here, in addition to general problems of
prediction, is that a willingness to use violence is not shown by a crime in which violence
may have been only threatened.
270. It is conceivable that prior record statutory aggravating circumstances might have
justifications other than incapacitation, but clearly their primary purpose is to identify
those persons who cannot be reformed. As a prediction of future violence, they are
indefensible.
The few states that ask whether the defendant will represent a threat of violence in the
future are not, theoretically, subject to this empirical criticism since sentencers in such
states are not pointed toward such unreliable evidence of such a tendency. Nevertheless,
when one considers the evidence upon which death sentences in such states are sometimes
upheld, the theoretical distinction disappears. See Bravo v. State, 627 S.W.2d 152, 158 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982) (1964 murder; 1974 "biting an officer and threatening to kill;" no psychiatric evidence).
271. It is true, of course, that every defendant for whom prior record circumstances
are relevant is a murderer since he has just been convicted of a killing. Thus a record of
violent felonies represents a violent record plus a killing. A prior capital conviction, if it is a
murder, thus represents two killings by this defendant. This defendant has killed before,
and might kill again.
A likelihood of future violence, however, is still a prediction. A prior record, by itself, is
essentially irrelevant as such to that prediction. As long as the states provide as a statutory
aggravating circumstance a factor that does not bear directly on what should be proved, i.e.,
future violence, the circumstances are inherently unreliable.
272. The absurdity of all of the future danger circumstances is brought out by the
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tencer should be asked is, given the imprisonment of the defendant
for life, is he likely to kill again? But given this question, the obvious answer is that because of future imprisonment, no such defendant is at all likely to kill again.
e.

Treatment of the Victim

There is no question about the desire of the public for the death
penalty in cases of torture killing.273 Reflecting this desire, most
death penalty statutes contain a statutory aggravating circumstance concerning treatment of the victim. 2 7 But the treatment of
comments of the trial judges in Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 295 S.E.2d 643,
654-55 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1280 (1983) and Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885
(Fla. 1979). In Quintana the trial judge justified the death penalty on the ground of future
violence because it was probable that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
"if he were to continue to live in the community," which was not an option in Quintanaor,
for that matter, in any death penalty case. In Miller, a case reversed by the Florida Supreme Court because Florida is not a state in which future danger is a statutory aggravating
circumstance, the trial judge stated that the defendant would not pose a threat if kept in
prison, but that a life sentence always carries the potential for release. These cases imply
what clearly is the case, that even if the threat of future criminal acts short of homicide
were a proper justification for the death penalty, the likely length of imprisonment would
reduce substantially the likelihood of future crimes.
273. See Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80, 287 S.E.2d 531, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1140 (1982):
"Torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death ....
"
Rarely is the death penalty not imposed when the victim has suffered severe physical abuse
prior to death. Id. at 88, 287 S.E.2d at 537 (quoting Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 861-62, 268
S.E.2d 339, 345, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1135 (1980)).
274. The various treatment-of-the-victim statutory aggravating circumstances are
closely related. Several states define torture itself as a statutory aggravating circumstance.
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(8) (1981) (amended 1983 NEv. STAT. ch. 110) ("The
murder involved torture. . ."). The use of torture can also be limited to the means of death.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(8) (Purdon 1982) ("The offense was committed by
means of torture").
The most popular such statutory aggravating circumstance, that the act was heinous,
atrocious or cruel, also involves the idea of torture. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2203(i)(5) (1982) ("The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved
torture or depravity of mind"). Generally speaking the same conduct that establishes torture can establish depravity of mind. See Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80, 88-90, 287 S.E.2d 531,
537-38 (1982) (defining "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravating battery to the victim."). As is the case
with torture, heinous, atrocious and cruel language can also be focused upon acts leading to
death. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(4) (West Supp. 1983) ("the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner ..... "). Connecticut's
language also illustrates the minor variations in these formulas that occur commonly.
As Krier illustrates, there is really no difference between heinous, atrocious and cruel
aggravating circumstances and the third major victim-treatment aggravating circumstance,
that the murder was vile, horrible or inhuman. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012(2)(7)
(Vernon 1979) ("The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that
it involved torture or depravity of mind"). Actually all three of these statutory aggravating
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these outrageous killings illustrates the failure of the Supreme
Court to foster rational dialogue concerning which defendants
most deserve to die.
The states have failed to give a coherent account of what type of
treatment of the victim justifies consideration for the death penalty. Some states identify torture of the victim as the relevant aggravating
circumstance, '7 but do not identify clearly what torture
2 76
is,

nor what the relationship must be between the torture and

circumstances are interchangeable. None of these three statutory aggravating circumstances
has any clear meaning beyond a certain core of conduct. Cf. People v. Superior Court (Engert & Gamble), 31 Cal. 3d 797, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76 (1982) (heinous, atrocious
and cruel special circumstance defining capital homicide held unconstitutionally vague). For
example, although listed in the disjunctive, it is unlikely that the author of "vile, horrible or
inhuman" had in mind three different categories of conduct. Cf. Williams v. State, 250 Ga.
553, 563-65, 300 S.E.2d 301, 309-10, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3097 (1983) (conduct justifies
finding aggravated battery, torture and depravity).
Other statutory aggravating circumstances involve treatment of the victim as well. For
example, a killing occurring during or immediately after a rape would qualify under a felony-murder statutory aggravating circumstance, but obviously concerns treatment of the
victim also. Nevertheless, the three circumstances listed above concentrate on such
treatment.
275. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
276. Some judicial interpretations have utilized a narrow concept of "torture," requiring on the part of the defendant a specific intent to cause pain, as opposed to a desire to
cause death, see Ortega v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 244, 185 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982)
and State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 416 P.2d 601 (1966) and, on the part of the victim, the
suffering of extreme pain. See Engert v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 688, 163 Cal. Rptr.
267 (1980). Thus, in State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981), the Louisiana Supreme
Court found that a brutal killing caused by multiple, deep stab wounds did not represent
"torture" because the intent of the defendant had been to kill, rather than to maim or to
inflict pain. Similarly, strangulation murder has been held not to be "torture," People v.
Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 163 P.2d 8 (1945) as well as a savage beating. People v. Anderson, 63
Cal. 2d 351, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43 (1965). The role of psychological pain in torture
is unclear. Generally, the courts speak of the infliction of physical pain in the definition of
torture, but there is also an understandable tendency to expand the definition to include
intentionally inflicted mental suffering in anticipation of death. See Brown v. State, 247 Ga.
298, 275 S.E.2d 52, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981).
There are, however, different judicial interpretations of torture. In interpreting the statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture . . ." the Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted
torture to mean simply "serious physical abuse before death." See Hance v. State, 245 Ga.
856, 861, 268 S.E.2d 339, 345, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1135 (1980). Thus, in Williams v. State,
250 Ga. 553, 300 S.E.2d 301, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3097 (1983), torture was found in a case
in which a man was beaten brutally, and then, still alive, was left in a dwelling that the
defendant set on fire. There was no requirement, nor was it apparent, that the victim actually suffered pain after the first blow, nor that the defendant knew that the victim was still
alive, nor that the defendant's actions were motivated by anything other than an intent to
kill, and then to conceal the crime. See also Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 677-79 & n.5,
601 P.2d 407, 413 & n.5 (1979) (instruction approved that "murder by torture" does not
require proof that the victim actually suffered pain, and the case held a savage beating
death sufficient to satisfy the elements of torture).
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the death of the victim. 2 "7 It is ironic that torture itself does not
expose a defendant to the death penalty unless he kills in addition,
2 78
but that the killing itself may be instantaneous.
Other states do not attempt to define what outrageous conduct
is, but simply define "heinous, atrocious and cruel," or some
equivalent, as the statutory aggravating circumstance. 27 9 The lack
28 1
of clarity in such concepts 8 " led the court in Godfrey v. Georgia
The Georgia Court has also been influenced by the deliberateness of the killing in defining
torture. Thus, in Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 812, 295 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1236 (1983), the methodical execution-style killing of two women, following the rape of one,
was held to constitute torture. In Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 882, 268 S.E.2d 349, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938 (1980), the Georgia Supreme Court found torture in a case in which the
victim was forced to drive his own car to an execution site and begged for his life for five
minutes before being executed. The Court's description of the significant torture aspects of
the case is instructive:
[Wihile the death itself was relatively instantaneous, the victim was not a member of
the appellant's family, nor was the victim threatening or causing any emotional
trauma to the appellant. The murder was a cold-blooded, execution-style killing, perpetrated for no other reason than to eliminate a witness to an armed robbery. The
appellant did not acknowledge his responsibility for his crimes, but fled the state and
had to be captured at gunpoint.
Id. at 883-84, 268 S.E.2d at 350.
277. In defining the related statutory aggravating circumstance, heinous, atrocious and
cruel, the Florida Supreme Court has said that not only the method of death is significant,
but the "entire set of circumstances surrounding the killing." Magill v. State, 428 So.2d 649,
651 (Fla. 1983). On the other hand, the language in some state statutes appears to require a
close connection between the torture and the death of the victim. See, e.g., Pennsylvania's
aggravating circumstances, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(8) (Purdon 1982) ("offense
. . . committed by means of torture"), and Idaho's definition of first degree murder, IDAHO
CODE § 18-4003(a) (1979) ("all murder which is perpetrated by. . . torture. . . ."). See also
State v. Morales, 129 Ariz. 283, 630 P.2d 1015 (1981) (conviction of murder by torture requires that death was caused by the torture).
278. Cf. Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 882, 268 S.E.2d 349 (1980) (torture present although death instantaneous). One can easily imagine a case of torture in which the killing
itself might represent an act of imperfect mercy.
279. See supra note 274.
280. Beyond the core conduct of an intent to cause extreme suffering in addition to
death, see State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 208, 283 S.E.2d 732, 737 (1981); Straight v. State,
397 So. 2d 903 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981), the case law concerning "heinous,
atrocious and cruel" or, "vile, horrible and inhuman" or their equivalents, is utterly incoherent. Thus, while there is general agreement that a single stab would is insufficient, Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1264 (11th Cir. 1982), multiple stab wounds may qualify as a
statutory aggravating circumstance, even though inflicted with apparent intent to kill. See
Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 561-62 (11th Cir. 1983). A single shot to the head is not heinous,
atrocious and cruel, Odum v. State, 651 P.2d 703, 707 (Okla. Crim. 1982), but four shots is,
even though inflicted with intent to kill, if the victim survives long enough to realize what is
happening. See' Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. Crim. 1982) (pregnant woman realizes
child will die as well). Certain methods are considered worse than others. Strangulation may
be considered heinous, atrocious and cruel, see Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172, 174-75 (Fla.
1982) and so may beating someone to death. See Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d
266 (1983). Any planned killing, even though instantaneous and plainly with intent only to
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to strike down one application
of this circumstance as applicable,
2 82
potentially, to any murder.
The Court may be forced, however, to give the same latitude to
state legislatures that was denied to judges and juries in Godfrey.
The basic idea behind torture and related statutory aggravating
circumstances is that such killings are repugnant. 8 3 But repugnance is an emotional response that may attach to wide ranges of
behavior.28 4 Nevada, for example, identifies random killing, without motive, as a statutory aggravating circumstance.2 8 5 This circumstance also concerns the treatment of the victim, who is killed
for no reason at all. If a state legislator finds this action as repugnant as a torture killing, is the Court going to suggest a theoretical
foundation to distinguish the two?
Repugnance is present in all of the decisions by the states concerning particular statutory aggravating circumstances. Since we
all react to crime differently, and since all murder is terrible, it is
not surprising that lists of statutory aggravating circumstances
tend to reflect the sum of the idiosyncratic judgments state legislators make about murders that bother them particularly. Nor is it
surprising that after all important voices have been heard, just
about every murder often is included under some statutory aggrakill rather than to taunt or prolong suffering, may be considered tortuous and depraved. See
Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 812, 295 S.E.2d 63 (1982). For that matter, a spur-of-the-moment
killing, for no reason at all, may also be heinous, atrocious and cruel. See Evans v. State, 422
So.2d 737, 744 (Miss. 1982); Washington v. State, 361 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1978).
281. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). For discussion of Godfrey, see supra notes 142-45 and 154-56
and accompanying text.
282. Id. at 433. The plurality opinion stated that the Georgia Supreme Court had been
defining "vile, horrible, or inhuman" narrowly, with awareness of its potentially expansive
character. However, Justice Stewart referred to two torture killings in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 429-30.
283. The basic component of repugnance in victim treatment cases explains why
courts mention that the perpetrator showed no remorse, State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292
S.E.2d 203 (1982), or seemed to enjoy what he did, see State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 661
P.2d 1105 (Ariz. 1983), or that the victim was in his own home, see Breedlove v. State, 413
So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1982), or that the victim was very old, and was left unconscious, to bleed to
death, see State v. Zaragozo, 135 Ariz. 63, 659 P.2d 22 (1983). Such highly subjective judgment explains as well the startling refusal of courts to consider the shooting of one's spouse
to be a particularly horrible crime. See State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 639 P.2d 1020 (1982);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1979) (killing not unnecessarily depraved since victims were "family members" in the context of an emotional divorce).
284. See Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266, 276 (1983) (prosecutor may
appeal to emotions in summation because imposition of the death penalty is in part an
emotional response.).
285. NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.033(9) (1981) ("The murder was committed upon one or
more persons at random and without apparent motive").
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vating circumstance." 6 Contrary to Justice White's prediction in
Gregg, 8 " this process would seem likely to increase categories of
aggravation over time.
Now an opinion by the Court suggests a need to evaluate this
rampant process. But the Court lacks the analytical tools necessary
even to begin. Who can say that repugnance truly felt concerning a
type of homicide is an inadequate reason for consideration of the
death penalty? 88 And even if such judgments can be discussed in
rational dialogue about deeply held values, what reason is there to
think the Court will engage in such dialogue?
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE GHOST OF McGautha v. California2 89

The requirement of one statutory aggravating circumstance may
be understood as a way of reconciling nonstatutory aggravating circumstances with Furman v. Georgia. Furman invalidated state
death penalty statutes because they were applied in an arbitrary
way. Statutory aggravating circumstances as the sole justifications
for the death penalty were viewed by many states as a way to reduce this arbitrariness. The Court in Barclay and Stephens rejected this approach and approved nonstatutory aggravation. This
means essentially that whatever strikes the sentencer as aggravating will justify the death penalty. Barclay, where the judge's experiences in World War II led him to impose the death penalty, 90
illustrates how this process can lead to divergent treatment of similar cases. To counteract this tendency, the Court has apparently
fastened on to narrowing statutory aggravating circumstances to
limit consideration by this potentially irrational sentencing system
to a small number of truly deserving murderers.
But to make this narrowing to the worst cases meaningful, the
Court will have to be prepared for extensive analysis of statutory
286. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
287. 428 U.S. at 222 ("As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be
imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate as they are in Georgia by reason
of the aggravating circumstance requirement ....
") (White, J., concurring).
288. From this perspective, Justice Stewart's easy conclusion in Godfrey that gruesome scenes are irrelevant in judging the appropriateness of the death penalty, 446 U.S. at
433 n.16, is not so easy to understand. Mutilation of a corpse has been said to represent
depravity, see State v. Newton, 627 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 1982) and how different is such mutilation after death from refusing to require that a victim actually suffer pain in torture
killings?
289. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
290. See 103 S. Ct. at 3423-24 & n.6.
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aggravating circumstances. If the foregoing is at all reflective of
what this would mean, the task is not an easy one, and the state
death penalty systems will face serious constitutional challenges. Is
the Court ready for major surgery?
What is more likely is that the Justices will approve any particular statutory aggravating circumstance as rational and will approve
the combination of such circumstances, though encompassing almost every Enmund-eligible murder, as sufficiently narrow. This is
about the level of review, or non-review, that death penalty statutes receive now.
This standard of review of statutory aggravating circumstances,
both in particular and in combination, is not likely to prove lasting. It will become obvious that under such review, statutory aggravating circumstances serve no function at all. The states, under
such a system, might just as well be permitted to do directly and
openly what such review permits indirectly through an ever increasing number of broader statutory aggravating circumstances:
define a degree of murder consistently with Enmund and then
upon a finding of guilt, provide for a sentencing hearing at which
the sentencer will consider all evidence about the defendant and
his crime and, without any guidance, and as an act of pure discretion, decide upon life or death. Thus, it may be anticipated that in
some future case, the Court will eliminate the requirement of a
statutory aggravating circumstance altogether. Once the Supreme
Court does this, we will have returned to the pre-Furman system
9
approved in McGautha v. California.2
' There have been improvements since McGautha: a separate sentencing hearing, 9 ' unlimited
mitigation,' 93 a narrowed class of murder eligible for death;9 4 but
291. In MeGautha, Justice Harlan upheld unlimited capital sentencing discretion
against a due process challenge. 402 U.S. at 196. Justice Harlan said that specifying relevant
factors in a death penalty case, ahead of time, is "beyond present human ability." Id. at 204.
He was content to accept the resulting "whimsy and caprice." Id. at 207-08. This was the
jist of Professor Kalven's attack on McGautha in the Supreme Court 1970 Term; Forward:
Even When A Nation Is At War, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1971). Insofar as Justice Harlan was
arguing that there was simply no alternative to the arbitrariness and irrationality of the
then-existing death penalty systems, Kalven said the position counted as an argument for
abolishing the death penalty rather than an argument for accepting the system.
292. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
293. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
294. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). These improvements are easily overrated. Other than the limit that a statutory aggravating circumstance places on which defendants are considered for the death penalty, McGautha's actual crime, trial, and sentencing
hearing resemble very closely the death penalty sentencing process approved in Stephens
and Barclay.
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it was disapproval of completely unguided sentencing discretion
that marked the change from McGautha to Furman, and once the
Court eliminates the requirement of a statutory aggravating circumstance, that change will have been reversed.
Stephens, with its insistence upon rational limits on state
choices of who deserves to die, thus may represent Furman's last
chance. Furman represented rejection of the idea that people were
to die on the basis of whim and caprice. Furman marked the beginning of an experiment to tame the death penalty, to make it
more dependable, and more rational. Insofar as the Court redeems
seriously Justice Stevens' promise to examine whether statutory
aggravating circumstances, individually and as a whole, reasonably
justify the imposition of the death penalty, the experiment continues. Insofar as the Court retreats to merely pro-forma review, the
experiment with reason is over. At that point, the Court will have
two choices. If a civilized society does not kill its prisoners without
good reasons, then, recognizing that we cannot construct, apply
and defend good reasons, the Court will declare the abolition of
capital punishment. If, however, the Court is ready to abandon
reason in the name of death, the Court will inter formally
Furman's promise of rationality.

